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A Genealogy of Ecological Rhetoric: Heraclitus, Bacon, Darwin and Huxley
Not all ‘ecological’ situations are equal,                             
especially when they include members of the human species     
among their protagonists  
Isabelle Stengers, Cosmopolitics (32) 
I would suggest that one of the richest legacies of classical rhetorical traditions  
may be the relative ‘poverty’ of its theories – its resistance to setting fixed boundaries 
to the always evolving and incalculable complexity of rhetorical practice.  
Janet Atwill, “Rhetoric and Civic Virtue” (89)  
It’s an issue of dramatizing, conveying how unprecedented are the questions raised by  
what we call global  warming or climatic disorder, and by all of the “inconvenient truths” 
whose common characteristic is, precisely, to “inconvenience” the perspectives  
put in place by this same “we”  who pride ourselves on no longer believing in sorcery. 
Isabelle Stengers, 
“History through the Middle : Between Macro and Mesopolitics” 
Chapter One:  An Ecological Rhetoric Reclaimed 
Humans have attained the magnitude of a geological force in terms of our ability to change Earth’s Environment and 
impact its climate system.  
NASA’s “Statement on how the Global Earth System is Changing”  
That we are living through an ecological ‘crisis’ that is no longer uncertain, and that our social 
and political responses to a changing climate are too slow, often reactionary, or contradictory, should 
confirm that the real dilemma is currently one of (or for) rhetoric.  When we grapple with ‘ecological’ 
issues today, we take on a challenge that now has more to do with mobilizing socio-political and 
economic responses than with building further scientific proof, which has demonstrated without a 
reasonable doubt that global warming, ocean acidification and mass extinctions are occurring at a faster 
rate than it ever in human history, and that humans are now the major cause of any changes, positive or 
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negative, on the planet.  To say, however, that ecological problems are rhetorical problems ready-made 
for the bread and butter work of rhetorician, philosopher, linguists, critical theorists, or sociologist 
working with language can still seem potentially ingratiating, or (more reasonably) rather inadequate in 
the face of unenviable challenges to keep up with rapidly changing science, policies and ‘development’ 
fueled by the advances of capital and technoscience we’ve long struggled to control.   This dissertation is 
a response to a number of such challenges for (environmental) rhetoric in recent decades, and an 
investigation into a longer history of thought that intersects rhetoric and ecology, looking specifically at 
the rhetorical interventions of Heraclitus, Francis Bacon, Charles Darwin and T.H. Huxley as “bridge 
figures” in the history of rhetoric, science and ecological thought.  The result is a historical work 
examining moments where rhetorical and ecological thought are connected in theory and practice and 
appropriate to a rhetorical tradition, and a genealogical work that foregrounds rhetorical theories and 
strategies (as discursive practices, performances and techniques) that are suitable to appropriate in 
rhetorical studies, teaching, and public work.   
Recent decades have proven that the rhetorical theories and practices in fields like 
(environmental) rhetoric, (environmental) science studies, or (eco) linguistics have made prominent 
contributions to better argumentation, improved inter-disciplinary research, more persuasive policies 
and successful advocacy in networks of science, politics, policy and activism.    At the start, a dissertation 
offering a long and periodic history of ecological rhetoric may seem out of step this kind of work, 
especially as contemporary scholarship works avidly to keep pace with an ‘ecological situation’ rapidly 
expanding with changing exigencies.  As the sciences grapple with our shifting relationships with nature 
we are witnessing previously unimaginable capacities to transform, speed up, slow down, or extinguish 
ecosystems, capacities which Thomas Princen captures in his analytic snapshot of new terminology that 
ripples through discourse communities of “scientists, business leaders, policy makers, and citizens alike” 
(5).1   Princen hones in on terms that have rapidly becomes commonplace and which reflect “many 
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people’s struggle to fathom fundamental shifts” --  terms like “surprise (which now has a technical 
definition), threshold (as in, ‘cross that threshold and your environment is completely different’), 
irreversibility (there is no going back, no recovery), nonsubstitutability (things like an atmosphere and 
water cannot be replaced), unprecedented rates of change (trends of the past are poor indicators of the 
present, let alone the future), and that all-purpose, ever-popular crisis (both fast and slow)” (5-6).  The 
changes marked by such “fundamental shifts” are now only imperceptible to those beguiled enough 
(often by a sizable effort by industries and think tanks to persecute scientists and flummox the public) to 
miss the disappearance of the great pollinators, the devastating impact of migrating species like the 
mountain pine-beetle on North American forests, an international state of the ocean report that points 
to a “high risk” of entering a phase of unprecedented extinction, a 2007 IPCC report concluding that 
emissions growth must end by 2014 to avoid irreversible tipping points, the Antarctic and Amazon 
defined as endangered ecosystems (that can sustain most life on earth), arguments that it is 
now physically impossible to increase “net energy” as we have in the past, and over a dozen books 
published in the last three years on the ethics of geoengineering.2   Living amid dramatic ecological 
changes compels us to begin with a provisional definition of ecological rhetoric as an evolving concept, 
one that also begins to explain my historical and genealogical endeavor as stipulating that ecological 
rhetoric be conceived as a part of the historical fabric of a rhetorical tradition – a gesture which I believe 
is ultimately in the vein of one of the most valuable legacies of a rhetorical tradition, which Janet Atwill 
describes as “the relative poverty of its theories – its resistance to setting fixed boundaries to the always 
evolving and incalculable complexity of rhetorical practice” (89).   
 The need for this definition stems in part from the way ecological exigencies are addressed in 
the rhetorical work most interested in ecology, trends developed in the subfield of environmental 
rhetoric which cohered around Killingsworth and Palmer’s landmark work Ecospeak: Rhetoric and 
Environmental Politics in America (1992) and which defined environmental rhetoric as primarily 
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emerging in the 20th century and as “primarily analytical” (1).  This compelling work aimed to delineate 
“the patterns of rhetoric typically used in written discourse on environmental politics,” and was pitched 
as a work of “rhetorica utens, a study of rhetoric in use” aimed at students of public rhetoric (1).  The 
authors sought to “restore the balance” to a field “exclusively focused on rhetorica docens, the theory 
and pedagogy of rhetoric, while ignoring actual living practice”  (2).3  Looking back at these moments in 
the early 1990s, we might say that aim of establishing environmental rhetoric as a subfield primarily 
aimed at analyzing and contributing to ‘actual living practices’ was the beginning of a familiar recurring 
problem for rhetoricians: the return of another potential ‘globalization’ of rhetoric as it attempts to 
account for the character and ‘wingspread’ of ecological rhetoric in theory and practice over the past 
twenty years.  A provisional definition of ecological rhetoric should account for this new brand of 
globalization taking place as rhetorical analysis tracks a network of discourses and practices that extends 
well beyond the analytic focus of a relatively narrow sub-discipline and even beyond the potential scope 
of an extraordinarily expansive discipline in rhetoric.  Ecological rhetoric today is studied and deployed 
by countless public and private organizations, and increasingly diverse disciplines and interdisciplinary 
fields, including the familiar work in our own subfields like environmental rhetoric and the rhetoric of 
science, which study or collaborate with those working in ecology and related sciences (the actual 
sciences of how ecologies work), the evolving works of environmentalism (critical and populist 
suggestions about environmental policy and activism), and critical and philosophical works interested in 
“ecology” in the broadest senses --scholarship that studies ecology as an evolving concept and 
intermingles ecological thought with other topics dealing with natural, human, social, technological and 
networks in more theoretical registers (such as Castells, White, Guattari, Gorz, or Morton).  Among such 
scholarship, ecological rhetoric is often theorized or defined by terms from rhetoric, philosophy and 
critical theory, or by drawing on the terms and ecological perspectives that took shape with systems 
theory, cybernetics and related “intellectual synergies of the late 1940s” that established 
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communication as the process that links the biological and psychological aspects of being, and that 
“refused to reduce communication to the verbal or written exchange among humans” and instead 
explored communication as connecting humans, machines, and ‘nature’ in important ways (Mathur 
156).  It is relatively well known to rhetorical scholars that concepts from cybernetics like message, 
interpretation, perception, the circuit, circularity, self-preservation, self-correction, the ‘social matrix,’  
meta-communication and entropy, seem to align well with many more ancient rhetorical theories about 
how communication practices take place or connect us with an environment.   
Another way to give some coherence to this expanding body of theory and practice, and to 
begin situating the contributions of this dissertation, is to think of our field as taking up ecological 
rhetoric as something akin to a dispositif (or “apparatus”) which Foucault defined as "a thoroughly 
heterogenous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, 
laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic 
propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid […]. The apparatus itself is the system of relations 
that can be established between these elements” (199). 4    For Foucault, an apparatus is "precisely the 
nature of the connection that can exist between these heterogeneous elements" and it forms a strategic 
imperative response to an "urgent need" (201).   The idea that ecological rhetoric is something like a 
dispositif promptly calls attention to what I believe are three vital registers and points of interest for 
rhetoricians working with ecological themes or exigencies today, and it highlights a number of important 
reasons why rhetoric might continue to provide some of the best strategic responses to ecological 
concerns at present.  First, as a concept it captures the scope already mentioned here in this historic 
challenge motivating our field’s efforts to do rhetorical work analyzing, improving or enacting the varied 
ecological discourses and material practices of sustainability in our teaching, research and action at 
nearly all points of this apparatus.  Second, it captures some sense of the thriving efforts in the field to 
create some “system of relations… between these elements” in our interdisciplinary and 
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transdisciplinary inclinations, which have shown a capacity for analyzing diverse rhetorical practices as 
sustainability is being indexed across various institutional and administrative mechanisms, physical and 
ecological systems, and knowledge structures that exercise power in social structures.   As ‘ecology’ and 
‘sustainability’ are cathected with so much energy at many points in society, circulating through 
scientific, political and social realms, rhetoricians must (as Mailloux argued convincingly) continue to 
illustrate how rhetoric can enable interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary work shaping productive new 
domains of scholarship in growing areas like the ecological humanities or political ecology.   Third, while 
this notion of dispositif captures one stipulation for an expanding cross-disciplinary role for rhetoric in 
these broad areas of scholarship, it captures another as it is variously translated as 'apparatus' and 
'deployment' in Foucault's work, which seems to suitably describe the corresponding disciplinary efforts 
aimed at rethinking and deploying our extraordinarily long and “flexible” rhetorical tradition (as Atwill 
noted in the above epigraph) as an archeological or genealogical resource suitable for use in a wide 
range of these “strategic responses” to this “urgent need” (201).  This latter emphasis on a long-view of 
rhetoric for the present ecological concerns is something that I believe needs further articulation if our 
rhetorical tradition is to continue to contribute to the work addressing ecological exigencies with the 
application of rhetorical theory and practice.     
 To begin to situate my contribution more specifically then, there are a number of interesting 
moments in the history of rhetoric which I believe deserve our attention, moments that run back to 
some of the earliest moments in Greek thought and which would seem to deepen an ecological slant on 
rhetoric today in ways that are both familiar (or perhaps surprisingly conventional to a history of 
rhetoric, largely as several figures and concepts examined are integral to a rhetorical tradition), and 
unfamiliar (by developing new relationships between undervalued concepts and strategies from a 
history of rhetoric and ecological thought, and applying them to present concerns for ecological rhetoric 
taking shape in theory and practice).  In other words, in exploring a history of ecological rhetoric in this 
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dissertation, the aim is also to pursue an objective that is more tactical and genealogical by not simply 
demonstrating what ecological rhetoric might have been historically, but by bringing forth useful 
rhetorical theories, concepts and strategies that contribute to rhetorical practices today, an effort which 
I think also contributes to thinking about ecological rhetoric as an evolving “apparatus” that has some 
“capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviors, 
opinions, or discourses of living beings” so they might think and live sustainably as a society (Jäger).5  Of 
course, I hope to substantiate this more ambitious claim throughout this chapter and the dissertation, 
but I can preview the specific contributions of this dissertation in three key areas:  theory, technê, and 
techniques/strategies.    
Rhetoricians studying recent histories of “environmental communication” have, as Ells argues, 
sometimes worked to “illuminate much about communication and rhetoric in general as ecological 
rhetoric [which] has considerable persuasive potential in itself for reasons that can be demonstrated 
through criticism and ascertained through theoretical reflection” (9, emphasis mine).   Sid Dobrin put it 
another way, claiming that in the past several decades the field has studied a “drama” playing out in a 
variety of political, cultural, and scientific discourses by generalizing the "greening" of rhetoric as having 
“rhetoric all its own”.6   There has been little said, however, about what this critical or “theoretical urge” 
(as Mailloux might call it) means for the field’s investments in updating its extraordinarily long tradition, 
or how to pursue it constructively.7   The main reason for this seems to be that most interested in the 
intersections of rhetoric and ecology have effectively recycled more recent cybernetic theory or turned 
to present-day complexity theories to articulate the ‘ecological’ character of rhetoric or writing (in 
literature I will review somewhat more below), but the field has done very little in turn to extend the 
overlap between rhetorical and ecological theory through more historical approaches, particularly 
through the rhetorical methodology Mailloux dubbed as “using rhetoric to practice history by doing 
theory” (Reception Histories, X-4).8   This project is an undertaking of this type, of rhetorical 
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hermeneutics as both interpretation and theorizing through figurations of rhetoric that re-articulate 
persuasive forces, characters, tropes, strategies and their effects upon socio-cultural formations that we 
might deem distinctive to a particular evolution of ecological thought.    While I will discuss my method 
in more specialized rhetorical terms below, my goal in taking up the works of Heraclitus, Bacon, Darwin 
and Huxley (the latter two discussed in conjunction) has been to treat them as ‘bridge figures’ in the 
history of rhetoric, science and ecology.  While there is no final intellectual synthesis between these 
figures here, or no fully fledged theory of ecology in their individual works, they offer what Kerry 
Whiteside recently called in Divided Natures the “rhetorical fields” of critical theories where “the 
identities of ‘nature’ and ‘humanity’ get constituted together reciprocally” – as they are consistently 
“reinforced by a rhetorical field in which ‘human’ and ‘natural’ issues are kept constantly intertwined” 
(46).   Like Whiteside, who forwards a kind of project that Mailloux would likely endorse by looking at 
how examples from French critical theory over the past fifty years worked with rhetorical concepts and 
strategies to shape enduring ecological discourses, philosophies, ethical tenets, or populist arguments, I 
look at these figures as casting enduring ‘rhetorical fields’ that are build around several core concepts, 
or (to borrow from a term from Gross) “essentially contested concepts” that are familiar to a rhetorical 
tradition, while also holding some sway over many more recent ecological discourses and histories (i.e. 
in environmental rhetoric, populist environmental arguments, ecological ethics, ‘ecosophy’, or critical 
theory).   Part of the work in this dissertation is to revisit, reclaim or re-construct rhetorical concepts like 
logos, technê, and invention that held historical relevance for several remarkable theories of ecological 
thought, and to consider how the concepts and theories developed by these figures might help us 
usefully re-orient some of the more challenged vectors of environmental rhetoric at present (discussed 
in more detail in the upcoming section below), critical theory, ethics, or activism (discussed in the 
chapter descriptions below).      
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Technê, above all, surfaced as a particularly important concept in this study.  Kelly Pender’s 
study Technê: from Neoclassicism to Postmodernism (2011) does the most at present to explore the 
general bearings technê has had on composition and rhetoric.  She argues that “technê’s features have 
become a kind of invisible foundation for the field”, a foundation with five distinctive modalities:  (1) as 
a “handbook” for rhetorical training , (2) a “rational ability to effect a useful result,” (3) as a “means of 
inventing new social possibilities,” (4) as “a means of producing resources” that situates “technê in a 
position of extreme [or dangerous] instrumentality” capable of turning the world into “resources” to 
exploit, and (5) as modes of production that are “capable of the opposite – summoning the world from 
the void” – the category which she calls technê’s “non-instrumental mode” (31 -33).9   Pender’s analysis 
of these last two modalities of technê  as ‘instrumental’ and ‘non-instrumental’ modes is designed to 
capture an extended use of technê in the twentieth century to analyze an ‘extreme’ spectrum from the 
most “dangerous” technologies, forms of capitalist production, and reified thought, to an “opposing” 
tendencies to analyze or reclaim versions of technê that might provide a conceptual place-holder for 
forms of ‘non-instrumental’ rationality – theories most often drawing on complexity theory, 
Heideggerean concepts, or joining phronesis to technê as a necessary counter-part to everyday modes of 
rhetorical thought.   What Pender captures in her discussion of these five modalities of technê is the 
growing trend in make connections between technê, rhetoric and ecological thought, and the 
development of problematic tendencies that result, mainly to either over-extend technê, or to look for 
ecological modalities of the concept in ways that recreate critical impasses between so-called 
‘instrumental’ and ‘non-instrumental’ modes.  This dissertation might help sort out some of these 
problems in two main ways.  My first response comes later in this chapter in a literature review and 
argument that foregrounds a more recent circulation of technê in ecological discourses 
(environmentalist, economic, literary, and philosophic) which captures a more specific reconfiguration 
of ecological thought that has coalesced around technê in recent decades, presenting us a more 
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distinctive modality where this concept functions as a productive form of ecological rhetoric, rather than 
operating in a so-called ‘non-instrumental’ mode which seems to stray too far from any viable 
understanding of this concept from the history of rhetoric or philosophy.  Accordingly, my first 
contribution is an argument that, if technê has often been an “invisible foundation” for the field, these 
four areas of ecological thought provide another foundation by recycling traditional understandings of 
technê as they offer technê as a core concept for ecocriticism, for argumentation in environmental 
rhetoric, for philosophical tenets in ecosophy, and for theorizing ecological economics.   While I will flesh 
out these interventions later in the chapter, these returns to technê take on rhetorical and instrumental 
qualities that line up to some extent with Atwill’s treatment of technê in Rhetoric Reclaimed, where 
she staked out an ancient rhetorical tradition that evolves as a technê, beginning with Sophistic and 
Isocratic paradigms connected by their notion of technê as a model of knowledge that took shape in 
theorizing and teaching how to “seize an advantage in social and political situations” and which 
promoted a version of rhetoric as “productive knowledge” with the power to embed man in a social, 
political and natural environment (contra to ideas of the soul and much in a humanist tradition) as well 
as to open up spaces for the expression of alternative models of subjectivity, knowledge, value and 
humanity (44).  This chapter argues that recent ecological discourses return to technê in parallel ways as 
they articulate ecological subjectivity, knowledge, and value – returns that seem like a key modality for 
understanding an evolution of ecological rhetoric today.   My second contribution will bear out in later 
chapters (previewed below), where technê frames aspects of the rhetorical interventions of Heraclitus, 
Bacon, and Darwin/Huxley at different moments in a history of ecological rhetoric.  To put it plainly, 
each figure bridges questions rhetorical and ecological knowledge by addressing questions about the 
role of a productive or inventive rhetoric for advancing forms of knowledge, subjectivity or value we 
recognize today as ‘ecological.’  Each figure poses what we might recognize as a recurring technê 
question that began with the Greeks (that propensity to ask: is X a technê?), each adds something of 
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interest about how such questions about technê bring together ecology and rhetoric in ways frame parts 
of their critical interventions, and each presents technê as one vector advancing ecological thought as a 
form of productive rhetorical knowledge that might bridge a number of ethical and political divisions 
that continue to be at the heart of more contemporary ecological discourses.  
In this vein, technê is also a placeholder for the value each figure places on certain rhetorical 
strategies (as discursive practices, performances and techniques) that address more enduring themes in 
ecological thought.  In one respect, my study of these figures follows a prompt by environmental 
thinkers such as David Orr and Wendell Berry who emphasize that critical ecological scholarship must 
continue to pull together ‘fragments of strategy’ from histories of ecological ideas to examine what 
tactics or strategies advance forms of ecological consciousness (or rhetoric) that “lands squarely in the 
realm of praxis, which is the study of efficient action” (Orr 62).  As I read them here, each figure lays 
some emphasis on strategic roles for rhetoric as a necessary counterpart (and an enduring challenge) to 
scientific and technical knowledge.  Or to put it another way, each figure emphasizes different ways that 
rhetorical strategies enact what Castells called an enduring ecologist’s challenge to “criticize the 
domination of life by science” while using “science to oppose science on behalf of life” in order to 
“present a superior knowledge” (181).   As I read them here, these figures present rhetorical strategies 
as integral to their version of ‘superior knowledge’ that works with advances in science or against them.  
Indeed, the canonical definitions of wisdom by Heraclitus, Bacon and Huxley are distinctive for bridging 
rhetorical and ecological qualities, and largely depend upon including rhetorical techniques and 
strategies for making this wisdom impact everyday life.    My motivation in this dissertation for the 
pursuit of historical iterations of rhetorical theory, noteworthy uses of technê, and certain persuasive 
techniques/strategies will be elaborated in the following three sections: the first generally discussing 
how scholarship in rhetoric (and how a history of ecological rhetoric) might be responsive to a changing 
ethos and strategies of third wave environmental discourses, the second foregrounding the particular 
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turns to technê in a range of ecological discourses and the exigence this presents, and the third placing 
this project’s method for a history of ecological rhetoric in the context of related work in the field.    
 
Theorizing a Third Wave Ethos: A Generous Review of Rhetoric and Ecology  
 
We know that “most versions of historical rhetoric proceed from a prior ‘theory’… that is, from a 
set of assumptions whether explicit or unexamined, regarding human psychology and social relations, 
yielding in each case a distinctive model of ethos – which we may here define, broadly and tentatively, 
as ‘character as it emerges in language”’ (Bauman 263).10   While demonstrating remarkable potential in 
recent approaches to ecological discourses, rhetorical scholarship in recent decades also seems 
increasingly distanced from the changing ethos and theories of a wider range of ecological discourses 
and practices, a gap we might characterize by noting a separation in many of our approaches to 
environmental rhetoric from what is often called a ‘third wave’ of environmentalism.    Several tensions 
that surface in a transition to a third wave ethos allow us to consider how we might rekindle certain 
theories and practices of environmental rhetoric, and to establish several provisions for the kind of 
historical work that might draw out suitable versions of ecological rhetoric from our rhetorical tradition. 
 It seems helpful to start again by making use of Ecospeak: Rhetoric and Environmental Politics in 
America (1992) as a starting point, since this seminal work by Killingsworth and Palmer became the 
conduit for so-much subsequent work in environmental rhetoric.   Inspired by rhetoricians like Edward 
Corbett and Charles Morris, critical theorists like Laclau, Mouffe, Habermas, Adorno and Horkheimer, 
and environmentalists like Carson, Leopold, and Commoner, Ecospeak analyzed the “insidious 
categorizations” and “bad philosophies” working their way into the newly minted forms of 
“environmental rhetoric” – an area of study that they would mostly solidify as the study of “The Rhetoric 
of Scientific Activism” (10). 11  This work focused on the appeals to science by activists and political 
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advocates that established a different set of practices, topics and problems, which at the time mainly 
included:  the distance that formal discourses of ecology tried to maintain from ‘activist’ discourses, the 
transformations of scientific discourses in the media (particularly the entrenching of ‘ecospeak’ on 
either sides of a “developentalist/environmentalist dichotomy”), the genre of the scientific impact 
statement specifically, the role of “environmentalist” and “utopian” discourses in community forming, 
and the emerging rhetorics of sustainability and ecological economics (10).  The alliance of rhetorical, 
critical and environmental thinkers used to approach these topics privileged two main theoretical 
frameworks that would give direction to much of the work in environmental rhetoric over the past 
twenty years. 12   On one hand, it privileged Habermas’ theory of communicative action and praxis (as 
rooted in Aristotle, cited as the great philosopher of “practical reasoning”), an approach to written 
discourses on environmental politics and sciences that asks rhetorical criticism to work on the possibility 
that rhetoric and communication could urge “continued development of the story of human 
cooperation” (167, 19).  This primary aim of environmental rhetoric was thoroughly aligned with “the 
rhetoric of scientific activism” in environmentalist writers who brought together new political goals with 
a “paradigm of scientific holism that had begun to emerge in the 1950s [through] the varied efforts to 
bring together scientific ecology and social ecology [...] from Aldo Leopold and Rachael Carson to Murray 
Bookchin” (19).  This genealogy focused the rhetorician’s efforts on the analysis of a “continuum of 
perspectives on nature” in mainstream science (interpreting nature as its object), in industries 
(interpreting nature as resource), and in social and deep ecologists (who the authors admired for 
reanimating nature as spirit) (11-21).13   Killingsworth and Palmer thus defined environmental rhetoric 
operationally, in a role of “witnessing” and responding to what the authors called “an attitudinal shift 
and corresponding power shift that would cause the continuum [above] to ‘roll,’ leaving a new alliance 
of deep ecology, science, and government – the environmentalist alliance – on the upper axis.  Such a 
shift depends largely upon rhetoric, the building of ‘discursive links,’ [and] the opening of new ‘subject 
14 
 
positions’” (15).  On the other hand, Ecospeak established a second main objective for environmental 
rhetoric: to work through the concept of hegemony, and the opposition, tension and direction of appeals 
between government bodies, business/industry, science, and environmentalist thinkers (14).  While the 
first aim is in developing forms of ‘alliance,’ this second aim focuses its concern on analyzing the 
constructions of hegemony and identity as framed by Laclau and Mouffe -- and is less focused on 
“rationalist coincidence of ‘interests’ among preconstituted agents” than on tracking a the beginnings of 
“power shift” that focused environmental rhetoric on the “construction of the very identity of social 
agents” (15).   
Over the past several decades, scholarship in these veins has spanned several subfields, most 
notably into the work in science studies and the rhetoric of science, which from the 1970s to the present 
has also had some great success in the objectives of exploring and creating new ‘discursive links,’  or 
exploring new subject positions and identities –particularly in the more moderate rhetorical approaches 
to science, of the likes of Bazerman, Miller, Prelli, Fahnestock, Malone, Myers, or Larson, whose analyses 
of communication practices, successes, and failures have taken advantage of practical rhetorical 
approaches and demonstrated their potential impact on policy.14   Indeed, in recent years we’ve seen 
rhetorical scholars like Elizabeth Malone and Jeanne Fahnestock make important contributions to 
ecologists and policy makers in works like Rhetorical Analysis of Arguments Made in the Climate Change 
Debate, and the works of ecologists like Brendan Larson contribute to rhetoric by explaining how 
scientists turn to metaphors, how these lead to, or hinder, social understandings and productive policies 
consistent with sustainability.  Such work is in line with a larger movement in fields like Communication, 
Science and Technology  Studies, Psychology and Sociology which have contributed to what Alex Flor in 
Environmental Communication (2004) calls a new global rhetoric with an ‘international standard for 
environmental communication’ being executed by organizations like Skeptical Science and the Union Of 
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Concerned Scientists, whose communications team produces handbooks of strategies for better 
argumentation and carry out tactical interventions at all levels of politics. 15   
While such work has brought rhetoric closer than ever to ecology in the past several decades, a 
there has also been a growing separation between  much of this analytic work aiming to explore, create, 
or remedy ‘alliances’ between science, industry, and environmental advocates, which has occupied the 
majority of “environmental rhetoric” in recent decades, particularly the work that has remained closely 
tied to a ‘second wave’ environmentalist ethos, while a shift in the ethos and rhetorical strategies of a 
recent ‘third wave’ of environmentalism seems to require rethinking the way we align critical and 
rhetorical theories with these environmentalist discourses.  For the most part, just as the second aim (of 
producing new forms of subjectivity) has gained in popularity in theories and strategies in the discourses 
marked by a popular ‘third wave’ of environmentalism.16   Consider briefly how so-called ‘second wave’ 
perspectives have drawn the most sustained attention in environmental rhetoric, shaping many of its 
goals and conclusions in recent decades.  Starting in the mid-1940s, a second wave is marked by a shift 
from Muir and Roosevelt style conservationism to more pervasive problems and intense concern about 
toxins in nature, food chains, and home environments from the use of synthetic pesticides, and about 
the relationship this had to a science that was associated with military funding and the war effort. 17   It 
is most often associated with figures like Rachel Carson and Murray Bookchin (whose Our Synthetic 
Environment in 1962 slightly predated Silent Spring), figures that popularized and politicized new 
knowledge about ecology and human health, or about pollution affecting what we eat, how we work, 
and live, while raising concerns about industrialized science and the increasing allure of technoscience 
as potentially ‘controlling’ nature.18  The evolving strategies of second wave advocates such as Carson, 
Erlich, Commoner, Meadows, or Bookchin influenced  landmark publications such as the "UN 
Conference on the Human Environment" (1972) wherein the Stockholm Declaration listed historic 
policies that might instead control and contain accelerating industrial damage to the environment, and 
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pioneered principles outlining a new “moral imperative” to cope with pollution as part of "a solemn 
responsibility to protect and improve the environment" (Guha 3).  Second wave perspectives have been 
extensively analyzed and evaluated by studies in communications, sociology and rhetoric for their 
effectiveness in motivating various ‘alliances’ as environmental projects (Orr, Theils, Waddell, Guha, 
Killingsworth and Palmer, Brown and Herndl, Brockmeier and Mühlhäuser, to name a few) and in 
theorizing how “nature” is thus constructed rhetorically to some extent (a focal point in Ecospeak, 
Herndl and Brown’s Green Culture, Harré, Brockmeier and Mühlhäuser’s Greenspeak, and Dobrin and 
Weisser’s Natural Discourse).  The latter efforts  tend to follow variations of the formula of the great 
environmentalist and ethicist Aldo Leopold’s famous “Land Ethic” where rhetors are tasked with not 
only demonstrating the rhetorical or social construction of nature, but with rhetorical work raising the 
land and other nonhuman agents to a new ethical status, or with finding new problems and 
opportunities to analyze tropes that elevate nonhumans to a different status in such relationships, such 
as victim, myth, or subject in historical narratives (Coppola 226). 19  Such work has occupied Weisser, 
Waddell, Cox, Oravec, Cantrill, Socolow, and Throgmorton, who take up the rhetorical problems that 
environmentalist and philosopher Wendell Berry summarized thusly: “We are using the wrong 
language... We have a lot of genuinely concerned people calling upon us to ‘save’ a world which their 
language simultaneously reduces to an assemblage of perfectly featureless and dispirited ‘ecosystems,’ 
‘organisms,’ ‘environments,’ ‘mechanisms,’ and the like” (8). 
On the other hand, popular discussions about a so-called third wave of environmentalism have 
circulated widely in recent decades, typically marking a key transition (by organizations like the Sierra 
Club, sociologists like Giddens, and environmentalists like Thiele, Shellenburger, Nordhaus, Brand and 
Hawken) where the ethos and strategies of “first wave” and “second wave” movements had been 
widely rethought in the late 1990s in a range of discussions on politics, ethics, the economy, technology, 
design, and environmental philosophy.  Such discussions also mark several specific changes in the 
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theories and strategies for rhetorical work:  less confidence in  forms of rational deliberation, less 
emphasis on heightening concern or speaking to ‘moral imperatives,’  less interest in the rhetorical 
construction of nature than with explicitly deploying or escalating persuasive strategies for modifying 
current political and economic systems (often by speaking to popular desires for security, status or 
fulfillment), and more attention to addressing ecological problems as problems of consumerism (rather 
than only resource management and population control).   Some of the most conspicuous third wave 
arguments circulated in the ‘post-environmentalism’ debate, which became a topic of popular 
discussion after the publication of Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger’s 2004 essay “The Death of 
Environmentalism,” and their subsequent book Break Through: From the Death of Environmentalism to 
the Politics of Possibility (2007).  These arguments largely worked on questioning the value of a number 
of dominant narratives in second wave environmentalist discourses, especially those focused on limits 
to growth, and an alienation or fall from nature, which third wave advocates saw as increasingly “de-
politicized” by elitist or ineffective liberal-issue groups, policy literalism, and the near exhaustion of 
“limits-based” strategies (or a “politics of limits”), which seemed insufficient in mobilizing support to 
“reverse, prevent, regulate and constrain” global warming, industrial production, or  economic growth 
(7).   To address the increasingly salient limits to energy, water, and food (and their connections to a 
better-known set of ecological tipping points), Nordhaus and Shellenberger proposed veering away from 
second wave portrayals of the human project as ‘essentially destructive’ caught in a moral crisis, and 
proposed work designed to steer more “affirmative” values and desires in ways that might support 
specific principles of political ecology, or promote environmental mitigation practices or adaptation to 
climate change.   The central idea of their proposal was to embrace new forms of ‘eco-pragmatism’ and 
‘eco-modernism’ with attendant forms of rhetorical work they saw taking shape in a wide range of 
environmentalist projects aiming to find more economic, political, institutional, technological means to 
re-orient behaviors that drive economies and technological and industrial processes towards the 
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measurable ‘indicators’ of sustainability.20  These rhetorical ideas circulate widely in forums like Dot 
Earth, and the works of authors at the Breakthrough institute, who argue for a new kind of public 
intellectual in environmentalism, less bent on 2nd wave “transformational conditions” creating “wicked 
polarization” in contemporary politics, than on creating a new “vision” for a “politics of possibility” 
through a “broader exploration of new ways to make ecological information work – to give ideas the 
best chance of getting where they are needed to help advance our relationships to the environment and 
each other” (Nisbet).   When reduced to a “mission,”  the goal is based on the possibility that we can 
“accelerate the transition” through the use of regulations and ‘regulative media’ that forwards solutions 
based in eco-pragmatism and eco-modernism as a possible “middle ground” in (environmental) politics 
that appeals to people’s desire for “secure, free, prosperous, and fulfilling lives on an ecologically 
vibrant planet” (Nisbet).   
While this emphasis runs far afield from a ‘moral imperative’ to protect (or return to an idea of) 
an ‘authentic nature,’ it remains without much theoretical or critical rhetorical grounding, and is instead 
rooted in rather hopeful arguments for a “post-industrial social contract” and a new “vision of politics” 
drawn from a selection of postmodern philosophy gathered by Nordhaus and Shellenberger (drawing 
especially on Kuhn, Rorty, Hegel and Nietzsche).  It does seem possible, however, to broaden our 
perspective on this “vision” of third wave rhetoric in recent decades by looking at a broader trend 
among similar environmentalists and ecological thinkers seeking out concepts and techniques from 
rhetoric, often by turning specifically to technê. 
 
Ecological Thought, Technê, and a History of Rhetoric 
 
 In an age increasingly defined by our attempts at environmental mitigation and adaptation, it 
might come as no great surprise that a wide range of ecological arguments have sought out technê as a 
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significant concept.  My analysis here focuses on several turns to technê in environmentalism, 
economics, eco-criticism, and philosophy/critical theory over the past several decades.  The intent is not 
simply to review several interesting turns to technê, but to use these to help us rethink how technê 
might continue to serve, as Pender put it, as a “kind of invisible foundation for the field” (33).  Technê is 
of course a central concept in the history of rhetoric (as well as philosophy and technology studies) and 
has maintained its appeal largely for the reason Michael Cahn articulates nicely here: 
In the strict use of the term, it designates the ability of a form of knowledge to successfully 
direct action, the ability to master it through the formulation of rules. Therefore technê is 
fundamentally ambivalent.  It belongs to two domains at once: to both method and action [...]. 
This double promise is what makes the title of technê so desirable for the rhetorician.  The 
rhetorical value of this concept is, however, grounded in an irresolvable ambiguity between 
acting and knowing (72). 
Cahn nicely summarizes the effect of an initial and “scandalous” framing of rhetoric as technê  in 
classical Greece as forming a distinct “unity of knowledge and action” that led both to a new emphasis 
on pedagogical effectiveness (i.e. of making students of rhetoric better speakers, and speech as a kind of 
action) and new interest in a kind of dynamis that evolves through technê’s exacting effects in systems 
of production and in the technologies we produce – resulting often in what Cahn calls a kind of “system-
mania [...] which involves an increase of the internal complexity [of rhetoric’s rules and conceptual 
distinctions] that cannot simply be subordinated to the pedagogical utility of its rhetorical insights” (72).  
Rhetorike technê, as the technical insights into controlling language, or systematizing language and a 
subject’s actions, would then manifest in a number different ways of asserting its complexity, most 
influentially as Aristotle’s anatomization of rhetoric, or most notoriously as the complex inventional 
systems of Hermagoras,  which Cicero opposed and Quintilian defended, and which is generally 
regarded as the chief example of a complex system that loses sight of the benefit of the “practical 
knowledge” that emerges in relationships between rhetoric, pedagogy and oratory (Cahn 74-5). 21   
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On the other hand, as Guattari put it plainly, technê is also, a prominent concept that has “since 
the origin of philosophy” helped many think through the relationship between “man, machine and 
nature” -- and many readers of this dissertation will recognize that such conceptions of technê have 
drawn more recent attention in field of rhetoric and composition in roughly the manner Pender 
describes when she articulates five key modalities for technê as a kind of foundational concept:  as a 
“handbook,” a “rational ability to effect a useful result,” as a “means of inventing new social 
possibilities” or in two distinctly ecological modalities for technê, which she notes took on new meaning 
in the 20th century (31 -33). 22  The positioning of these latter two modalities of technê  as ‘instrumental’ 
and ‘non-instrumental’ is something paradoxical in the best rhetorical sense of enlarging frames of 
received opinion by emphasizing a lesser-known connection between rhetoric, technê  and ecological 
thought, but it also creates something of a false dichotomy -- a pairing that leans too heavily on 
Heidegger’s formulations of technê for the 5th mode while missing much of the work in ecological 
rhetoric giving more weight and relevance to this concept in ways that deserve some attention from 
rhetoric at present:   (1) as technê is used to frame characteristics of a populist third wave ethos, 
especially in brands of ‘ecopragmatism’ (for example, in works by Stuart Brand and Paul Hawken), (2) as 
technê is forwarded a key concept in theories of Sustainable Economies (i.e. from Shumacher to Marglin, 
Holt and Norgaard), (3) as technê is positioned as a central concept defining the interpretive work for 
ecocriticism (as noted by Buell) as a rhetorical endeavor, and (4) as technê marks a nexus of debate, and 
a new direction for ecosophy (in both Naess’ effort, and Guattari’s response).  An analysis of these four 
perspectives on technê gives us specific articulations of how ecology and technê are often conceptually 
joined at the hip in ecological discourses, and a better sense of how these fields value technê as a 
productive form of ecological rhetoric designed mainly as rhetorical strategies, techniques or 
interventions that “rewrite” the linkages or oppositions between the artificial and the natural, or the 
technological/cultural through forms of critical interpretation, rhetorical argumentation, philosophical 
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tenets, and economic theories.  In doing so they also they raise more specific questions for us to 
consider what this means for rhetorical theory and practice today.   
Full attention to technê in a wide range of popular environmental texts over the past 50 years 
would indeed require us to wade through a large number of texts promoting or bemoaning Heidegger’s 
technê or following many of the presumptions of 20th century philosophy about how humanity exists in 
tension with some version of technê that stands in for industrialism or a hegemony of instrumental 
reason.23  Beginning instead with several more productive recoveries of technê, we can start here with 
populist third wave discourses that turn to technê in two key registers.  The first explores technê as a 
theoretical concept similar to most anthropologists, or to Marx and Engels, Leroi-Gourhan, or Steigler 
who all see humans as fundamentally shaped largely by their ‘tools,’ and takes up technê as a concept 
that connects us in different ways with nature, rather than simply providing a critical foil or antithesis to 
the authentic or ‘natural’.  The second registers technê as a main conduit for forms of writing and action 
in ecopragmatist interventions associated with ‘bright-green environmentalism’ and the works of Stuart 
Brand and the network of ‘Whole Earthers’.   
In the first case, consider how Bookchin (who’s thought bridges both second and third wave 
approaches) took up technê as a means to rethink production practices in terms of Aristotle’s 
discussions of technê – using this concept to bracket the productive practices that seem to have once 
conditioned more ecologically responsible subjects.  He appeals principally to Aristotle’s discussions of 
technê as a means to recall a more complex, intimate, and responsible relationship between ancient 
“technology” and the practices embodied in the ancient “craftsman” – a relationship he thought might 
help define a form of environmental ethics based in history of “highly sophisticated subjects” who 
understand the evolution of this ‘makers knowledge’ (305).   Decades later, Hawken and Lovins bring up 
technê as the concept standing for a similar ideal in Natural Capitalism (1999), where it is suggested that 
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a history of ecological ideas might be outlined through technê as an evolving concept, claiming that such 
a history which would use technê to link modern technology to ancient handcraft in order to offer a 
crucial ‘long view’ of particular changes in human agency over systems of production, while emphasizing 
their ‘ecological contexts.’  Hawken offers weaving as an example which suggests that thinking about 
technê in one bioregion would meant tracing how an ancient technê and village industry is transformed 
into industrial textile mills, and into a progressive sustainable company called Interface.  For Hawken, 
such a history of technê would foreground any of the ‘making practices’ that produce not only industrial 
changes, but cultural, and biological evolutions as well, and would therefore be intent on mapping out 
these as the “longish, tough, flexible filaments that connects nature to itself and to human life” (171).  
Bookchin’s “co-responsible” agent “bringing forth” or “presencing” an artifact based on Aristotelian 
notions of technê and Hawken’s proposal for technê as integral to an ecological history of cultural and 
economic processes connected to natural processes, are interesting spins on some old-saws in 
(environmental) philosophy and rhetoric.  However, we might argue that these perspectives on technê 
took on more than an air of scholarly nostalgia as they circulated extensively through third wave 
discourses associated with the works of Steward Brand and the Whole Earth Network, which built an 
‘ecopragmatic’ ethos around technê in the literate practices and creative processes of invention in 
Whole Earth catalogues, and their transformation into open source cultures like “The WELL” (Kirk 217).24   
While Brand’s work originally emphasized individual and communal empowerment through “access to 
tools” and ‘how-to’ forums promoting environmental projects, the recent emphasis has been more 
explicitly on leveraging forms of persuasion by creating persuasive artifacts and texts that might create 
cumulative forms of social change.  Brand defines the ethos of “Planet craft” as both a technological and 
rhetorical endeavor, saying: “We are forced to learn planet craft – in both senses of the word craft as 
skill and craft as cunning.  […]  Our participation has to be subtle and tentative, and then cumulative in a 
stabilizing direction. If we make the right moves at the right time, all may yet be well” (276). 25   Brand 
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defines today’s “ecopragmatist” project as a “Whole-Earth Discipline” that focuses more explicitly on 
the productive capacities of new technologies and the creation of new “systems of exchange” intended 
to "nudge civilization toward making long-term thinking automatic and common"  through projects such 
as the Long Now Foundation.  The “Long Now” project builds both monuments and icons intending to 
reframe the way people think (like the 10, 000 year clock and Library in Nevada) and the more explicitly 
rhetorical “Long Bets,”  which is a forum of public wagers between wealthy authors, biologists, futurists, 
and environmentalists who make high wage predictions about the future in order to act out long-term 
debates that they think might slowly refine logic, improve predictions, and create systemic 
accountability, while improving certain argument fields or environmental ‘ecospeak’ (Long Bets). This 
network of third wave discourses recalls some of the more dynamic understandings of technê in 
rhetorical scholarship in recent decades, particularly Atwill’s delineation of technê as “productive 
knowledge” – a category distinguished from theoretical and practical knowledge that evolves in the 
realm of rhetorical invention and interventions that are “persistently implicated in the transgression of 
boundaries…limits to knowledge and subjectivity, as well as social, political, and economic limits” – and 
that marks “a desire for ‘more’ that challenges or redefines relations of power” (2-7).  Atwill insists that 
this modality of rhetorical technê is one designed to create value (not merely conserving values) or 
forms of signification that create value, and is something that must be studied as “a power rather than 
[only as] a body of principles or information, as it creates new subjectivities and produces new 
possibilities and lines of power in every exchange” (ix-x).    What Atwill and others have studied, 
recovered, or reclaimed as a modality of technê may indeed by the best theoretical framework for what 
is taking shape in such third wave discourses – and as a configuration of ecological thought that 
coalesces around technê, this might present us a more distinctive modality where this concept functions 
as a productive form of ecological rhetoric in theory and practice, rather than in a so-called ‘non-
instrumental’ mode.   
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In a second register, technê is more specifically connected to theorizing economic transactions 
and sustainable economic systems as it is an underlying concept in the work of environmental 
economists like E.F. Schumacher, Stephen Marglin, and (more recently) Richard Norgaard and Richard 
Holt.  Schumacher was of course the economist and student of Keynes who wrote Small is Beautiful and 
was the pioneer of the “Appropriate Technology Movement” which has since morphed into the group 
“Practical Action.”  In his philosophical study of knowledge systems, A Guide for the Perplexed, he 
argued that the separation of technê and arête was at the heart of the energy and economic crisis in the 
1970s.  For the sake of brevity here, consider how Stephen Alan Marglin (member of the “World Future 
Council” and professor of economics at Harvard since 1968) picks up Schumacher’s invocation of technê 
in his 2006 essay “Sustainable Development: A Systems of Knowledge Approach.”  Here Marglin argues 
for a version of sustainability as a knowledge system, arguing that sustainability is “a way of 
understanding, perceiving, apprehending, and experiencing reality” – which requires developing a 
shared or “common” systematization of knowledge “by distinguishing episteme and technê as two 
generally accepted forms of knowledge systems” (Schroyer 145).26  Granting that economists, chemical 
engineers and physicists all deal with different domains of knowledge, and even have their own theories 
of knowledge and different rules for acquiring and sharing knowledge, he argues that “from a 
knowledge-systems perspective, the central problem of the Western economic model with respect to 
sustainability is the imbalance between episteme and technê; [as] the marginalization of technê  puts to 
one side our best hope for softening the destructive effects of episteme on our selves, our work, our 
land, and our body politic” (146). For Marglin, the marginalization of the knowledge associated with 
technê causes most economists to miss “other socio-cultural mediating factors” that would allow them 
to integrate and help to manage “situations where craft production or other micro-industry 
combinations can be supported by socio-political arrangements that facilitate the optimal integrations 
of local-regional, national, and even wider markets” (148).  In other words, Marglin theorizes (similarly 
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to Norgaard, Holt and other environmental economists writing in recent years) that an important 
dimension of ecological knowledge was subverted with technê’s subversion to episteme, which is 
recognized less as a philosophical crux than as an economic problematic today, since a subversion of 
situated and embodied practices (such as ‘ethno-sciences’ and biologically diverse systems of 
horticulture) seems to overshadow crucial components needing to be managed as globally sustainable, 
or suitably diversified biologically and economically as systems.27   One example is detailed in Frederique 
Appfel-Marglin and Kathryn Pyne Addelson’s essay on how “Situated Knowledge” of groups like PRATEC 
(an Andean Project for Peasant Technologies), as a small organization in Peru responding to the 
“technical packages of the green revolution in South America,” can affirm “a peasant technê domain 
rather than modern epistemic agronomy” with qualitative and quantitative benefits for a sustainable 
model of agronomy (Schroyer 137).  These benefits are only economically viable in a sustainable 
economy with a global metric for diversity, which includes farming practices that economists not only 
‘know’ have value, but can be put to use as systems that demonstrably show how to “live in, participate 
in, and to collectively create” sustainable agriculture and economies in a bioregion (137).   In other 
words, these economic discourses points to the domain of subverted knowledge that must be 
maintained or rebuilt as ecologically and culturally diversified technê, a task which urges us to think 
about well-known rhetorical modalities for technê (that Pender lists), while specifically addressing new 
connections between quantitatively indexing sustainability, and rhetorically constructing these 
participatory and inventive regional economies.     
In a third register, Laurence Buell, one of the pioneers of ecocriticism, has frequently appealed 
to ecocritics to pay careful attention to the place of technê in ecocriticism during the past two decades.  
In Writing for an Endangered World (2001), Buell states that while critics “have always taken a keen 
interest in how the material world is engaged, absorbed, and reshaped by theory, imagination, and 
technê,” ecocritics have paid more attention to the obvious changes in the relationship between technê  
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and physis since the late 60s, when certain topoi and general fears of an increasingly toxic world 
cascaded into the public imaginary and into fields including medicine, political science, history, 
sociology, economics, and ethics (42-45).28   Buell coins the expression “toxic topoi” to refer to the 
excessive and redundant focus of on the critical ideas in second wave discourses led by “ecological 
holism models” (also favored by much in a second wave of environmental rhetoric), and the 
corresponding acts of ecocriticism that sought out acts of imagination or persuasion that have “the 
capacity to reconnect us with a purified physical environment” (45).29  In a third wave of 
environmentalism, Buell largely re-established technê as a leading concept for ecocritics by “reinforcing 
the deromanticization of nature” and by “urging the expansion of ‘nature’ as an operative category” 
associated closely with technê (45).30  As he says: “this view is neither ‘preservationist,’ given its 
recognition of the human powers and the legitimacy of human needs, nor is it ‘conservationist,’ since 
not resource management so much as viable symbiosis with physical environment is its goal” (45-6).  In 
the Future of Environmental Criticism (2005), Buell offers his plea to continue to take up a “strong 
interest in rhetoric” and technê, while having new forms of ecocriticism serve “as rhetoric, as 
performance, and as world-making” (45).  Buell’s challenge to ecocriticism frames its challenge by urging 
interpretive work to be framed as a technê, again as a form of rhetorical “productive knowledge” that is 
as Atwill suggests “situational and relational, representing the realm of human invention and 
intervention” (ix).  
In a fourth register, technê surfaced as a critical concept in defining ecosophy – a term that 
gained currency in its different uses by Guattari and Arne Naess and his student David Rothenberg in the 
late 1980s.  Naess had begun using the term ecosophy (sometimes calling it “ecosophy T”) to 
supplement the perspectives laid out in deep ecology, the ‘ethics of care’ that provided a major 
direction for second wave environmental thought, and to set his work apart from what he also coined as 
the “shallow ecology movement” the “fight against pollution and resource depletion” which he saw as 
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coupled with the goal of “the health and affluence of people in the developed countries” (7).31  While 
the ecosophy famously proposed by Naess worked on a definition of the human as a totally integrated 
organism, dissolved in a relational “total-field image” of the human organism as “knots” linked in a field 
of intrinsic relations, it was in Næss’ later projects in ecosophy where he tied this ecological philosophy 
to technê by creating a template of principles that was to become one foundation for an environmental 
ethic based in argumentation.  Here deep ecology ceased to be a philosophical doctrine, and instead 
became what he called a “platform” of eight simple points upon which Næss hoped all deep green 
thinkers could agree and put to use in different ways.  The platform (though less successful than he 
hoped) was conceived as establishing a middle ground, between underlying philosophical orientations 
and the practical principles for action in specific situations, principles generated from underlying 
philosophies. Thus, his ecosophy became an effort at developing a technê (Ecosophy-T) that would be 
explicitly pluralist and normative, as Naess took his version of ecosophy from a philosophy of ecological 
harmony or equilibrium, and turned it towards spreading a kind of wisdom he called “openly 
normative...containing both norms, rules, postulates, value priority announcements and hypotheses 
concerning the state of affairs in our universe” (Drengson and Inoue 8).  As Naess says: “Wisdom here is 
policy wisdom, prescription, not only scientific description and prediction” (8).32  Most explicitly drawing 
on technê, Naess and his student David Rothenberg co-wrote the chapter “Ecosophy T: from intuition to 
0system” in the 1989 work Ecology, Community, and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy, where they set up 
Ecosophy as kind of rhetorical ability to respond, specifically contrasted to the kind of paralysis one can 
have from seeking ecological wisdom in a kind of “philosophical repose,” which they say must be re-
qualified as a ‘love of wisdom’ that comes only when it is wisdom related to action.   Rothenberg would 
follow his mentor’s prompts by leaning on technê as the guiding concept in the 1993 work:  Hand’s End: 
Technology and the Limits of Nature -- where he pursued technê in an attempt to historicize different 
ecological perspectives, arguing that they have depended on the technological and rhetorical “complex 
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that enables us to approach nature” (109).  Recreating facets of history that foreground several 
principles and axioms about technê, he says that “it has always been possible to look at nature as a 
machine [although] the meaning of the machinery changes consistently though history [...and] that 
certain technologies seem to express a yearning towards nature itself through its ‘latent language’” 
(109).  He argues that many technologies have repeatedly displayed or made visible a larger order that 
(he believed) is beyond pragmatic uses and that working through these various technical analogies 
humans have connection with nature as a machine, and encountered what he also calls a “recurrent 
“paradox of technê” (xv).   
This later work in Ecosophy comes closer to Guattari’s work of the late 1980s, which had already 
argued that technê and ecology should now to be thought of as inseparable.  He argues that technê 
should be understood as a concept that enveloped any form of technology or communication 
technology reconstructing a social assemblage, and stipulates that the concept should carry a forward 
momentum (rather than any scholarly nostalgia) as it might help “unbound the unconscious from 
archaic fixations by reorienting it towards the future” -- a future that he saw forcing us to re-orient  both 
human and non-human nature, without, as he stated, “completely doing away with human time or with 
physis” (Conley 99).  His use of technê was of course a response to two familiar stances on the concept 
(Heidegger’s and Aristotle’s), but Guattari still emphasized that technê must be thought of as being “the 
order of ‘knowledge’ and not simply of ‘doing’” (Chaosmosis 34).   What he means by this, I believe, is 
that the idea that technê might have power as body of knowledge that emerges as a kind of creative 
mediation between theory and practice, and between nature and humanity whose status of intercession 
Guattari treated as a source of perpetual ambiguity.  As noted earlier, Guattari picked up on technê 
primarily because it was a concept that, as he said: “since the origin of philosophy” helped many figure 
out or interrogate the relationship between “man, machine and nature,” but also because technê 
presented us with a force that progressed ‘on its own’ to some extent, and formed a part of his proposal 
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for an ‘escape forward’ (Chaosmosis, 30).  Most basically he defined technê as an umbrella concept for 
those strategies oriented towards constructing or altering social and natural equilibriums that, he 
predicted, will require a period of greater human intervention.33  
Verena Andermatt Conley, following Guattari’s interest in technê through the 1990s, argues that 
this concept should be at the core of the humanities, since it was increasingly accepted that technology 
is a mode of thinking, since it might be the best concept for problematizing how technology “literally 
applies its own rules to itself and then becomes,” and since we might pursue technê as a means of 
“introducing the concept of history into nature” (xii).  Again, Atwill implies some of this potential to 
foreground some important ecological modalities for technê in Rhetoric Reclaimed by tracing how it 
emerged as a rhetorical concept from comparisons to how humans mimic and extend forms of animal 
cunning (56, 53, 62), by demonstrating how technê was initially (as far as we know) defined against 
physis (70), by elucidating how technê came to frame the ideas that nature was now compelled by art 
(61), and by arguing that technê framed ideas about an extended human being or extended human 
agencies that take shape through humanities constant transformation of limits in their environment 
(19).  In the following section, I discuss how I contribute to these ecological modalities of technê and 
how this concept helps tie together my contribution to a history of ecological rhetoric that might be of 
some value to the present.  
 
A Genealogy of Ecological Rhetoric:  Contested Concepts and Rhetorical Strategies   
 
Writing a longer history of ecological rhetoric in this dissertation might primarily be thought of as 
an attempt to move recent histories of ecological rhetoric from the fringes of a rhetorical tradition 
closer to the center.   Most of our landmark ‘ecological’ theories, including Cooper’s seminal essay “The 
Ecology of Writing” (1986) and Luhmann’s Ecological Communication (1989) catalyzed an ecological 
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perspective for rhetoric and composition in the late 1980s by using the concepts from systems theories 
to bridge rhetorical theories or to introduce "an ecological model of writing,” as Cooper did with her 
“tenet that writing is an activity through which a person is continually engaged with a variety of socially 
constituted systems," just as “writing produces systems” as it interacts with them (367).   While work 
exploring these relationships between rhetoric, systems theories and cybernetics will continue to be 
some of our most significant scholarship, our attempts to extend connections with a history of rhetorical 
theories or practices have (as mentioned in the introduction) too often been quite focused on the 
‘discursive,’ and have not pursued other potential configurations for ecological rhetoric like this 
recurrent modality of technê.    We have, however, generated several leads for a deeper history of 
ecological rhetoric, such as Dobrin and Weisser’s prompt for historical work in Natural Discourse (2002) 
where they claimed that ecocomposition “begins” with ancient rhetoric, with the Socratic and Sophistic 
questions that divided or connected the human (and human concerns) from natural forces, which 
surfaced in a nomos-physis antithesis that “stands to teach us about ... discourse, discursive functions, 
constructions, communities [that] all operate as norms, or nomos” (166).  The classification of discursive 
conventions “as a series of nomos” that operate as “antithetical to physis, to that which is natural,” is 
emphasized as a ‘beginning’ because the Sophists blurred this nomos-physis distinction by acting as 
‘technicians’ selling rhetorical moves and rhetorical teachings treated as discourse and “as a system 
[that] transcends the nomos-physis antithesis and stands as a system that is rhetorically both nomos and 
physis, a discursive means by which to taxonomize and codify natural from constructed, and as […] 
discourse becomes an entity that resists that very codification” (167).  This work, however, remains 
more of a brief and insightful prompt to investigate ancient rhetoric in light of contemporary ecological 
concerns, pointing to this well-known antithesis, as well as to “Aristotle’s conception of the 
communicative situation” as something “ecological” (a claim supporting without much luster, as it 
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doesn’t go much farther than reminding us of the persuasiveness of discursive constructs or that the 
rhetorical situation is ‘transactional’ and includes a real context) (168).   
In contrast to this relatively uncomplicated prompt for an ecological history of rhetoric, Bernard 
Alan Miller’s recent Rhetoric’s Earthly Realms: Heidegger, Sophistry, and the Gorgian Kairos (2011) 
develops a complex and highly refined notion of ecological rhetoric in a thorough study that addresses 
Plato’s elevation of “the realm of absolute reality and truth above and beyond the world of language, 
discourse, and rhetoric,” which he contrasts to Sophistic rhetoric which he thinks “bears the expression 
of physis and native soil” (13).  Miller makes a familiar counter argument to Plato’s subverting of 
rhetoric, but extends this to examine how this subverts “the earth” as harboring “mere appearances and 
the evils of the bewitching powers,” which he claims is integral to Gorgias’ conception of kairos, and 
which he takes to denote a spontaneity of an “earthly realm” (13, 15). While this is an innovative study 
of kairos, his effort to re-configure Sophistic concepts (including doxa, apate, and technê) is framed by 
his theory of “earth” in its Heideggerian aspects, and by a focus on  demonstrating how this resurfaces 
“purely as language” (15).    As we increasingly see historical work extend ecological thought back to the 
Greeks (such as Donald Hughes’ work with the pre-Socratics), to philosophical or rhetorical concepts like 
Plato’s “first principles” as what might deepen theories of political ecology (William Ophuls), or to ethos 
and ethics in order to rethink theories of sustainability (Melissa Lane), rhetoric seems especially well 
positioned to build a more diversified and robust history of ecological rhetoric that runs back to some of 
its earliest moments, while remaining responsive to today’s critical and populist ‘third wave’ of 
ecological rhetoric, to which we might continue to serve as a resource.  In doing so, we should not 
delimit our efforts to thinking, as Cooper does in her 2010 essay “Sustainable Writing,”  that 
environmental rhetoric is “ultimately the kind of work that promotes rhetorics of deliberation working 
through the discursive shaping of complex social, scientific, and economic data that is being framed in 
discourses about sustainability” (236). 34   What we might emphasize instead is a history of ecological 
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rhetoric built carefully through a configuration or rhetorical and ‘ecological’ concepts (granting some 
special attention to technê as having, as Socrates said, its own dunamis or potency/potential as a type of 
wisdom like episteme or phronesis), in association with rhetorical strategies that are responsive to 
contemporary exigencies and environmental arguments.35   This kind of history might grant a clearer 
depiction of the evolving relationship between rhetorical and ecological knowledge, while articulating 
specific rhetorical strategies with the potential to change minds or behaviors today.  
Thus, my method in writing a longer history of ecological rhetoric is largely based on the ongoing 
challenge of ‘recovering’ (or revisiting and repurposing) specific rhetorical concepts and strategies 
recognizable as a history of ecological and rhetorical thought, and suitable for our present ecological 
rhetoric.  Some context for my positions on historiography is expected here, as is the expectation that I 
briefly lay bare any assumptions I make about why this project would enable another contribution to 
histories of rhetoric.  As a field, rhetoric and composition has developed a lengthy body of work on its 
histories and on historiography more generally, approaches which have supported diverse studies of the 
theory and practice of rhetoric in different historical periods, cultures and languages, and in relation to 
politics, religion, law, science, poetics and other cultural forces.36  Debates over historiography in 
rhetoric are tied closely to the rise of rhetoric and composition as a distinct field in the 20th century, and 
revolve around a number of influential histories of rhetoric by classicists (i.e. Kennedy 1963, 1980) and 
members of English departments (i.e. Corbett 1965, Vickers 1988) that helped ease rhetoric and 
composition into its place in the Liberal Arts (Walzer and Beard, 15-16).  The field, however, continues to 
question the establishment of any uniform “rhetorical tradition” (often invoked during efforts to 
legitimize programs in rhetoric and composition), while coping with scholarship that consistently adds 
complexity and breadth to its history, a trend that (for some) reproduces confusions about defining any 
sense of a rhetorical ‘tradition’ (Gross 32).   For instance, when Stephen M. North took his ‘portrait of an 
emerging field’ (1987) and offered a valuable account of “the historians” as knowledge makers helping 
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the impressive rise in status of rhetoric and composition, he was concerned that the methods of finding, 
identifying, and validating relevant texts was tainted by “voices so often seem[ing] more zealous than 
reasonable, fervent than curious, converted than, in the best sense of the word, disinterested” (92).37   
More than two decades later, with the influences of postmodernism, new historicism, feminism, and the 
allure of dependably ‘recovering’ excluded or subordinated rhetorical traditions, the field has witnessed 
many histories written with more strategic and persuasive ends in mind.  While we are familiar with 
historical ‘recoveries’ that unpack rhetorical concepts, figures, strategies and texts for the present (such 
as Glenn’s Rhetoric Retold, Atwill’s Rhetoric Reclaimed, Jarratt’s Rereading the Sophists, Hawk’s Counter-
History, Asante’s The Afrocentric Idea, Brooke’s Lingua Fracta, etc.), the act of ‘recovering’ a history of 
ecological rhetoric seems ill-suited to some of our better-known schematics, like Vitanza’s current-
traditional, revisionary, or sub/versive histories, or Kennedy’s proposal that the rhetorical tradition has 
three strands: technical, sophistic and philosophical.38  While these are useful breakdowns for students 
of rhetoric, a historical work aiming to be recognizably rhetorical and ecological might simply bridge 
such categories while taking up a challenge of ‘recovering’ in a relatively straightforward manner, by 
recovering certain ‘contested’ rhetorical concepts we think of as recognizable to a history of ecological 
and rhetorical thought, while appropriating certain strategies from figures that have thought through 
these concepts, making them appropriate to the present exigencies in ecological rhetoric.   
In working with certain rhetorical concepts, I follow several related stipulations from recent 
work:  John Muckelbauer’s approach to reading rhetorical concepts in The Future of Invention, a similar 
proposal for working with “essentially contested concepts” by Alan Gross, and Richard Doyle’s 
Deleuzean approach to thinking about concepts that bridge the sciences and rhetoric.  Muckelbauer 
identifies dialectical problems in historical work that tends to develop innovative ideas only by 
overcoming or negating other concepts, models, or social structures.  He works to resolve this with a 
method of “affirmative strategies” for reading the “constellation of concepts and practices … [that] offer 
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a wealth of possible points of intervention for the extraction of singular variation” (Muckelbauer 43-44).  
To put it plainly, Muckelbauer proposes that many so-called ‘recoveries’ in the history of rhetoric might 
work best through a nondialectical reading, performing a kind of “repetition” of “familiar figures from 
the history of rhetoric,” as well as key concepts that “end up seeming both recognizable and somehow 
unfamiliar” (44).  In approaching figures like Heraclitus, Bacon, Darwin and Huxley, the concepts I 
emphasize for an ‘ecological rhetoric’ are often also what Alan G. Gross calls the ‘essentially contested’ 
concepts of the field – concepts which are imbricated in numerous ‘old quarrels’ between rhetoric and 
philosophy.   Making a similar argument to Muckelbauer, Gross proposes (in The Viability of the 
Rhetorical Tradition, 2005) that a careful reconstruction such “essentially contested concepts” can form 
the intellectual strand of the rhetorical tradition, a form of historical reconstruction “that accepts 
historical discontinuity and centers on the problem of coherence, that sees the tradition as a succession 
of theorists, each of whom makes a contribution, one that is, at the same time, unique and dependent 
on past theoretical refinement” (33).39  Gross claims two disciplinary advantages for emphasizing 
“essentially contested concepts” in this way.  The first is that this emphasis can addresses problems with 
our ‘archeological’ approaches that have attempted to finesse rhetorical anthologies by giving equal 
treatment to figures like Nietzsche, Bakhtin, Bacon and Thomas Sheridan, while at the same asserting 
that this “lack of continuous intellectual progress is not, essentially, an artifact of anthology making” -- 
which Gross thinks is more of a symptom of “anthology makers” who “unsuccessfully finesse” an 
“intellectual strand of the rhetorical tradition” and overlook some important continuities in the concepts 
they deploy (32).40  The second advantage is that arguing for “essential” concepts in the field might not 
only address a problem of finding any “genuine continuity,” but might improve genealogical efforts 
aiming to build an “intellectual history of rhetoric” through the “elevation of mediocrities to canonical 
status or by the specious transgression of disciplinary boundaries” (33).  Muckelbauer’s performative 
reading might be the best example in recent years of a method that succeeds in finessing this approach 
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to the ‘essential’ concept of invention, while leveraging both of these advantages: a “political” 
advantage of reconstructing concepts from classical rhetoric in a way that helps to provide an 
“intellectual core” and “legitimation” for the field, while also allowing for continued dialogue with 
related disciplines like communications and philosophy, which he calls “a necessary condition for 
disciplinary flourishing” today (which in Muckelbauer’s case demonstrates how rhetorical invention can 
address certain impasses in postmodern theory) (Gross 33).   As I see it, Muckelbauer’s spin on 
‘affirmative repetition’ is a method that aligns well with what Gross calls “the safest general 
characterization of the European philosophical tradition,” one that (quoting Whitehead) “consists of a 
series of footnotes to Plato,” and addresses the “contestant users of concepts” that originate in 
“exemplars” in classical and pre-classical times (34).   
While this dissertation works with a number of ‘essentially contested concepts’ from a long 
history of rhetoric, philosophy and ecological thought (such as logos, physis, and technê), the emphasis 
is often on how certain concepts have bridged or altered the power dynamic between scientific and 
rhetorical knowledge formation.  Richard Doyle offers some useful provisions about how certain 
concepts can effectively bridge this terrain in his study On Beyond Living: Rhetorical Transformations in 
the Life Sciences (1997).  He reiterates that concepts must be seen as ‘historically morphing’ with 
‘multiple becomings,’ and as empirical inventions of philosophers, but he also emphasizes that concepts 
as such mark a fundamental “genre distinction” between philosophy or rhetoric and science, where the 
latter sees scientific thought as “not derived from concepts, but by functions or propositions; [where by 
contrast] every concept has an irregular contour defined by the sum of its components [...] only on this 
condition can it escape the mental chaos constantly threatening it, stalking it, trying to reabsorb it” 
(Doyle 6, citing Deleuze 116).  In other words, this fundamental genre distinction is found in how the 
“irregularity of the concept is ill-suited to machine science” that takes regularities as its “prey” (6).  
While concepts evolve in creative/irregular ways, scientific propositions function more like a freeze-
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frame, or a “fantastic slowing down” of matter and of thought -- where thought is “disciplined” into 
references as matter is “framed” and “penetrated with propositions” (6).  What is perhaps most 
significant is that the majority of the scientific language that creates these ‘freeze-frames’ obscures or 
erases the technology of framing -- the conceptual apparatus or the so-called “rhetorical software” that 
can highlight active rhetorics in the life sciences that make possible the inventive and imaginative 
framing of matter, and the emergence of scientific statements and events (2,7).  Doyle’s coinage of 
‘rhetorical software’ works alongside the Deleuzian notion of the ‘functive,’ where certain concepts can 
function at the intersection between science and philosophy, like ‘bifurcation’ or ‘pre-individual state,’ 
which can move in two directions, one way becoming “reinscribed” into science as propositions, 
functioning to make verifiable truth-claims, and another where it is “borrowed” to create a concept that 
concerns philosophy, rhetoric or the creation of the ‘virtual’ (7).  Importantly, while the notion of 
rhetorical software highlights the textuality of scientific processes, he coins it to help avoid textual 
determinism, stating that “as any user of software knows, software is usable only within a network of 
hardware and – this frequently overlooked ‘wetware’ of bodily and cognitive functions (7).41   Following 
Doyle a bit further, I pursue several concepts in ecological rhetoric based on the hypothesis that the 
historical ‘morphing’ of concepts can be studied as they are put in use by a number of well-known 
figures from a history of rhetoric and ecology thinking through protean concepts that we might deem 
‘essential’ to an ecological rhetoric formed in a vital tension between rhetorical and scientific knowledge 
formation at several key historical moments.42  Doyle again follows Deleuze and Guattari’s claim that we 
study concepts by thinking about how they were made “persuasive” by figures who leave their mark or 
“signatures” on certain concepts (such as Descartes’ cogito, Leibniz’s monad, Bergson’s duration) (2-4).43  
In this sense, ‘giant figures’ like Heraclitus, Bacon, Darwin and Huxley have reflected explicitly on 
rhetorical concepts and appropriated a number of these from rhetoric to ‘frame’ science since antiquity.  
In re-appropriating the “conglomerate of metaphors, principles, analogies, and figures” we’ve 
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associated with rhetoric since ancient Greece, they offer up one way to create a history of ecological 
rhetoric where ‘contested concepts’ like physis, logos, technê , nature, invention, mastery, artificial 
selection, and ecology allow us to think through the ‘rhetorical software’ of ‘bridge figures’ that have 
advanced ideas about rhetoric and ecology.    
While emphasizing certain concepts can contribute to the groundwork for our theories of 
ecological rhetoric, this study also extends a genealogy of concepts to emphasize key rhetorical 
strategies.  While Gross’s “safeguard” proposal to work with concepts cautions against certain forms of 
genealogical work, each upcoming chapter makes an effort to foreground rhetorical strategies 
responsive to certain exigencies for ecological rhetoric today.   Like other scholars studying “strategy as 
practice” in the humanities and social sciences, this approach emphasizes another level of analysis built 
on the conceptual base (upon which strategies develop) by examining how rhetorical strategies take 
shape as discursive practices, performances and techniques that are inextricable from exercises of 
power.  Kornberger and Clegg stipulate that the analysis of “strategy as practice” asks both what 
knowledge is a strategy based upon, and what are its power effects?  These driving questions focus an 
analysis to extend beyond the study of concepts, to the exigencies for the strategy-making process, to 
the performativity of such strategies, and to track any notable consequences on power relations (and in 
this study, to think particularly about the power relations between humans and ‘nature’) (137-8).   
Emphasizing a genealogy of “rhetorical strategy as practice” in this dissertation seems salutary for two 
central reasons.  First, this emphasis on “strategy as performative practice” has gained appeal in recent 
years in studies of economic and environmental organizations, and there is new potential to bridge 
these approaches with this rather familiar emphasis on rhetorical strategies in rhetorical studies (more 
on this in the concluding chapter).  Second, and more ambitiously, constructing a history of ecological 
rhetoric as a genealogy is an attempt to follow many more ambitious attempts to demonstrate how 
genealogical work can, as both Foucault and Nietzsche hoped, form “a new organization of the sciences, 
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a new organization of philosophy, a determination of the values of the future” (Deleuze NP, 3).  A key 
aspect of what we deem to be ecological rhetoric is genealogical in the sense that it may have to lead or 
structure other types of knowledge, and orient current thoughts towards a sustainable future.  As such, 
this dissertation is perhaps a small contribution to this end.   
Chapter Descriptions 
 
Chapter Two, “First Second Nature: Heraclitus and the Ecologist’s Challenge,” begins with the case 
that Heraclitus may be a figure that most resembles the first ecologist. In a few words, my thesis in this 
chapter is that Heraclitus promotes an ecologist’s challenge not because he introduced “ecologic 
considerations” and classifications in “scientific literature” or epistemologies, but because Heraclitus 
presented a challenge for a rhetorical tradition to pick up his fragments from On Nature as a well 
calibrated rhetorical intervention and strategy.  This occurred in a great historical “shift from relative to 
absolute” uses of physis as a critical concept, and was designed to counterbalance early scientific 
interests in nature by attempting to make principles he observed in nature’s hidden Logos engage his 
audience with a common way of perceiving, thinking and acting (Hadot 18).  I suggest that the 
movement around Heraclitus’ thought might now challenge us to engage with two concepts.  The first, 
which I’m calling “logos from the Logos,” follows Barry Sandywell’s analysis of Heraclitus’ rhetorical 
innovations as evidence of a “logos on the Logos,” or as an “icon” or principled expression of written 
ideas (his logos) on the elusive metaphysical concept Logos (as something like ‘natural processes’).  
Extending Sandywell’s reading, I lay emphasis on how this analysis enables us to sidestep problems with 
reading Heraclitus as representing the metaphysical concept Logos, and instead allows us to read logos 
as a more dynamic set of rhetorical innovations and goals drawn from principles Heraclitus found in his 
singular pursuit of Logos, core principles such as flux, the unity of opposites, and strife as justice, which 
are integral to his discussion of persuasion as type of common wisdom and a social force.  Thus, I’m not 
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attempting to conclusively answer the elusive historical question “what was Logos?” once and for all in 
this chapter, but make a case for reading this particular logos as a distinctive rhetorical strategy and 
persuasive method that gave form and content to his wisdom.  The second concept I emphasize in this 
chapter, first second nature, preserves his vital word play while minimally defining Heraclitus’ singular 
strategy and its goal – a unique persuasive strategy to be embodied in his figuration of the wise man, 
with an end goal of making logos a broader ‘sense,’ ability, ‘attunement’ or type of wisdom held in 
common. In other words, first second nature emphasizes that the value of this sage seems to be tied to a 
vital challenge to make something strategically persuasive from pre-Socratic ideas of first nature by 
affirming a way of thinking he thought should become so “obvious”44 that it be considered nothing less 
than second nature.45      
The third chapter, “The Whole Strategy/To Stir the Earth:  Bacon’s Ruse of Mastery and the 
Precepts of Rhetorical Invention,” begins with a genealogy of ‘mastery’ (as a concept that has perhaps 
shaped Bacon’s legacy more than any other) that forms a well-known crux in ecological thought.  Here 
Bacon’s philosophy and method are used to help explain many more contemporary forms of domination 
– often going as far as positioning Bacon as one of the great “sources of all our ecological misfortunes” 
for promoting a “philosophy [that] gave birth to the scientific dream of modernity [where] the 
advancement of society goes hand-in-hand with the unimpeded development of all technologies” 
(Mathews 15, Zittel xx).   I then pick up on what has been demonstrated frequently enough by rhetorical 
scholars defending Bacon, that those who have branded Bacon’s authority or his ideas as ‘commanding’ 
or ‘mastering’ nature have persistently misread his rhetorical innovations or strategies, or as I will argue, 
more substantially missed the role and responsibility Bacon gave to rhetoric and persuasion in 
constructing human/nature relationships.  I thus join a group of scholars who have countered a wide-
range of resentment such as Brian Vickers and John Briggs who have shown that twentieth century 
perspectives building on a topoi of mastery have persistently avoided the central role of rhetoric and 
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persuasion as “the paradigm for Bacon’s ‘universal Philosophy’ or the ‘wisdom’ he identifies with new 
learning … the new sciences, which indeed promise to move or persuade ‘all things’” (Vickers 3, Briggs 1-
2). 46    My initial contribution is to extend these defenses by connecting Bacon’s notion of mastery to his 
deeper insights on this ‘promise of persuasion’, which requires thinking about the odd admixture of 
agency and arrogance in his discussions of rhetoric and persuasion as a surprisingly apposite idea of 
mastery that took on a range of meanings for this term (as forms of power and dominion as well the 
forms of skill, control, or proficiency).   I argue that Bacon’s ideas about the ‘arts of possibility’ hinge on 
his more aggressive rhetorical strategies for configuring novel human/nature relationships – what I’m 
calling ‘the whole strategy’ (after Serres).   After making this case, the third section explores two 
undervalued components of Bacon’s “whole strategy” by introducing two rhetorical “precepts of 
invention” -- a term he uses in both Advancement and Novum to denote certain principles, axioms and 
strategies for shaping human/nature relationships (CXXVII).  This reading requires making a considerable 
switch in emphasis from some disciplinary views that Bacon attenuated this canon  by reducing 
invention to a role of ‘mere discovery’ in support of Bacon’s science, a praxis oriented method, or a new 
natural philosophy.  To state it plainly, in this chapter I stress the precepts for invention as a leading 
category for his thought, and as a key to understanding his notion of mastery.   Bacon treats invention as 
an exigency for his articulation of the well-known internal function of rhetoric as a tool for managing the 
faculties within his larger rational system (and moderating the imagination in his constructivist 
epistemology), and as an exigency for a less-often discussed external function for rhetoric as a social 
force -- those strategies which inspire and organize some of his more aggressive persuasive strategies 
for changing the relationships between nature and culture.47  My final section concludes by considering 
what a more recent history of ecological thought might resemble had it embraced Bacon’s handling of 
rhetoric and his rhetorical conception of mastery in particular – examining especially the long shadow 
this casts on deep ecology, the precepts of anthropomorphic/ecocentric debate in ecological ethics, and 
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more recent trends in ecological thought that seem to slow-down or undermine many strategic or 
political responses to today’s ecological exigencies.    
In the fourth chapter, Darwin’s Ecology, Huxley’s Ethics:  Artificial Selection and Rhetoric, I draw 
our attention to a history of ‘rhetorical Darwinism’ that has taken up Darwin’s work as integral to a 
history of ecological thought in the sciences and humanities.  Similarly to other well-known efforts to 
rectify certain ideological uses of Darwin’s theories or his ethos (among which perhaps Richard 
Hofstadter’s work still stands out as the model), my primary aim is to discuss a number of ways that 
‘rhetorical Darwinism’ advanced with lines of ecological thought and ecological ethics, especially those 
treating Darwin as a proto-ecologist and leveraging a ‘synthetic appeal’ that tends more and more to 
borrow symbiotic metaphors from Darwin in work that offers rich descriptions of networked behaviors 
that avoid  or confront assorted dangers of "biologism" or "essentialism" and offer many ways for 
scholars to become more conscious of their descriptions of complex (and many relevant) technological, 
social and ecological factors in their work.  Such work, however, also seems too often to overdetermine 
the case of our ‘entanglements,’ ‘meshwork,’ or ‘interconnectivity’ with other organisms and living 
systems, and are less adept from an ethical or rhetorical point of view, often making it difficult to give 
due relevance to human intelligence, situate responsible agency, or translate this to present forms of 
action, largely because the complex nodes of agency also strategically passes over “what is commonly 
taken as distinctive or even unique about humans” and/or insists on superseding or forcing out any or all 
nature/culture dualisms (Bennettt, ix).  This is the main reason why I believe those in the humanities 
interested in ecology might benefit from  particular reading of Darwin’s ‘rhetoric of artificial selection’ as 
originating a form of rhetorical agency that remains in some ways unexplained and which could be a 
potentially valuable history for ecological thought today.  This chapter does not seek to cast a new 
proposition about artificial selection as a ‘mechanism’ of evolution, but in taking a more thorough 
rhetorical approach to thinking about certain risks Darwin took in using artificial selection as a crucial 
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trope (metaphor, analogy, and concept), I diagnose how this trope repeatedly influences a genealogy of 
ecological thought, and I infer another way it might open up to a more “conceptually progressive” 
reception history for ecological thought today (to borrow a term from Paul Sheldon Davies).  To make 
this case the chapter draws our attention first to the ways that ecological thought in the humanities 
orbits around artificial selection as a problematic metaphor that encourages an unwanted division 
between of Darwin’s (anthropocentric, individualistic, or economic) rhetoric and forms of ‘true 
ecological connectedness’ – a division that is defended against in some of the earliest definitions of 
ecology (i.e. Haeckel) and that becomes an exigence for resultant forms of ecological ethics bent on 
limiting Darwinian rhetoric with metaphors of symbiosis and cooperation (i.e. Leopold), or a division 
that fuels Darwin’s ‘persuasive logic’ in ways that polarizes a great deal of 19th century Arcadian vs. anti-
Arcadian ecological themes.  A following section then examines a counter trend in rhetorical scholarship 
valuing this division by looking particularly at Burke, Campbell, and Davies as leading arguments into 
own reading of the rhetoric of artificial selection as initiating a suitable trope for ecological thought 
today.   Indeed, many discussions about the accuracy or appropriateness of parallels between natural 
selection and artificial selection have become something of an unwanted or dangerous cliché in histories 
of science largely because they have missed much of what rhetoricians have valued in this trope as 
marking a crucial ‘division’ or moment of incommensurability between science and rhetoric that raised 
certain challenges for Darwin which orbit around questions of agency, ethics and ‘the rhetoric of 
artificial selection.’  To demonstrate how this rhetoric artificial selection becomes an important trope for 
ecological rhetoric in particular, I shift from a discussion of Darwin to a comparative analysis that maps 
out an understudied debate over artificial selection between Darwin and Huxley as one of the first 
thinkers responding carefully to these questions.  This reading emphasizes a shared exigence for 
amplifying artificial selection as a symbolic category that compelled a kind of rhetorical inquiry between 
the two, an exigence for defining artificial selection in rhetorical terms as a technê, and an exigence for 
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establishing certain ethical principles and rhetorical strategies that might guide practices of artificial 
selection --- principles that Huxley believes might steer artificial selection away from transcendent ideals 
and towards an emphasis on an ethics of ‘transactions’ or ‘debts’ and ‘redundancies’ calibrated between 
two ‘artificial’ realms: a social-rhetorical realm and a more rigorously scientific realm of artificial 
selection (agriculture, fisheries, etc.).  It is the latter realm that Huxley conceives of as a ‘centre of force’ 
in society, creating a dynamic that replicates something like the ‘cosmic processes’ in nature.     
The dissertation concludes by thinking about the future of ecological rhetoric and applying some 
of the concepts and strategies to the challenges of theorizing and defining the present responsibilities 
for this area of study. I conclude by dealing with advantages and disadvantages of the historical and 
genealogical approach of this dissertation, and raising several potential implications for rhetoricians 
interested in rhetorical theory, environmental rhetoric, technical writing, or ecocomposition.    I argue 
that the project’s investigation into a longer history of rhetoric might make modest contributions as we 
“move beyond the foundational and totalizing question of ‘What is rhetoric?’ to a more inclusive and 
proactive question: ‘What can a rhetoric be?’” (Haskins 208)  The potential contributions here are 
fleshed out in three registers.  First, this study of several authoritative figures from a long history of 
rhetoric bridges rhetorical and critical ecological theories in ways that might also help extend this 
alliance as it has developed in recent decades.  It particular, it can help us deal with the failed promises 
of critical theory since the Frankfurt school to free ecological thought from ‘instrumental reason’ with its 
varied critiques, mainly by aligning several concepts from this history with critical work that has worked 
to move beyond such critiques (work leveraging actor-network theory, cybernetics, ecocriticism, 
political ecology, or theories in science studies), and also by noting particular changes in recent social 
and ecological circumstances that add more responsibility to rhetoric for theorizing axioms for a kind of 
responsible instrumentality.  Second, the dissertation offers several accounts of technê as a core 
concept for a progressive ecological rhetoric, accounts which add to our field’s interest in this concept’s 
44 
 
performances in different historical and cultural circumstances (i.e. Papillion, Jarratt, Atwill, 
McComiskey, Haskins, Pender, Hawk, etc.).   Moreover, as Pender argues that “technê’s features have 
become a kind of invisible foundation for the field,” the way the project ties in an ecological definition of 
technê in the first chapter began by negating the opposition of ‘instrumental’ vs. ‘non instrumental’ 
modalities of this concept, and proceeded to replace this with a genealogical narrative of recent 
ecological valuations of technê as a core concept for ecocriticism, for argumentation in environmental 
rhetoric, for philosophical tenets in ecosophy, and for theorizing ecological economics (followed by the 
three turns to technê in each subsequent chapter where technê marks another distinctive unity of 
ecological knowledge and action) (31).  Thirdly, the study offers an emphasis on the inclusion of 
rhetorical strategies that might reform or advance forms of ecologically responsible praxis today, or to 
put it more boldly, rhetorical strategies offering us some lessons for the responsibilities of ecological 
rhetoric today.  
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 Chapter Two) First Second Nature: Heraclitus and the Ecologist’s Challenge 
 
Cultures exhaust themselves; civilizations die; everything becomes inscribed in the mechanism of 
saturation ...  This is nothing we don't not already know.  There is however a more interesting question: 
what is it that causes life to perdure? The glimmers of an answer may in fact be found in the Heraclitian 
or Nietzschean perspectives: destruction is also construction. 
-- Michel Maffesoli, The Time of the Tribes (115) 
We need never deny the presence of strife, enmity, factions, as a characteristic motive of rhetorical 
expression. We need not close our eyes to their almost tyranneous ubiquity in human relations; we can 
be on the alert always to see how such temptations to strife are implicit in the institutions that condition 
human relationships; yet we can at the same time always look beyond this order, to the principle of 
identification in general, a terministic choice justified by the facts that the identifications in the order of 
love are also characteristic of rhetorical expression.  
--Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (20) 
Introduction:  
Among many caveats and disagreements about anachronistically classifying Heraclitus as an 
early ‘process philosopher,’ ‘scientific cosmologist,’ ‘metaphysician,’ or ‘religious thinker,’ it seems less 
contentious to risk a claim that what we have in Heraclitus may be a figure that most resembles the first 
ecologist.48  Even though environmental sciences and ecology are understood as interdisciplinary fields 
that took shape in the second half of the 20th century, conceptions of ‘ecology’ and ecological thought 
are now regularly extended to classical Greek thought.  More often than not, ecology is traced back in 
accordance with views on early Greek ‘ecological science,’ above all to Aristotle and Theophrastus as 
they introduce “ecologic considerations into scientific literature” by developing an inductive method 
and system for examining the relationships between living and nonliving matter, and a lexicon for 
dealing with natural cultivation, extinction (of plants only), and relationships between species and 
habitat (what was called by Theophrastus “the appropriate place” oikeios topos) (Hughes 63).   On 
several occasions Theophrastus has been named as the ‘first ecologist’ for his consistent application of 
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Aristotle’s methods on these ecological topics, while also resisting Aristotle’s suggestions that “creatures 
exist to serve mankind” (60).49   In another set of interests shared among scholars in the humanities, 
Greek thought contributes to the rhetorical, social and political aspects of ecological thought as scholars 
reassess specific philosophical or rhetorical concepts in light of ecological exigencies, such as rethinking 
Plato’s “first principles” as they might support theories of political ecology (William Ophuls), adapting 
ethos and ethics to questions of sustainability (Melissa Lane), or re-interpreting Gorgias’ kairos as a form 
of ecological time (Bernard Allan Miller).50   In some respects, work of this kind is only the most recent 
return to vital ideas among the Greeks concerning how ‘nature’ can have a formative influence on ideas 
and civilization, ideas that largely take shape in relation to a cast of figures running from pre-Socratics 
like Empedocles who saw the earth’s elements as a constant process of interchange or “endless 
recycling,” or poets like Hesiod whose saga of the Earth’s decline predicts declining civilizations, to 
philosophers like Democritus who chiefly “saw the environment as a teacher” whose “habits” when 
closely observed taught many civilizations to advance, or Thucydides who tracked nature’s effects on 
history and war (Hughes 62 -67).    
It is also common enough for histories of science to position pre-Socratic figures as sages who 
anticipate major scientific positions, where Anaxamander’s vortex serves as examples for the study of 
spiral galaxies, Heraclitus’ fire resonates with energy and conservation problems, or Parmenides’ 
immutable substance appears as a forbearer of quantum physics, however, to think of Heraclitus in this 
vein would undermine much about how this provocative sage has endured.51  It is well-known that 
Heraclitus proposed a model of wisdom that competed directly with early Greek science, and as 
Foucault stated with typical insight, Heraclitus has relayed a much longer history of thought allowing 
him to “speak” to “urgent situations” about social change, and about the meaning and social value of 
competing ideas of truth, wisdom and knowledge (Courage of Truth 17).   It is in light of today’s 
ecological exigencies that Heraclitus seems compelling again, and much less because his wisdom 
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anticipates some principles of ecological science per se, than because his method intercedes and 
arbitrates between the earliest scientific and philosophical perspectives, and as I argue here, because 
this wisdom has evolved as both a challenge for rhetoric and an “ecologist’s challenge” relating a much 
longer history of thought.    
  Castells used the term “ecologist’s challenge” in The Power of Identity (1997) to describe aspects 
of the “fundamental struggles over the appropriation of science, space, and time, [through which] 
ecologists induce the creation of a new identity, a biological identity, a culture of the human species as a 
component of nature” (184). He traces the roots of this challenge from a small 19th century discourse 
community of ecological thinkers to a major expansion in the early 1970s in innovative networks of 
environmentalist, scientific, humanist and social thinkers linking a diverse set of environmental “actions, 
discourses and practices” with ecological “beliefs, theories, and projects that consider humankind as a 
component of a broader ecosystem and wish to maintain the system’s balance in a dynamic, 
evolutionary perspective” (171). 52  Castells marks a direct correspondence between the rise of a 
networked society and the spread of four fundamental components to the ecologist’s challenge that 
resonate with social and academic pursuits in recent decades.  The first challenge is largely rhetorical, 
and stems from a “an ambiguous but deep connection with science and technology” that Castells maps 
from a 19th century “revolt of science against science” to contemporary challenges to “productively 
negotiate diverse responses to technoscience” ranging from zealous proposals to geoengineer the 
planet to authoritative activists with neo-luddite biases (181).   A second related challenge stems from 
attempts to use science while “criticizing the domination of life by science or to “use science to oppose 
science on behalf of life” in order to “present a superior knowledge” (181).  Castells states: “The 
principle advocated is not the negation of knowledge, but superior knowledge: the wisdom of a holistic 
vision, able to reach beyond piecemeal approaches and short sighted strategies geared toward the 
satisfaction of basic instincts” (181).  Thirdly, the challenge is to create structural transformations in 
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social and economic life, which he calls a challenge “tantamount to fighting for historical redefinition of 
two fundamental material expressions of society: space [emphasizing the importance of constructing 
local sustainable spaces], and time [emphasizing an evolutionary perspective and a sense of ‘glacial 
time’ as a necessary perspective to changing social and economic structures]” (183).  The fourth is to 
create a historical struggle that works against forces that “fundamentally break the unity of humankind, 
as well as the interrelation between territories,” the appropriations of science and technology for profit, 
the commandeering of territorial and social spaces, or forms of nationalism, regionalism or individualism 
that impede a necessary kind of “harmony” that is essential to ecology as a  “unity of the species, then 
of matter as a whole, and of its spatiotemporal evolution”  (184-5). 
Castells repeatedly makes the case that these four themes of a networked “ecologist’s 
challenge” sum up a sizeable intellectual challenge to bring together and strengthen the connections 
between different expressions of environmentalism and ecological wisdom, and to extend these across 
a much longer history of thought, back to our best understandings of our “cosmological self” and to a 
“fierce green fire” (184).  From this point we might begin to think of Heraclitus as the first to present a 
version of an ecologist’s challenge that relays similar themes back to ideas stemming from his influence 
on pre-Socratic conversations that obsessed over nature while inaugurating key-areas of scientific and 
philosophical inquiry such as ontology, cosmology, the configuration of the soul, perception, and the 
possibilities for human knowledge.  Initially we might note that, similar to how ‘ecology’ sits in an 
uneasy rapport with the ‘pure sciences’ today, Heraclitus’ theory of social and natural change was 
promoted as a kind of ‘common wisdom’ that also sat uneasily among the pre-Socratics, among their 
competing obsessions with nature, and among a larger conversation among the Greeks about 
philosophy and rhetoric.  While this “weeping philosopher” is often thought of as an outlier from 
philosophical schools and often said to have “made a wisdom of his own” by searching reclusively for 
what is ‘hidden in nature,’ Heraclitus’ work On Nature was a uniquely designed53 provocation, and 
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provocative enough so to make him the archetypal thinker of change or flux, a figure who is now 
impossible to approach in isolation without retrieving extensions of interpretations, quotes, mediums, 
and other figures in relation (McLuhan 21).54  Therefore, to begin to think of Heraclitus as a unique 
figure in an ecological history requires thinking through Heraclitus as what Gadamer called a “persistent 
challenge” for subsequent thinkers bent on categorizing his thought, or restoring Heraclitus’ voice in the 
present (Gadamer, The Beginnings of Knowledge 38).   While the evolution of this challenge can be 
mapped in several different ways, it can be analogous to an ecologist’s challenge from the beginning if 
read as a distinctive rhetorical intervention, one designed to intervene among pre-Socratic obsessions 
with nature’s “hidden code,” to intercede in the historical trends where the concept of nature was in 
transition from more “relative to absolute uses,” and where Heraclitus becomes a figurehead for a great 
antagonism towards either extreme (Hadot 18).   This intervention seemed to anticipate some sense of 
permanence as a written text designed for public consumption, and might endure as an intervention 
calibrated among early scientific and philosophical perspectives on knowledge, as it is passed down to a 
rhetorical tradition starting with the Sophists rather than into the hands of Plato or Aristotle.55   During a 
19th century resurrection of Heraclitus by major thinkers like Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and T.H. Huxley 
(who all become devoted Heracliteans in different ways), perhaps Huxley said it best when he said that 
“the scientific heritage of Heraclitus passed neither into the hands of Plato nor Aristotle” but inspired 
those taking scientific ideas about evolution of a ‘cosmic process’ as crucial to understanding social 
progress, which for Huxley insists that “social progress means a checking of the cosmic process at every 
step and the substitution for it of another, which may be called the ethical process; the end for which is 
not the survival of the fittest... but of those who are ethically the best” (70, 81).  Huxley in fact crafted 
his “Evolution and Ethics” in part by borrowing from Heraclitean principles, tracing these in relation to 
others who have “seen the cosmic process in evolution ... and sought to discover the bearing of these 
great facts on ethics,” while maintaining that “no better expressions of the essence of the modern 
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doctrine of evolutions can be found than are presented by some of his pithy aphorisms and striking 
metaphors” (53, 69).   
 In a few words, my thesis in this chapter is that Heraclitus promotes an ecologist’s challenge not 
because he introduced “ecologic considerations” and classifications in “scientific literature” or 
epistemologies, but because Heraclitus presented a challenge for a rhetorical tradition to pick up his 
fragments from On Nature as a well calibrated rhetorical intervention and strategy.  This occurred in a 
great historical “shift from relative to absolute” uses of physis as a critical concept, and designed to 
counterbalance early scientific interests in nature by attempting to make principles he observed in 
nature’s hidden Logos engage his audience with a common way of thinking and acting (Hadot 18).   It is 
no coincidence that Heraclitus made no concerted contribution to new fields of science such as physics 
or astronomy, but stressed the underlying principles of nature, the logos and its two-part idea (that all 
things are one and undergoing constant process of changes creation and dissolution) as crucial to 
understanding the human condition, human senses, and a process of ‘reasoning’ or a capacity to think 
he characterized as both wisdom and fate.  It is also no accident that some Heraclitus scholars in recent 
decades have made the case for reading Heraclitus’ method rhetorically as a robust means to 
understand his enduring appeal to major thinkers, and to analyze his work as a form of persuasion in 
order to elucidate his unique wisdom.56   
Building on such approaches, I suggest that the movement around Heraclitus’ thought might 
now challenge us to engage with two concepts.  The first, which I’m calling “logos from the Logos,” 
follows Barry Sandywell’s analysis of Heraclitus’ rhetorical innovations as evidence of a “logos on the 
Logos,” or as an “icon” or principled expression of written ideas (his logos) on the elusive metaphysical 
concept Logos (as something like ‘natural processes’).  Following and extending Sandywell’s 
identification of several rhetorical tropes in On Nature, my reading lays emphasis on how his analysis 
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enables us to sidestep problems with reading Heraclitus as representing the metaphysical concept 
Logos, and instead  allows us to read logos as a more dynamic set of rhetorical innovations and goals 
drawn from principles Heraclitus found in his singular pursuit of Logos, core principles such as flux, the 
unity of opposites, and strife as justice, which become integral to his effort establishing a form of 
persuasion as type of common wisdom and a social force.  Thus, I’m not attempting to conclusively 
answer the elusive historical question “what was Logos?” once and for all, but make a case for reading 
this particular logos as a distinctive rhetorical strategy and persuasive method that gave form and 
content to his wisdom, which of course he thought should be persuasive enough to be held in common 
thought and action.   
The second concept I emphasize in this chapter, first second nature, preserves his vital word play 
while minimally defining Heraclitus’ singular strategy and its goal – a unique persuasive strategy to be 
embodied in his figuration of the wise man, with an end goal of making logos a broader ‘sense,’ ability, 
‘attunement’ or type of wisdom held in common. In other words, first second nature emphasizes that 
the value of this sage seems to be tied to a vital challenge to make something strategically persuasive 
from pre-Socratic ideas of first nature by affirming a way of thinking he thought should become so 
“obvious” (as he repeatedly puts it) that it be considered nothing less than second nature.57   Reading 
Heraclitus’ method rhetorically we can emphasize how his wisdom was grounded in a strategy to make a 
common character and rhetorical ability permeate the early stages of the ‘Greek Miracle’ -- a pursuit 
that we might mark as a distant comparison to what Castell’s saw as “the creation of a new identity” by 
a networked ecology movement.58  My concluding section in this chapter distinguishes Heraclitus’ ideas 
about what should be ‘common’ from other ideas about ‘common sense’ in antiquity, and then 
distinguishes Heraclitus’ intervention as a “fundamental strategy” to establish something like common 
rhetorical attunement as a superior type of wisdom.  To examine how he attempted to make this 
intervention among the more “private” understandings of nature (among geometricians, early scientists 
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and philosophers) I examine how Heraclitus aimed to intercede among emerging conceptions of nature, 
human nature, and truth, which we recognize as integral to this historic phase of Western thought.    
We already think of Heraclitus as having an important place in genealogies of the pre-Socratic 
idea of truth, where Heraclitus is often discussed as a reclusive sage and a “lonely truth finder...eternally 
and everywhere seeking one” (Nietzshe), or the reclusive ‘sage’ with an ethos equated to one of four 
distinct modes of “truth telling and veridiction” (Foucault’s Courage of Truth), or similarly as one of the 
“poet masters of truth" (Detienne’s The Masters of Truth in Ancient Greece).  We rarely, however, think 
of this ‘sage’ as a distinctive figure promoting a truth value in terms more amenable to a rhetorical 
method – one designed to make certain connections between social and natural change seem true in 
the sense that they are obvious (or perceptible everywhere), inseparable, and potentially just. In striving 
to make something strategically persuasive from pre-Socratic ideas of first nature, he affirmed a 
distinctly rhetorical way of thinking he thought should be so obvious that it be considered second 
nature, a way of thinking that might ensure human/nature relationships are held in common thought, 
and only thusly ‘ring true’ in everyday life.   
Reading Heraclitus Rhetorically 
Day and night … they are one 
Heraclitus, B57. 
 
The obscurity in the philosophy of Heraclitus lies essentially 
in the fact that a speculative thought is expressed in it. 
Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy 
 
Heraclitus is called the ‘obscure’. But he is the luminous. 
Heidegger, Aletheia 
 There is of course an interminably long chain of patient research into Heraclitus’ contributions 
to pre-Socratic discourses and to the so-called ‘Greek Miracle’ in civilization, art, thought, and social 
organization.  Moreover, his concept of logos has drawn some of the greatest debates during the history 
of philosophy and rhetoric, inspiring interpretations ranging from ‘god,’ to ‘fate,’ ‘necessity,’ 
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‘universality,’ ‘wisdom,’ to ‘law’.    During the shift from mythos to logos, when speech became the 
instrument of the city’s political life, Heraclitus obsessed over the power of “both human thought and 
the governing principle of the universe” (Guthrie, 428).  His great essay On Nature presented Logos as an 
exciting and curious type of world-ordering or world-regulating principle, in ways that were both highly 
figurative and symbolic, and principled on a much more straightforward conviction that neither gods nor 
humans created the world’s logos, all things could be produced and changed by fire, and all things can 
be perceived as constantly changing and becoming. His method, which combines an odd mix of material 
monism (all things flow from or are modified by fire) and dialectics (considering everything to be 
generating and changing through the conflict and unity of opposites), offered up a distinctive brand of 
ecological thinking recognizable in his unique analysis and its intervention into pre-Socratic thought.   
In the first respect, he formulated as a series of subtle and poetic analyses affirming the 
interconnectedness of contrary states in society and in nature.  The many apparent contradictions 
Heraclitus observes, such as "The way up and the way down are one and the same," did of course 
inspire many great (and still encumbering) debates about what it meant to speak ‘correctly’ or logically 
about nature, but Heraclitus was clearly bent on establishing a perspective on time and patterns of 
change that he thought was a cut above other ways of thinking about nature.59  When Heraclitus states, 
“Collections: wholes and not wholes; brought together, pulled apart; sung in unison, sung in conflict; 
from all things one and from one all things” (B10), this statement was provocative in design because of 
its apparent paradoxes and logical contradictions, and because it proclaimed a higher perspective on 
many disparate phenomena, contexts, and perspectives, which seem to bear out what he says as true.  
For instance, Heraclitus offers the evocative perspective on how many contraries are connected over 
time:  “As the same thing in us are living and dead, waking and sleeping, young and old. For these things 
having changed around are those, and those in turn having changed around are these (B88).”   
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We should be reminded that his ‘superior’ perspective on expansive time and dialectical change 
(often deemed ‘elitist’) stems from his apparent belief that he had found significant problems with 
budding sciences and their ‘rational’ studies of nature -- an antagonistic stance that stirred many 
accusations or Heraclitus as a mystic or misologist.   As one of the most influential Heracliteans, Hegel 
(who claimed in his Lectures “there is no proposition of Heraclitus which I have not adopted in my logic”) 
saw Heraclitus as offering up a “mature” dialectical logic in response.60   This took shape as the first 
attempt to distinguish nature not only as material phenomena, but as the “single idea in the form of 
otherness... as the negative of itself,” or simply as the “externality” that “constitutes the determination 
in which nature as nature exists,” or the first to “grasp nature as in itself infinite, that is, its essence as 
[dialectical] process” (Lectures, 192).  Hegel framed Heraclitus as establishing the need for a ‘superior 
wisdom’ among Pre-Socratics by diagnosing the moment when ‘nature’ became responsive to 
contingent ideas, “human words or art, ethical programs, reflective self-consciousness,” and to 
necessary ideas about material changes “obedient to natural laws,” those ideas he saw presenting 
nature as a “living whole” over a sequence of historical stages including “ideas about nature as 
universal” (like math), “real and apart from inorganic nature” (physics) and “actually living” (organic 
physics) (Miller).61  While it is now both commonplace and potentially trivial to say that pre-Socratic 
nature began to evolve as a Hegelian “ideology” marked by the emerging concepts like physis or logos, 
or that nature can still be thought of as evolving in dialectical terms, Hegel thought Heraclitus 
inaugurated a mature form of dialectical thinking for a second reason. 62  He not only diagnosed the 
behavior of both ‘necessary’ and ‘contingent’ categories for thinking about nature, but his effort was 
bent on challenging his audience to “yield a few well-integrated truths” from this logic into everyday 
thought and action, and to do so in ways that were responsive to problems he associated with the 
‘private,’ ‘bookish’ and ‘limited’ wisdom of his contemporaries promoting early science and histore in 
particular (Harntack 17).63   It is this strategy by Heraclitus to “yield a few well-integrated truths” from 
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nature’s perceived ‘logic’ that prompts this rhetorical reading of his intervention in Greek thought, a 
reading that still accounts for this curious mix of dialectics and material monism as integral to his 
method, but that sees this as less befitting to a Hegelian or Platonic framework than to a line of thought 
interested in Heraclitus as initiating a unique rhetorical intervention, which can resonate with ecological 
thought in ways I begin to detail below.  
This rationale also stems from the fact that I am not the first to try and make such connections 
between Heraclitus, rhetoric and ecology.  Several deep ecologists sought to develop such connections 
in the mid 1980s when Devall and Sessions initially suggested that Heraclitus might “sponsor a deeper 
ecology” and offer the “possible basis for an ecological metaphysics of the West” (Deep Ecology, 1985, 
p236).   While Devall and Sessions positioned Heraclitus briefly as a prehistoric “process philosopher” 
engaging with notable “ecological themes,” this was followed by a more thought-provoking perspective 
on Heraclitus by Arne Naess and David Rothenberg who discerned several rhetorical qualities in 
Heraclitus that they believed might ring with a “Deeper Ecology.” 64   Naess and Rothenberg believed 
ecological philosophies were promoting a “new love of wisdom” that seemed increasingly “unconnected 
to action” because it was paralyzed by ecological ideas that seemed both wise and ethically sound, while 
being strategically inept in the face of obviously accelerating social and technological changes 
(particularly those second wave environmental tenets promoting a morality or respect for our 
interconnectedness with nature, and bent on resisting or slowing change by always proposing to lessen 
excessive human interventions into wilderness, preserve nature, live simply and tread lightly) (Naess 
2).65  In a co-authored argument in Ecology, Community, Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy (1993), they 
turned to Heraclitus to argue that Deep Ecology might “strive for a greater familiarity with an 
understanding closer to that of Heraclitus: everything flows” and work against “objective descriptions of 
nature offered by physics” while striving for new ways to articulate “universal” or “common” 
descriptions of certain conditions of interdependence – a tradition they also suggest might be passed 
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down to the Sophists (Protagoras in particular) (50).   In subsequent projects, Naess would turn his 
attention to developing schematics and principles for effective argumentation on environmental issues 
and policy (what we largely recognize when we think of technê as a handbook for argument), while 
Rothenberg would position Heraclitus as the first to offer a “technique” promoting an historic 
“ecological sensibility” by challenging his audience with a thought-provoking conception of logos and a 
“recurrent paradox of technê” as somehow inseparable (2-3). 66  Rothenberg argues that Heraclitus 
deployed these concepts because ‘nature’ seemed to elude language at the time, and his fragments 
present an initial “technique” for understanding and “reconnecting” with nature by analyzing logos with 
images and analogies from the realm of technê (2).  He points to the famous fragment of ‘the bow and 
lyre’ to suggest that Heraclitus thought these concepts could mutually explain or ‘reveal’ a hidden flux of 
nature by showing his audience how nature eludes linguistic explanation on its own, and takes on fuller 
meaning only through analogies to the world of technê; thus establishing that nature evolves or changes 
with both linguistic and “technological” interventions (2, 109). 67  A fragment such as “The name of the 
bow is life, but its work is death” thus serves to help reveal a basic principle from nature, that the ending 
of one life is often necessary to sustain another, and to promote a kind of thinking that embraces how 
certain human actions and technologies are always imbricated with a constant “advance” of human built 
processes and techniques that either excludes or “enhances our place in nature... [as they] change the 
vary meaning of nature” (Rothenberg xv -xvii). 68  Here the value placed on technê seems to be how it 
offers allegories and metaphors that enables one to articulate and potentially construct relationships 
with nature, often in ways that either metaphorically extends what logos states or represents to the 
realm of action, or in ways that relates the potentially distant or rarified language describing nature to 
the realm of rhetoric, especially the reproduction of techniques and actions we associate with technê. 
It is not hard to see that Naess’ frustrations with a ‘love of wisdom’ or Rothenberg’s gestures 
towards an earliest pairing of logos and technê might appeal to a rhetorician interested in intersections 
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between ecology and rhetoric, as it raises the possibility that we could think more critically and deeply 
about the deployment of this original ‘ecological sensibility’ as something like a rhetorical “technique” 
that intervened in pre-Socratic discourses, and as a challenge to a longer history of thought.   Glossing 
these endeavors to renew Deep Ecology shows us that Rothenberg and Naess (to a lesser extent) hoped 
to leverage Heraclitus as the first to put in words a “mental technique” that blurs “somewhat the 
distinction between thought and action” while promoting a common ecological mindset (Rothenberg 
45).  Rothenberg suggests that Heraclitus introduces a kind of intelligence that is recognizably dialectical 
as well as promoting a “tangible idea” associated with technê as the very “first technology... which 
begins with the hand ... Fingers trained to guide tools to reshape the world in our image, bridging the 
gap between those two infinities: human idea and tactile nature” (45, xi).  While claiming that this kind 
of intelligence seemed to depend on pairing of technê and logos, Rothenberg leaves ample room to 
unpack the rhetorical elements of this “mental technique” (109).69  Unpacking this so-called “technique” 
rhetorically allows us to think about the development of an “ecological sensibility” as supported by a 
more dynamic idea about the potentials for rhetoric than other ancient thinker’s ideas on rhetoric, and a 
fairly methodical set of strategies for social persuasion -- designed with the historic goals of influencing a 
form of common thinking that is indeed recognizably ‘ecological’ in a number of respects.  
 To bear out these rhetorical aspects of Heraclitus’ intervention, my method for reading 
Heraclitus rhetorically in the remainder of this chapter follows Gadamer’s careful approach to 
“Heraclitus Studies” in a number of ways, particularly as he describes “effective history” in this area to 
involve both careful attention to primary texts and characterizing a coherent theme from the “persistent 
challenge” Heraclitus presented to subsequent thinkers (The Beginning of Knowledge, 23).  Gadamer is 
of course well-known by his preference for studying the beginnings of Western thought based on the 
“solid ground” offered by Plato and Aristotle, texts “handed down to us authentically and completely,” 
and for critiquing how quoted passages of Pre-Socratics lend themselves to almost any use whatsoever 
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(The Beginnings of Philosophy, 33).  When addressing pre-Socratics he gives “a certain priority” to 
original texts like the Phaedo where the title On Nature70 first appears, but in his writing on “Heraclitus 
Studies” he makes a vital exception when arguing that “the challenge since Plato” has been to find a 
“historically appropriate yet philosophically expressive understanding” of Heraclitus, which is only well 
understood as he “remains a continual challenge for every thinker...Men such as Hegel, Nietzsche and 
Heidegger met this challenge in fundamentally different ways” (203).71   When Gadamer diagnoses the 
persistency of a “Heraclitean challenge” across a wide range of thinkers he follows a similar tact to 
classicist Charles Kahn who urges that we avoid looking for the “real meaning” in Heraclitus (which he 
calls a “whole history of mistakes”) and instead look for certain consistencies in how On Nature often 
functioned like “a kind of commonplace book” among a wider range of Greeks, and in a longer history of 
philosophy formulating arguments about a range of topics including language, nature, cosmology, ethics 
and politics (Kahn 6-7).72 
Gadamer makes two critical stipulations for any such reception history, or for readings that 
might invoke a rhetorical slant aimed at producing a longer theme from the arguments enabled by 
Heraclitus’ thought.  First Gadamer specifies that we maintain the general appeal Heraclitus presents as 
“a constant challenge for every kind of thinking” and in the promises of a pre-historic wisdom which 
took shape prior to more stable origins of Western thought (17).  In this respect, the challenge is to 
effectively re-appropriate the protean Heraclitus, to carefully maintain the allure of his dramatic 
questions, curiosities, and guidelines that were both general and persuasive enough to ring with all 
subsequent pursuits of knowledge in the early sciences, philosophy and “sophistry” (Gadamer 17).   In a 
second respect, and perhaps more interestingly for its contrast, writing near the end of his life Gadamer 
also marks a challenge of reading Heraclitus as one still holding potential as a “figure of the 
enlightenment, a thinker with no sophistic theatricality” (17).   In the first respect, Gadamer resurrects 
Heidegger’s infatuations with Heraclitus as offering space for thinking outside some of the delimiting 
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questions of Western philosophy, looking to Heraclitus for a different sense of truth, or a broader truth 
value in his versions of logos and aletheia, as Gadamer raises the central question: “Was cosmology 
really of much interest to him at all, or was it, rather, the whole of human/political love?” (18)   In the 
second respect, he argues that Heraclitus might inform an ‘enlightened’ method, if we ground this 
archetypal figure in ways that avoid certain “modern terms,” distinguish him from other figures of early 
Greek sciences, sophistry, and philosophy, and emphasize the “style in which Heraclitus constructs his 
propositions” as our most reliable perspectives on his method (34).   
Subsequently, several scholars have risked using more explicitly rhetorical terms to help 
distinguish Heraclitus’ method.  As Erin O’Connell put it several years later, until the mid 20th century 
relatively few scholars, “with the notable exceptions of Nietzsche and perhaps Hegel” had considered 
Heraclitus’ “unusual rhetorical style to be a method that clarifies his meaning rather than obscures it... 
and the relationship between form and content was overlooked, especially the relationship between 
rhetorical style and his epistemological point of view” (O’Connell 8).73  O’Connell positions herself as 
following an increasing trend to give “weight to his use of subtler tropes of communication that are not 
found in the other Pre-Socratic authors, tropes which connect a physical theory of cosmological unity... 
with an account of the human epistemological condition, and, significantly, imply its relation to the 
production of meaning” (9).  For O’Connell, it is the intersections between his metaphysical views on 
physis and logos, his account of a vital human condition, and his ideas about knowledge production that 
rhetorical readings are well suited to draw out from the near-legendary obscurity that often surrounds 
Heraclitus.  Indeed, as Barry Sandywell has also suggested, Heraclitus endures largely as the result of his 
innovative rhetorical moves, stating: “nowhere in the surviving fragments does Heraclitus turn 
deliberately to explore the reflexive resources of the Greek language or its multiform linguistic 
traditions; yet his rhetorical manipulation of language attests to a critical consciousness of the 
possibilities and limits of traditional speech and literary genres” (257, emphasis his).74  Sandywell reads 
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Heraclitus in full command of his form and suggests that we have in Heraclitus a “logos on the Logos,” or 
in other words, a rhetorical intervention based on “aphoristic, reflexive and not infrequently enigmatic 
word-play [that] should be seen as a principled expression of the paradoxical phenomena which forms 
the substance of his thought; his style is ‘homologous’ in both revealing and occluding... in other words, 
Heraclitus’ own discourse is an icon of the original Logos” (256).    
My own reading of Heraclitus follows Gadamer’s cues, as well as Sandywell and O’Connell’s 
prompts to further inquire into Heraclitus through rhetorical analyses of his fragments.  However, my 
main goal is to deepen these analyses by making the case that this rhetorical reading resonates more 
deeply with critical ideas brought into sharper relief by today’s ecological exigencies.  To begin, while 
Sandywell is concerned with a rhetorical reading that emphasizes a logos on Logos (Heraclitus’ rhetoric 
as a kind of representation and implementation of Logos), my reading might be said to focus on how 
Heraclitus originates a certain logos from the Logos to argue that this is not only well understood as 
initiating a unique method of persuasion, but that this had noted rhetorical effects on something like an 
ecological sensibility, and that this might be a necessary starting point for a longer tradition of ecological 
thought and rhetoric.   
logos from the Logos  
 Despite his distance from the more formal lineage of Greek rhetoric, it is not hard to think of 
Heraclitus’ most fundamental ‘rhetorical’ move as an attempt to make something strategically 
persuasive from nature’s Logos.  Sandywell makes a similar claim when he argues that his rhetorical 
analysis of “logos on the Logos” not only reads Heraclitus’ fragments as an “icon” making Logos a 
distinctive concept (remembering that Heraclitus pursued the “invisible harmonie/harmonia [which] is 
better than the visible”), but as an interplay of rhetorical features in On Nature designed to “effect a 
change ... in his listeners commensurate with the vision it recounts” (Fr. 54, Sandywell 257).   Sandywell 
61 
 
emphasizes the “homologous” logos on the Logos is well understood as a “principled expression of the 
paradoxical phenomena which forms the substance of his thought,” as an interplay of several main 
rhetorical “codes” or tropes that give us the sense of his logos as expressing something about how 
nature works (modeling his language on the paradoxes he saw in nature for instance).  Sandywell also 
mentions however that this allows us to study a method for persuading and ‘unifying’ an audience to 
‘hold’ on, ‘listen to,’ or ‘gather in’ principles from physis so that these rhetorical tropes influence a way 
of thinking with ethical and political consequences (256).75   Sandywell analyzes several main tropes 
designed to affect this change: an adversarial code that served as a polemical device, an alethic code 
that insists on a version of the truth that “plays with verbal devices to mark truth and inquiry together,” 
a paragramatic code of “ambivalent symbols, antithesis, and paradoxes” designed to incense 
contemporary thinkers, and a dialectical code “concerned with the elaboration of dialectical 
oppositions” (256-7).   Sandywell’s rhetorical analysis of On Nature identifies these features as 
constituting a Heraclitean logos, features discussed as rhetorical innovations that seem inseparable from 
the substance of his wisdom.  Unpacking these ‘codes’ or tropes somewhat further here, we can  
deepen Sandywell’s analysis by emphasizing the connection between these rhetorical features and the 
type of ecological sensibility Heraclitus supposed should become immanent to his audience in both 
thought and action.    
As mentioned in the introduction, approaching Heraclitus’ conception of logos from a rhetorical 
perspective does raise some strong reservations, as we tend to think of logos as more fully fleshed out 
by the Sophists or Aristotle, or during more protracted debates about the principles of logical reasoning, 
truth, falsity and rhetoric (Metzer 87).  While Heraclitus’ logos seems to be the first place where the 
concept was given a special consideration in ancient Greek philosophy, it is notoriously difficult to 
translate from fragments where it can mean "word,” "reason,” “speech,” "account,” “gathering in,” 
"plan,” "formula,” "measure,” "proportion,” or "reckoning" (Watkins).76   This indispensable range of 
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meaning usually distinguishes Heraclitus’ logos as the earliest attempt to, as Guthrie put it, explain 
“both human thought and the governing principle of the universe” a challenge that set the stage for 
many to make his logos into a more “technical term” or strive to “discover a metaphysical sense for it” 
which, according to Jonathon Barnes, only encouraged so many vain attempts “wasting labour by 
seeking Heraclitus’ secret in the sense of logos” (44).  In the early 1970s Barnes attempted to clear the 
ground among classicists and philosophers by arguing “Heraclitus had no ‘metaphysical’ theory to 
propound, no ‘Logos-doctrine,’ as the commentators have it,” claiming instead that logos is “just what is 
said” about nature, and that this was an “act” that begins “something like a ‘general law of nature’ 
[where] ‘everything happens’ in accordance with the account” (44).77   Evan Brann reiterated this 
argument in The Logos of Heraclitus (2011), claiming that because translations of logos would run from 
‘word’ to ‘world-principle,’ from ‘sense’ to ‘universal law,’ we are better off with “the upshot that no 
interpretation has prevailed” because there maintains “a spirit of receptivity and reserve” that still looks 
to ground this curious version of logos in appropriate contexts (Brann 6).78    
While such interpretations always seem to flirt with philosophical relativism or call to mind a 
number of core postmodernist and poststructuralist concerns, Barnes and Brann both hedge by 
emphasizing that Heraclitus’ logos must be understood in relation to the polemical edge found 
throughout his fragments. Even the most general interpretation of logos as only “what is said” about 
nature implies that Heraclitus was responding to more ‘private’ accounts of nature, and will reference 
claims that logos is “common to everything” and what all men should have in common but remain 
“deaf” (Barnes 59).  Interpreters like Mark Cohen and J.H. Lesher emphasize this polemical edge further, 
arguing that logos must be thought of as “a kind of polemical argument” to make logos something held 
in common , emphasizing that logos is more than “just what is said” about nature, calling this 
“deflationary” (Cohen).   In citing fragments 1, 2, 44, and 104, Cohen points out that readers are told 
the logos can “hold,” be “heard” and be “understood,” as well as that things “come to be in accordance 
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with” it, that it is “common,” that it is wise to “listen to it,” and that it can at the same time be “so deep” 
that its limits can never be discovered (Cohen).  Cohen and Lesher emphasize that logos is thus more 
than just one concept in a list of Heraclitean theories or principles, noting that it must be understood as 
the formula that connects all other components of a method for engaging and ‘unifying’ a public in ways 
similar to what Heraclitus observed as the harmonia that bound conflicting opposites in nature’s Logos, 
and that his own logos can be understood similarly as a kind of “unifying formula or proportionate 
method of arrangement of things, what might almost be called their structural plan, both individual and 
in sum” (citing Kirk, Raven and Schofield).   Cohen and Lesher in fact stress that there is some “genuine 
content” to logos only if we understand it as a method that opens up to and engages a public with this 
‘unifying formula’ Heraclitus saw inherent in natural processes.  
Stressing the expression logos from the Logos maintains that his logos is more than a 
representation or ‘icon’ of the patterns of change he saw in nature’s Logos, and stresses that this is part 
of his “unifying formula” that is not only a polemic, but a fundamental strategy reformulating principles 
from nature into a kind of ‘rhetorical’ intelligence and attunement that might unify a public.  It is helpful 
to remember that this slant on Heraclitean wisdom was crowded out by other perspectives on logos, 
particularly by the commanding heights of Plato’s notion of a ‘world soul’ or the Catholic church’s notion 
of logos as ‘divine consciousness’ which was cast partly in an ideological separation of a Christian logos 
from the logos of Heraclitus which was deemed as pagan.  It is also of course fairly common to see the 
re-purposing of logos in these ways as integral to the gradual partitioning and separation of humans 
from nature, as pursuing logos gradually became associated with a pursuit of the ‘divine’ word rather 
than natural, or as the pursuit of logos was allied with epistemological pursuits of natural substances.  
Comparably, Heraclitus drew his logos from the Logos in a most direct way that rests comfortably with 
rhetorical qualities that do away with the shadowy business of the soul or divine consciousness or 
eternal substances as they would be articulated in branches of philosophy and science.  If Heraclitus 
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fashioned logos as something fundamental or eternal it is that the basic principles or logos of nature like 
constant change or flux, the unity of opposites, were carried forward, condensed into his pithy 
aphorisms and his style which were well suited to convey wisdom aimed at being easily remembered or 
kept in mind.  What is constant is his constant working out of ideas in opposition, which shows both the 
division and certain unity of such opposites, which is revealed through what he calls the “counter-
thrust” or harmonia between opposites in fragment 75: “The counter-thrust brings together, and from 
tones at variance comes perfect attunement, all things come to pass through conflict” (fr 75, Kahn). The 
simple but constant pairing of opposites in his fragments fuels a method far less concerned with any 
detailed representations or explication of the natural phenomena that obsessed him, than with 
presenting and encouraging a simple and pervasive pattern of thought from the most pervasive patterns 
and paradoxes of ‘first nature’.  His polemic is thus a kind of insistence on a fundamental or common 
attribute to human understanding.  When Heraclitus stated that “The hidden attunement is better than 
the obvious one,” or “A hidden connection is stronger than an obvious one” or “Invisible harmony is 
better than visible,” he established a position that is therefore pointedly polemical and dialectical 
because, since it is the case that what is hidden is not only better, but that this type of attunement or 
harmony must indeed be resolved in a process of becoming so ‘obvious’ that it is visible nearly 
everywhere, from the basic rhetorical structures of Heraclitus’ thought to the broad patterns of nature, 
life and social exchanges.  To put it more plainly, for Heraclitus, wisdom is meaningful only when it 
becomes persuasive enough to pervade our thinking about human interactions and human/nature 
interactions.     
There is also, of course, a more targeted antagonism that fueled Heraclitus’ rhetorical 
formulation of wisdom.  This is apparent in the attitude he bore towards a number of problems he 
perceived in other pre-Socratic obsessions with nature, some of which he explicitly mocked as profound 
failures or fallacies. Heraclitus makes this apparent in his first two fragments.  Even while there is some 
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debate about whether the fragments are part of a single treatise or whether it was titled On Nature, 
there is little dispute that there was once a significant order with a rather unambiguous starting point, a 
claim which Jonathon Barnes notes that both Sextus Empiricus and Aristotle testified to in his Rhetoric 
(44). 79  As Barnes put it, there is relative unanimity on a “critical and polemic nature at the beginning” in 
the first and second fragments, which offer a condensed argument granting some stability to other 
arrangements of his ideas (Barnes 43).80   
Though this Word is true evermore, yet men are as unable to understand it when they hear it 
for the first time as before they have heard it at all. For, though all things come to pass in 
accordance with this Word, men seem as if they had no experience of them, when they make 
trial of words and deeds such as I set forth, dividing each thing according to its kind and showing 
how it is what it is. But other men know not what they are doing when awake, even as they 
forget what they do in sleep (DK1). 
Here Heraclitus establishes his fundamental concern with interpretations of Logos, as the first part of his 
polemic targets the failures of human senses to adequately ‘gather in’ or ‘account’ for what is hidden in 
nature, and then mock schools of thought that “make trial of words and deeds ...dividing each thing 
according to its kind and showing how it is what it is” (DK1). The second fragment then sets the tone for 
his fundamental problematic:  “Though the Logos is common, the many live as if they had a wisdom of 
their own” (DK 2).  Or as it is often put in other common translations: “Although this Word is common, 
the many live as if they had a private understanding” (Barnes 2).  This antagonism can, however, be 
further understood as calibrating his pursuit of what is common through a more measured or moderate 
stance between competing perspectives on nature, or as many have put it, as deeply warring in spirit 
against these extremes.    
While these initial fragments are still often used to identify a ‘weeping philosopher’ “generally 
railing against human failures to grasp the universal logos in an effective way,” or to call to mind that 
Heraclitus encouraged forms of misology, his antagonism was clearly a more strategic and measured 
response to what he saw as the extremes in early Greek science, philosophy and histore (Kahn 8).   
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G.E.R. Lloyd’s adage that Heraclitus is only well understood as a combatant against the “far more radical 
view that reason alone is to be trusted,” situates Heraclitus’ antagonism as an attempt to place his ideas 
in a middle position among contemporary ways of thinking about nature (36-38).    As Pierre Hadot 
argued more recently in The Veil of Isis (2004), Heraclitus was in fact calibrating a strategy that turned 
pre-Socratic obsessions with a ‘hidden nature’ into a widespread polemic during a historical trend where 
the concept of nature was in transition from more “relative to absolute uses,” a transition when 
Heraclitus became figurehead for a great antagonism towards either extreme, building his work in 
response to both relativistic and more ‘objectivist’ pursuits of knowledge about nature’s “hidden code” 
(18).  By the same token, it was the potency of these ‘fighting words’ that Nietzsche prized most 
intensely as a strategy, one that deepened his own suspicions of the rationality that seized pre-Socratic 
philosophers and early figures of science, which Nietzsche of course saw as ‘the greatest error’ and 
‘aberration of philosophy’ to believe that these “possessed the criterions of truth and reality” instead of 
as means “towards the adjustment of the world” towards more utilitarian ends – a position that perhaps 
also suggests that the rationalists confused nature by treating it as something to be understood as logos 
without seeing how logos also somehow ‘becomes’ technê  (Will to Power, B3, 584).81   Heraclitus was 
particularly compelling for Nietzsche on a number of levels, but emphatically because Heraclitus 
strategically directs a fight that “tames this drive” in emerging rational understandings of nature, and 
counters this fundamental error with a method that affirms a different set of contingencies and 
constraints for thinking about ‘nature’ (Nietzsche PTAG 46).82   While these contingencies and 
constraints are framed on either end by his firm rejection of scientific and poetic interpretations of 
nature, rejecting “polumathiê or information-gathering on the grounds that it ‘does not teach 
understanding,” and treating “the epic poets as fools and calling Pythagoras a fraud,” he seemed to 
accept other constraints, including something from the mathematical theorems of Pythagoras who had 
“pursued ‘scientific’ investigation further than other men” and established mathematically the one and 
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the dyad, which clearly resonated with Heraclitus notion of logos as a formula that gave some “account” 
of physisa in a logic that captures the “the beginning of strife” between  varied nature/human 
relationships – which in his “account” of nature presents as an evolving fight between humanity and 
nature that also unifies them in multiple ways (Burnet 31-2).  The ‘fight’ therefore is both a rhetorical 
one aimed at the limitations of other treatments of nature in this historical context, and integral to his 
logos as a ‘superior’ accounting of ‘nature’ that thinks only this in terms of this ‘conflictual harmony’.  
Primarily then, Heraclitus’ impact on pre-history is in his attempt to make nature a central force 
in human knowledge by moderating or correcting the ‘fundamental error’ Nietzsche gave so much 
currency to in his genealogies of truth, lies, and power – the so-called “entire fatal error” he identified at 
the moment when reason began to construe as “false” the opposing properties that constitute the 
world:  “change, becoming, multiplicity, opposition, contradiction, war” (Will to Power, B3, 584).  While 
Heraclitus’ affirmations of fire, flux, becoming and contradiction are often said to establish him vis-a-vis 
the “way of truth” of Parmenides, and to position him as “the first opponent to ‘the first philosopher,’” 
the more basic contrast is in his antagonism towards any “appeal to nature” arguments that point to 
‘nature’ as a kind of foundation, and do so in ways that tend toward the more formal “naturalistic 
fallacy” -- those claims that associate something ‘inherently good’ or right with what is natural and what 
is ‘inherently wrong’ or bad with what is ‘unnatural’ (Brann 5).83   Accordingly, Hadot describes 
Heraclitus plainly as the pre-Socratic that insisted any definition of nature always account for more than 
knowledge of what is by accounting for how nature was already in a process of becoming deeply social 
as it always already exists as a “process of realization, appearance or growth” that takes shape, but 
“loves to hide” in “the discourse of dissimulation” (8-10).  As Hadot states, it is for this reason that 
Heraclitus is almost never left out of our discussions of the Pre-Socratic concept of nature, and for this 
basic reason that his understanding ‘nature’ evokes its potential as form of rhetorical responsibility in 
his audience – since the contemplation of nature begs thinking about how nature is transformed, 
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hidden, or dissolved as a concept as it circulates public discourses rhetorically (8-11).84  Indeed, 
Heraclitus’ interest seems to be, in the broadest purview, in how everyone thinks of nature.   
 To put it another way, if Heraclitus’ logos from the Logos can be thought of as a starting point 
for rhetorical strategy working against varied naturalistic fallacies, we might say that it his concern is 
with working to articulate and resolve new “second order problems” (to borrow Luhmann’s terms for a 
moment) about how we observe nature.  As Luhmann saw it, historically, concerns with “second order 
observations” mark “vastly different historical starting points for problem solving methods [...]Where a 
first-order observer lives in a world that seems both probable and true... by contrast, the second-order 
observer notices the improbability of first-order observation ... [and begins to work on articulating] the 
problems of various arts concerned with how we cut up the world” and offering solutions that can make 
any “actions it requires accessible to everyone” (Art as Social System, 62).   That Heraclitus is a kind of 
‘second-order’ problem solver is most evident in his ‘paragrammatical’ intervention -- the strangely 
unnatural language that marks his starkly contrasting style as a well-known innovation, one which 
comes to us as an almost exasperating series of aphorisms, logical paradoxes, enigmas, and 
equivocations that reflect the attitude Heraclitus bore towards polymathy and histore and attempts to 
make this palpable to a broad audience (Sandywell 256).85  The paragrammatical (or stylistic and 
grammatical deviations) support his intervention in important ways, buttressing his deep interests in 
“expunging the devine” from natural phenomena and cosmogony, while promoting his efforts at 
breaking down the less obvious natural fallacies that were impediments to his own professed method, a 
way of understanding the problematics of everyday language and encouraging inquiry into the form and 
content of a more publically available logos (Granger 236).  We know that the paradoxes in On Nature, 
while pointing out perceptible contradictions observed in nature, also outraged more logical ways of 
thinking and prompted an innovative kind of ‘linguistic inquiry’ that took many deep into his thought.86    
Carol Poster’s “The Task of the Bow: Heraclitus’ Rhetorical Critique of Epic Language” has already 
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offered an insightful look at this role of Heraclitus’ stylistic innovations, especially his novel use of 
paradox, arguing that “reinterpreting natural phenomena and using new verbal modes were not 
independent activities; the means and the ends of intellectual inquiry were constantly interacting with 
and reshaping each other” (4).  Poster argues that his paradoxical style was designed to set an inquiring 
process in motion, and was thus a rhetorical intervention that was equal parts:  (1) an attack on epic 
forms misusing language (particularly in the example of using the wrong term for “bow”), (2) an attempt 
to both “lead readers to question the relationship of names to things, and particularly whether names 
can be correct in a nonarbitrary manner (doing so well before Prodicus or Protagoras),” and (3) an effort 
to show that “behind these errors are truths that can be discovered by allegorical reading, albeit truths 
that were not necessarily apparent to the epic authors” (16).  In other words, Heraclitus challenged his 
audiences to see deeply into the paradox that change is the one constant, and his unusual stylistic 
innovations seem largely designed to make these “truths” he saw in nature immanent to his audience by 
provoking them to take on a common process of inquiry that could promote an appropriate grasp of the 
world and their place in it.   
As such, it remains accurate, as Sandywell suggested, that this “infrequently enigmatic word-
play should be seen as a principled expression of the paradoxical phenomena which forms the substance 
of his thought” or his “discourse is an icon of the original Logos,”  but, moreover, his incessant use of 
contrasting opposites (such as “it is by disease that health is pleasant; by evil that good is pleasant; by 
hunger, satiety; by weariness, rest”) are deployed to create a sense that such unnatural language 
reflects a certain strife that is not only ‘natural’ but potentially just.  This strife between opposing 
powers is presented as essential to the cosmos and its ability to sustain life, health, pleasure, and 
goodness, and these equations are fundamental to a kind of ethics based equally on a human ability to 
measure such apparent truths – truths obvious enough that any simple “linguistic analysis” of any single 
event in nature can reveal them (Sandywell 12).  His principal paradoxes thus emphasize something 
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equally about nature and about humanity, since man is, or can be, the measure of this Logos, and the 
paragrammatical intervention only reinforces that this measured truth is within man’s purview and basic 
ability to weigh such oppositions.  Accepting certain inviolable contradictions and paradoxes thus 
potentially opens one up to a continual and difficult practice of discrimination based on such insights, 
and a more careful and a more disciplined habit of thought, not some form of mysticism or misology.    
First Second Nature  
The [sciences] introduce no reasoning which is aimed to deceive, but all the principles of the rhetoricians 
are aimed exclusively at that, and according to Heraclitus rhetoric is the prince of liars87 
Fragment 81 translated by Diogenes of Babylon, cited in Philodemus, Rhetoric, I, col. 62. 
The “strife of opposites” is really an “attunement” (συντονισμός).  From this it follows that wisdom is not 
a knowledge of many things but the perception of the underlying unity of the warring opposites.  
That this really was the fundamental thought of Herackleitos as stated by Philo.  
Burnet, 158 
In recent decades, the activity around Heraclitus’ thought has been largely motivated by two 
contrasting trends:  the possibility of inferring that he attained some higher insight into a type of truth, a 
singular or “superior truth” not hither-to established, or the possibility that he represents a type of 
‘postmodern Pre-Socratic’ (Burnet 151-2).88   Gadamer and Sandywell, for instance, both stress a unique 
alethic code in the fragments, doing so mainly by following Heidegger’s influential reading of Heraclitus 
as offering a ‘habit of mind’ that in fact performs how one might think ‘Being’.   In other words, in these 
readings Heraclitus seems to offer a method for thinking about the ways we are in the world, and a way 
that nature can simply be “that which can be thought” without recourse to Plato’s ontology or 
Aristotle’s metaphysics.89  On the other hand, in recent decades we have seen Heraclitus refigured as a 
type of postmodern Pre-Socratic, a trend that Joanne Waugh described as a revaluation of a type of 
anti-essentialism, of the multiple interpretations of meaning in his fragments, and of a sense that the 
“only demand” in Heraclitus seems to be that he “demands to be uncertain” (608).  According to both 
Havelock and Waugh, much of these interpretations tend instead to “follow” Nietzsche’s valuation of 
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Heraclitus as “eternally right with his assertion that being is an empty fiction… [that] the ‘apparent’ 
world it the only one: the ‘true’ world is merely added by a lie” (Twilight of the Idols, 167-8).   
Both interpretations reiterate that Heraclitus’ intervention takes place in the interstices 
between the extremes of relative and objective understandings of nature, while at the same time re-
embedding us in some of the most well-known critical impasses of ‘nature’ as a critical concept.   The  
‘Heidegerrian’ perspective upholds some of what is most interesting or singular about Heraclitus by 
relying on terms like ‘higher truth,’ which plays into the tendencies to brood over some lost truth, lost 
nature, or even lost sense of holism.  The approach applying a so-called postmodern emphasis on 
‘contingency’ that masks Heraclitus’ singular point that logos must be what draws enduring connections 
between principles of social and natural change, and seems to make the prior his key stipulation for 
making this relevant as a form of common knowledge.   In order to emphasize what is historically unique 
(and perhaps most noteworthy today) about Heraclitus’ logos from the Logos, we can think further 
about the specific ways Heraclitus’ rhetorical strategy seems to play out, especially as it was designed to 
intercede among these emerging conceptions of nature, human nature, and truth, which we recognize 
as integral to this historic phase of Western thought.  Heraclitus does indeed contribute to an “alethic 
code” as key contribution to the genealogy of the pre-Socratic ideas of truth.  This contribution is 
typically discussed as one of the “poet masters of truth" (Detienne), or as initiating a distinctive form of 
truth telling that, as Foucault argued, has a modality of veridiction based in the ethos of the sage who 
“against the background of his silence, tells of being and nature (phusis) in the name of wisdom” 
(Courage 24).90  We might, though, open up such discussions of this ‘sage’ and his pursuit of ‘truth’ in 
terms more amenable to rhetoric than often granted in these genealogies, and in doing so see the novel 
conceptions of truth, nature, and human nature as the primary targets that triangulate Heraclitus’ 
distinct intervention as it emerges among these fundamental concepts -- largely by working against how 
they tended to promote forms of private knowledge rather than common wisdom.  If his logos from the 
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Logos surfaces among such concepts, his competing “fundamental thought,” as Burnet called it in the 
above epigraph, is perhaps less apposite as a ‘higher truth’ or as an ancient an ‘anti-essentialism’ than as 
a unique rhetorical ‘attunement’ and vital ability of a wise man, which he prescribes as a more 
pervasive, social or common form of wisdom we can value as distinctly rhetorical and ecological.  The 
“fundamental thought” here is more like a competing “strategy” designed to make the underlying 
principles he saw in Logos seem indispensable from the logos of a wise or “judicious man” –  a capacity 
to think that gave the wise man his sense of character and of fate. Unlike the poets Homer, Hesiod or 
Orpheus who either personified natural phenomena, or saw man “Born of the Earth” (which as Loraux 
demonstrated, established distinctions between natural men and their artificial creations and technical 
acts), and unlike the more fully fleshed-out theories of human nature we find in Plato or Aristotle, 
Heraclitus characterizes logos in the figure of a wise man, and argues for this brand of wisdom to 
become nothing less what me might simply call first second nature.     
 The term first second nature preserves his vital word play and his emphasis on paradox, while 
minimally defining Heraclitus’ singular strategy and its goal – a unique persuasive strategy drawn from 
his observations of Logos, to be embodied in his figuration of the wise man, with an end goal of making 
logos a broader ‘sense’-ability, or type of wisdom held in common. In other words, first second nature 
emphasizes that this ‘sage’ and his ‘truth value’ seems to be tied to a vital attempt to make something 
strategically persuasive from pre-Socratic ideas of first nature by affirming a way of thinking he thought 
should be so obvious that it be considered second nature.  Rhetoric has been particularly attentive to 
the recurring trope of ‘second nature’ from Aristotle’s association of rhetoric as part of the warring spirit 
that is “like second nature” to man (in The Politics 1.3.8, and Rhetoric, 1152a 30-32), to George 
Campbell’s belief that a rhetorician’s work involves negotiating the fundamental relationship between 
human nature and evidence (The Philosophy of Rhetoric, volume 1), to Burke’s contention that man is by 
nature the ‘symbol using animal’.   Here we can shift our attention from unpacking the rhetorical tropes 
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that make up Heraclitus’ compact rhetorical strategy, to focus more explicitly on the desired ends, the 
form of common “attunement” or abilities that would deeply embed something like rhetorical and 
ecological thought as competing with (or at least holding the same currency as) the emerging ideas of 
truth, nature, and human nature.    
We can discuss this effort on three levels.  First, and most explicitly, in the effort to promote his 
figure of the wise man as one holding this ability or ‘attunement’ that observes an ‘order of fire’ in 
oneself and in society -- and who uses this as a form of leadership that actively promotes this as a 
necessary form of public intelligence.91  In this perspective, we see his intervention not only as a 
compact rhetorical strategy deploying aphoristic or epigrammatic wisdom relying on the rhetorical 
tropes discussed above, but also as a type of pact for the judicious man to deontologize and transgress 
boundaries like human and nature, to promote instead a common ability that is recognizably rhetorical 
in its attempt to create social connections as a form of attunement or harmonia.92   Second, we can 
account for the distinctive goals of his ‘common knowledge’ as having not only a personal/social role, 
but an ethical characterization designed to reverse some tendencies he saw in emerging natural 
sciences -- particularly Anixamander’s view that natural strife, or the growth and passing away of nature, 
was unjust.  As is fairly well known, the common intelligence Heraclitus initiates is intent on promoting a 
form of cosmodicy – an ethical model that hinges on his “judicious thinker” promoting a way of thinking 
that might make the connections between personal, social, ‘technological’ and natural change seem not 
only obvious and inseparable, but potentially just.93  Together, these arguments might compel us to 
delineate the emergence of an “ecological rhetoric” in Heraclitus’ thought, which we can use to 
distinguish his intervention from these earlier ideas about contingency or ‘higher truth.’   
The first way Heraclitus’ logos promotes something like first second nature is in his treatment of 
the ‘inward-outward’ turn of a judicious thinker –his promotion of the ‘wise man’ as a figure reflecting 
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upon destructive tendencies equated with ‘second nature’ which he aligns with an ability to observe 
destructive trends in ‘first nature’.   It is commonplace in Heraclitus studies to note that Heraclitus 
sought to promote an “inward journey [where] one discovers the value of a measured existence for 
one's well-being, which depends upon knowledge of the proper limits of the great destructive forces of 
emotion and desire” (Granger 257).  This turn inward is never dissociated from its essential opposite 
orientation, the outward observations of a world order of "fire ever living, kindled in measures and in 
measures going out" (B30).  Heraclitus promotes this basic dialectic as a vital human measure of a world 
and our impact on that world – as only by looking outward to nature’s Logos can one reflect inward in a 
way that promotes a kind of self-understanding of our common destructive tendencies.  His figure of 
wisdom or ‘judicious man’ has to start with a fundamental question: What can be done to counteract an 
aspect of human nature itself?  The answers he offers are in caught in the same dialectical questions 
about how the ‘wise-man’ can live with a deeper sense of strife, caught in a tendency towards more 
mystical, reclusive, and introspective pursuits, which all point to a singular pursuit of logos  -- a form of 
wisdom which requires one taking on a more active social or public role.  Heraclitus of course seems to 
have become an aloof sage himself, with an “inward-turning wisdom” in the singular pursuit of one 
intelligence (or logos) in all things. It almost goes without saying that the figure of “sound thinking” 
Heraclitus promoted is often reduced to Heraclitus’ own path in life and its odd conclusion, ending (as 
the story goes) as a reclusive and elitist “hater of humanity wandering in the mountains living on a diet 
of grass and herbs,” speaking for nature and truth before dying of a natural remedy for malnutrition that 
either involved drowning in a cure made from dried cow dung, or baking to death in this remedy as he 
lay in the sun (Critchley 12).  Such stories turn the distrust Heraclitus had for the thinking and actions of 
everyday people into a main trope of an elitist philosophy looking down on the wider human condition, 
rather than emphasizing the basic tension between an ‘inward journey’ and his apparent aspirations to 
make a ‘common truth’ ring with everyday knowledge.  The role of the wise and ‘privileged thinker’ is in 
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fact to show that such fundamental “truths” about destructive tendencies are “superabundant” or 
equally open to all, or “no farther away than in the homely truths of every man's daily life” (Granger 
258).  While Heraclitus also seems to have seen this wisdom as a rare skill and virtue,94 he encourages 
this capacity in individuals only if it creates leadership95 that would encourage a certain common sense, 
stating that “speaking with sense we must fortify ourselves in the common sense of all… for all human 
laws are nourished by the one divine law.  For it prevails as far as it will and suffices for all and is 
superabundant” (B114).96  The full challenge for the wise man, as far as we can tell today, is to work 
against a “great clutter of truths,” to make a few “well-integrated truths…yield to a judicious man,” and 
to make these persuasive enough that they make common “man’s character his fate” (B 19, 238).      
This brings us to the second way first second nature becomes an important target for Heraclitus’ 
thought, as this characterization of the wise man making ‘sound thinking’ common is the basis for any 
sense of Heraclitus’ ethics. When Heraclitus says: “Sound thinking as the greatest virtue and wisdom: to 
speak the truth and to act on the basis of an understanding of the nature of things” (B112), this 
fragment is agonizingly open to interpretation, but it hinges on his repeatedly making the categories of 
“speaking” and “action” integral to the “character” and “fate” of a “judicious man,” a point he 
frequently makes by contrasting his wisdom to Pythagoras’ “bookish” wisdom that transformed nature 
into a form of private “malpractice” and “plagiarism” and mistook language as “a necessary condition 
for wisdom for a sufficient one” (Granger 248).   As we noted earlier, Heraclitus’ paragrammatical 
choices present some evidence of his distrust of some emerging genres of writing, which seems largely 
due to their insufficiencies in supporting forms of public intelligence.97  This also reinforces his tendency 
to endorse his type of wisdom as enacted through a type of “common sense” which he (and the wise 
man) promotes quite literally as a way of seeing.  In promoting vision over other senses (as he says “eyes 
are more exact witnesses than ears,” B 101), Heraclitus elevates a kind of first hand learning based quite 
literally on an ability to see a wide variety of phenomena in nature, language and culture as all taking 
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place like “exchanges for fire.”   While aspects of this idea are unclear, we can put it plainly as an odd 
spin on ‘common sense’ that is most clearly at odds with the ‘common sense’ Aristotle defined in De 
Anima (Book III, Part 2) as sensus communis, a lower tier rationality whereby the senses unite and judge 
the substance of a thing (a howl of a wolf for example).  Heraclitus instead differentiates and elevates an 
ability to see/observe similarities in nature, society, and self as the highest prerogative. Common sense 
is for Heraclitus, as Nietzsche argued, rooted in a an ability to recognize repeating patterns in nature and 
in everyday life, and to maintain that these are the beginnings of what is just, an idea that is distinctly 
contrary to Anixamander who offered the idea that the natural law of becoming and passing away is 
unjust.  Nietzsche showed that Heraclitus instead presents a polemical “cosmodicy over and against his 
predecessor, the teacher of the injustice of the world” (PPP, 63).  Cosmodicy, a term for the vindication 
of the goodness of the cosmos, becomes (to put it very briefly by comparison) an insistence that justice 
starts with observations of the strife of nature and is developed through their concords (or ‘conflictual 
harmony’) with the forms of striving one does in everyday life.98  It was in reading Heraclitus that 
Nietzsche most firmly rejects any formal separation between systems of morality and the patterns of 
strife in nature, deeming instead the necessity of finding ethics only in the idea that Heraclitus started, 
which, as Simon Gillham put it, “from ceaseless strife comes ceaseless justice” (148).  History, 
philosophy and ethics are rendered meaningful only in the face of such patterns of necessity which are 
visible in nature and life, and from their articulations as a common sense, since in Heraclitus “this 
conception of justice is grounded in accordance between the just man and the creative strife of the 
cosmos” (148).     
Conclusion: 
We might emphasize in conclusion some of what seems to have limited the Heraclitus that we 
have discussed here as a rhetorical intervention.  If we take something of his aim to be as ambitious as 
creating something like first second nature, and this is to be something common, it is in notable contrast 
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to other more familiar types of ‘common knowledge’-- since Heraclitus consistently shows his disinterest 
and distrust in persuading towards common ground or common consensus.  For Heraclitus, ‘common 
sense’ is not like Cicero’s use of the common to denote the rhetor’s efforts to account for “common 
practice, custom, speech, views, and mentality of the crowd whose tastes the orator had to take into 
account if he were to influence them” (De Oratore, I, 3, 12).   Although, it is perhaps like Cicero’s 
common sense when it factors in the ethical sense he attributes to the “collection of spontaneous 
judgments which all men possess by nature and which permits them to discern good from evil” (De 
Oratore, III, 50, 195).    The specific differences would be that Heraclitus’ fundamental strategy seems to 
be designed as a rhetorical strategy best suited for the sage or teacher (sophist), though this connection 
is never clear, and is one that may not have disseminated as a common rhetorical ability to press back 
against certain common fallacies associated with other emerging pursuits of nature, human nature and 
truth, forcing inquiry into certain rhetorical fields that were seemingly unexplored by his 
contemporaries.  Instead, if we read Heraclitus’ texts as a strategic rhetorical intervention that did 
disseminate significantly, it seems to have done so in other important ways, as influencing perceptions 
of nature an human agency to some extent.   Susan Jarratt notes something similar when she stresses 
the importance of Heraclitus for the sophists, noting that he offers a theory of “human agency for 
change” in light of the “continuity between physical and social forms” (47).  This is perhaps one and the 
same starting point for thinking about his influence on rhetoric, and for thinking about the ‘ecologist’s 
challenge’ it still presents.  Heraclitus intervenes among concepts like truth, nature and human nature 
by pushing thinking into a rhetorical field that must be responsive to ‘obvious’ or perceptible aspects of 
logos.  But that this is actively promoted as integral to an ‘original’ human condition, seems to be only 
an untapped potential for the teachings of the sophists, who clearly treated subjects not as any singular 
or isolated human nature, but instead as part of rhetorical terrain for a network of activity in 
relationships between nature, society, technê and the self.   We could say that Heraclitus’ promotion of 
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a wise subject is similar to some figures of the sophists, whose ‘wisdom-for-hire’ always involved 
thinking through set of relations held in place by rhetorical structures of relations, exchanges and 
possibility.  This has been argued to marks the terrain a ‘relational ontology,’ but for rhetoricians it 
might be the terrain of a primordial ecological rhetoric.99  As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, 
while Heraclitus is recognizable as introducing an odd mix of ecological themes, combining of material 
monism, the doctrine unity of opposites, and dialectics, it might be the rhetorical quality of his wisdom 
that sutures these together and brings the "natural" (the physical, material, or ecological) into a our 
present concerns about ecology that are today suffused with concerns about articulation, discursivity, 
and social construction, without, at the same time, taking us back to any ideas about transcendental 
nature, or simply to something like post-modern contingency.  In so doing, we might keep in mind that if 
Aristotle and Theophrastus suit ecological histories interested in clarifying the beginnings of a scientific 
epistemology undergirding one division of ecological thought, Heraclitus might be understood as carving 
another primal space for ecological thought among the pre-Socratics, one that is perhaps only well 
understood rhetorically. 
To put it more plainly, this is a prompt which rhetoricians might take up again as a challenge.   
Many philosophers and classicists since have come together to challenge the once commonplace 
presentation of Heraclitus’ work as one of “superficial obscurity” with treatments of Heraclitus as 
offering a more “systematic view of human existence, a theory of language which sees ambiguity as a 
device for the expression of multiple meaning, and a vision of human life and death within the larger 
order of nature.”100   As I see it, the two concepts discussed in this chapter can emphasize that what is 
often interpreted as obscure or esoteric wisdom in Heraclitus is essentially grounded in a fundamental 
rhetorical strategy to make logos something distinctly common -- a strategy that has long engaged us as 
teachers and scholars with historical exigencies about truth, relativism, nature and ethics that only seem 
to resonate more strongly with ecological concerns today (Kahn ix).    At the beginning of this chapter we 
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saw several ways Heraclitus has already been considered an important figures in deep ecology and 
ecosophy, and how we might enhance his potential contribution to ecological thought through 
rhetorical readings that make logos from the Logos into a more consistent theme.  To finally draw 
conclusions about how such rhetorical approaches provide methods for reading the ‘persistent 
challenge’ Heraclitus presents, first second nature is a challenge that might resonate with our histories 
of rhetoric, as well as current trends in critical theory and ecological thought.   The field has both 
cautioned against historicizing rhetoric in relation to Heraclitus (Metzer) and looked to make historical 
connections to Heraclitus both valid and interesting.101  Schiappa, and several scholars since, have read 
Heraclitus as the possible initiator of the man-measure doctrine and at Protagoras’ two-logoi fragment 
as “a logical extension of the Heraclitean thesis” (Schiappa), as leading to Gorgias’ unique emphasis on 
kairos (Miller), or as offering a peculiar theory of style meaning, and persuasion given to rhetoric by “an 
ontology of flux” within a very particular “religio-pholosophical rhetoric” of a historical moment 
(Poster). 102  Susan Jarratt’s Rereading the Sophists argues that Heraclitus was a key figure grounding the 
Sophistic movement in an early ‘science’ and concern with things ‘natural,’ and that he established the 
paradox that lead to the “contradictory arguments Protagoras identified as the basis of rhetorical 
encounters and the only possible source of knowledge,” a sophistic principle that need not lead to “a 
necessary logic of non-contradiction,” but to “at least a suggestion ... that other arrangements of 
thought and language were possible” (45).   Would it not be possible then to see Heraclitus as the 
forerunner of an ecological rhetoric?   
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 Chapter Three) The Whole Strategy/To Stir the Earth:  Bacon’s Ruse of Mastery and the Precepts of Rhetorical Invention 
Do not be in a hurry to open Heraclitus’ book. The Ephesian’s work is very hard going.  It is unrelieved 
darkness unless an initiate guide your steps, and then it is brighter than the sun.   
Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, p. 225 
We are very far from knowing enough about Lord Bacon, the first realist in every great sense of that 
word…  
Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p.246 (1888)  
"I am not much in the habit of giving you advice concerning university work, but if you want to study 
Bacon, I don't think that you would be wasting your time."  
Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, p. 267 (1978) 
Introduction:   
 
Being convinced that the human intellect makes its own difficulties, not using the true helps which are at 
man’s disposal soberly and judiciously; whence follows manifold ignorance of things, and by reason of 
that ignorance mischiefs innumerable; he thought all trial should be made, whether that commerce 
between the mind of man and the nature of things, which is more precious than anything on earth, or at 
least than anything that is of the earth, might by any means be restored to its perfect and original 
condition, or if that may not be, yet reduced to a better condition than that in which it now is.103 
Opening lines: The Great Instauration 
There is perhaps no opening judged more often for its audaciousness than these first lines of 
Bacon’s Great Instauration or his ensuing claim that “there was but one course left, therefore -- to try 
the whole thing anew upon a better plan, and to commence a total reconstruction of sciences, arts, and 
all human knowledge, raised upon the proper foundations” (8).   His ambitious ‘new natural philosophy’ 
took shape in writings that were capacious and often incomplete, taking on subjects ranging from the 
most particular axioms of logic to the most general questions about natural philosophy, history, science, 
mechanics, magic, wisdom, and rhetoric.104   While he stands out among early modern contemporaries 
for his skillful and subtle treatments of many such topics, it might be his drive to displace older 
philosophic and religious discourses on nature, truth, ethics, and politics with a revised idea of ‘mastery’ 
that has shaped his legacy more than any other.  Mastery is, of course, not a concept Bacon carefully 
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defines.  It has, most often, been given distinctive shape through efforts at interpreting a Baconian ethos 
fueling his ambitious new method that would not yield “just a few discoveries, but a mastery over 
nature hitherto undreamed of” by aligning the “twin objects: human Knowledge and human Power, 
which do really meet in one” (Purvers 32).105   Just as any sense of mastery is bound to be flanked 
between these ‘twin objectives’ of Bacon’s legendary attempt to bring together truth and works, or 
knowledge and power, it is also flanked by two standard evaluations of the methodical and the 
rhetorical aspects of his work, which also go hand-in-hand.  On one hand, Bacon’s elaborate method 
revolutionized empirical research, induction and experimental science, and revised a theory of forms -- 
all of which made nature more accessible as it grew more open to manipulation by scientist as the 
knower/maker of nature’s representations, which radically changed the groundwork for the productions 
of truth and knowledge.  On the other hand, a conception of the ‘mastery of nature’ is (more often?) 
studied not just as praxis oriented methodology fed by empirical research, data gathering and 
experiment, but as a rhetorical framework sustaining a sort of credence or belief that scientific, 
technological and social advancement would come to depend on increasing knowledge of natural 
phenomena and control of natural processes as the fuel for a new age of production.  Thus, as many 
Bacon scholars know well, ‘mastery’ is perhaps even better understood as a kind of master trope 
constraining a number of historiographical perspectives on Bacon’s authoritative thought, acting as both 
metonymy (a great reduction of the shifting conceptions of truth and nature that Bacon helped usher 
into early modern discourses on science), and as metaphor (a means of shaping many subsequent 
perspectives returning to Bacon’s sense of ‘mastery’ to explain other forms of power that carry-over 
from one historical moment to another).  Montaigne in fact seems to be the first to have alluded to 
Bacon’s central trope in this way, calling such interpretations the beginning of a ‘ruse of mastery’ and 
hinting at how such readings would come to reduce or amplify Bacon’s reputation and value for the 
present. 106   Indeed, in recent years Bacon’s ‘mastery’ has indeed become the frequent target of 
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environmental critiques looking for the root of problems in the spirit of science that Bacon brought to an 
age of production.  This has perhaps been the greatest ‘ruse’ on ecological thought in recent decades, 
since Bacon’s theme of mastery introduces us to his distinctive mix of arrogance and human agency in 
his vision of rhetoric, which can help us think through a spirit of science in an age of consumption.  
Thus, it is largely by rethinking a relationship between this theme of mastery and the role 
granted to rhetoric in his body of work that Francis Bacon becomes a pivotal figure in this dissertation’s 
study of rhetoric in a history of ecological thought.  In one respect this chapter follows a series of 
responses to the dissemination of this theme in more recent decades, when Bacon became a figurehead 
for the ‘mastery of nature’ and shaped a well-known crux in ecological thought where his philosophy 
and method have been used to help explain many more contemporary forms of domination.  Such 
arguments have gone as far as positioning Bacon as one of the great “sources of all our ecological 
misfortunes” for promoting a “philosophy [that] gave birth to the scientific dream of modernity [where] 
the advancement of society goes hand-in-hand with the unimpeded development of all technologies” 
(Mathews 15, Zittel xx).   Even though the term ‘mastery’ as dominatus only surfaces in a handful of 
instances in all of his work, and usually in the context of cautioning against a form scientific arrogance, 
conceptions of ‘mastery’ were indeed woven into a foreboding theme by many of the grander critiques 
of technoscience in the 20th century, such as Heidegger, Popper, Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse, 
Merchant and Harding who all libeled Bacon as one of the origins and authors of a topoi of mastery.  In 
such readings, Bacon’s attempts to renovate scholasticism and natural philosophy in order to found a 
new “commerce between the mind of man and the nature of things” became the grounds for well-
known critiques of the modern scientific method, positivism, objectivism, rationalization and technê --  
usually by selecting particular phrases about ‘disturbing nature’ (natura vexata), ‘mechanizing natural 
philosophy,’107 or ‘instrumentalizing science’ and connecting these to an ill-fated alignment of 
knowledge, power, science and technology.  It almost goes without saying that many of these 
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arguments are also guilty of extending what Foucault called the “blackmail of the enlightenment,” the 
forced choice that one must be “for or against” this transition into a 17th century intellectual movement 
without regard for its complexities.108  Indeed, Bacon might be a more problematic case of ‘blackmail,’ 
as historians like Paolo Rossi and Nieves Mathews have noted an awkward inclination where: “those 
who exalted science allowed Bacon no part in it, while those who looked on it as thoroughly evil, saw 
him as its very essence.” 109   The resulting ebb and flow between “character assassinations” and 
historical “defenses” is a trend that Mathews charted in great depth, noting that the most influential 
defenses of Bacon tended to recapture how Bacon not only ushered in key methods and concepts 
supporting the emergence of physical and applied sciences in the 17th century, but a philosophical 
system that bridged a brand of vitalism with rationalism (most notably defended by Vico and 
Whitehead), or that developed a system that placed its highest values on developing ethical 
relationships between scientific, political, social and experiential knowledge formation (most notably 
valued by Coleridge).110  The result of the so-called ‘blackmail’ and subsequent ebb-and flow of 
‘recoveries’ have overshadowed much of what might be more resolutely important about Bacon’s 
rhetoric, and its use in an age of ecology.  
Rhetorical scholars have, of course, also made many important contributions to ‘defending’ 
Bacon by revaluing the role and responsibility Bacon granted to rhetoric as a discipline and as a force or 
power affecting social change – indeed, a good number of contemporary analyses of Bacon now take for 
granted that his reform of the scientific method and his reform of rhetoric go hand-in-hand. 111   It has 
been demonstrated frequently enough that those who have branded Bacon’s authoritative ideas of 
‘commanding’ or  ‘mastering’ of nature as exploitative have persistently misread his rhetorical 
innovations or strategies, or, as I will argue, more substantially missed the role and responsibility Bacon 
gave to rhetoric in constructing human/nature relationships.   Here I am joining a group of scholars who 
have endeavored to counter a wide-range of resentment towards Bacon’s authority and influence by 
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paying closer attention to the central role of persuasion in Bacon’s work (Vickers 3).112   Brian Vickers 
and John Briggs in particular have shown that twentieth century perspectives building on a topoi of 
mastery have persistently avoided the central role of rhetoric and persuasion as “the paradigm for 
Bacon’s ‘universal Philosophy’ or the ‘wisdom’ he identifies with new learning … the new sciences, which 
indeed promise to move or persuade ‘all things’” (Vickers, 3, Briggs 1-2).   Given that Bacon has, as 
Zappen argued, “upheld several different even incompatible and conflicting views of science and 
scientific rhetoric [in search of] models or precedents for our own time,” it seems most worthwhile to 
return to Bacon’s broader meanings of mastery as they correlate with his deeper insights on this 
‘promise of persuasion’.  This asks us to think about the odd admixture of agency and arrogance that 
materializes in his discussions of rhetoric and persuasion as the heart of surprisingly apposite forms of 
‘mastery’ that take on a range of meanings for this term as forms of power and dominion as well the 
forms of skill, control, or proficiency that mark Bacon’s ideas about the ‘arts of possibility’ that he 
articulates largely as rhetorical strategies for configuring novel human/nature relationships.    
Therefore, this chapter aims to rethink this topoi of mastery by arguing for a rhetorical 
conception of Bacon’s mastery that takes shape as both a set of strategies in Bacon’s thought, and 
particularly as a structuring principle for Bacon’s reformulation of rhetorical invention as a leading 
concept in his natural philosophy.113   As a ‘strategy’ it might be wise to appropriate what Michel Serres 
once called a “whole strategy” when arguing that mastery surfaced within “Francis Bacon’s work, 
[wherein] these relations have been described, from the heights of his social situation, by the 
command/obedience couplet. One commands nature only by obeying it” (21).   Serres situated this 
‘command/obey’ trope as central to Bacon’s sense of praxis, calling it a “political ideology betrayed by 
the prosopopeia—which implies practices of ruse and subtlety: in short, a whole strategy” (21).114  This is 
an apt term for the pivotal role Bacon gave to a set of rhetorical strategies and their connection to 
guiding a number of social actions, which Serres both reduces to their simplest form as a 
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‘command/obey’ imperative, and identifies as a form of ‘betrayal’ because it is not a natural “contract 
but a strategy, a tactic not a pact, a fight to the death and not a coitus” (105).  Of course, Serres is here 
only reiterating a well-known historical sentiment undermining or undervaluing both the complexion 
and the components of this whole strategy since Hobbes and Descartes who, although they were great 
admirers of Bacon, diluted the value of any “strategic” rhetorical designs of our relationships with 
‘nature’ because this is not reasonable enough, because there is too much of a duel or agonistic struggle 
for mastery of nature between reason and rhetoric.   
The first arc of this chapter is therefore a genealogy of sorts, a look at a number of the historical 
‘revaluations’ of the rhetorical strategies that form this whole strategy for shaping nature/culture 
relations.  Continuing my method of rhetorical hermeneutics in this dissertation, I analyze rhetorical 
paths of thought by examining rhetoric as a topic and as a tool, and more particularly, I describe the 
latter in terms of “rhetorical strategy as practice” by examining how rhetorical and discursive practices, 
performances and techniques are inextricable from exercises of power.  The initial genealogy may also 
‘betray’ some of Bacon’s own ideas by foregrounding a reception history that enhances some preferable 
ideas that Bacon often contradicts elsewhere, or by aligning and simplifying some of his key principles 
and precepts through these histories that are better suited to the present.   As such, the goal of this 
chapter is a genealogy that works to articulate Bacon’s whole strategy as a more dynamic set of 
rhetorical strategies than typically accounted for, demonstrating that his sense of mastery must be 
approached from several angles, and that it can be demarcated in familiar rhetorical forms as power, 
dominion, control, skill and proficiency.  Like in many rhetorical histories, in this reading Bacon is treated 
less as a pre-scientific figure working to inaugurate a modern scientific method, than as a figure 
inaugurating a version of ‘scientific rhetoric’ that still holds much value, in this case as promoting an 
open-ended art of invention that might create correlated means of human control over nature and 
society that he fundamentally treats as an ecology of persuasive forces.  
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As such, the bulk of this chapter then turns to a closer reading of Bacon’s primary texts to build 
on Bacon’s whole strategy by introducing two rhetorical “precepts of invention” -- a term he uses in 
both Advancement and Novum to denote certain principles, axioms and strategies (CXXVII).  This reading 
requires making a considerable switch in emphasis from some disciplinary views that Bacon attenuated 
this canon by reducing it to a role of ‘mere discovery’ in support of Bacon’s science, a praxis oriented 
method, or a ‘new natural philosophy,’ towards reading rhetorical invention as a leading category for his 
thought.  To state it plainly, in this chapter I stress invention as an exigency for both the well-known 
internal functions Bacon gave to rhetoric as a tool for ‘managing’ the faculties within his larger rational 
system and ‘moderating’ the imagination in his constructivist epistemology, and as an exigency for 
related external functions where Bacon grants explores the potential roles of rhetoric as a social force, 
those strategies which inspire and organize some of his more aggressive persuasive strategies for 
changing the relationships between nature and culture.115  My final section concludes by considering 
what a more recent history of ecological thought might resemble had it embraced Bacon’s handling of 
rhetoric and of the question of mastery in particular – examining especially the long shadow this casts 
on deep ecology, the precepts of anthropomorphic/ecocentric debate in ecological ethics, and more 
recent trends in ecological though that seem to slow-down or undermine many strategic or political 
responses to today’s ecological exigencies.    
Visions of Mastery, Rhetorical Revisions, and the Whole Strategy  
 
Nature to be commanded must be obeyed; and that which in contemplation is as the cause is in 
operation as the rule”  
Novum Organum, 1.3, Works 4:47 
English Renaissance ideas of rhetoric—and hence ideas of persuasion—are invisible to modern 
readers precisely because they have not taken into account the traditional associations of natural 
philosophy... with the figures and ends of rhetoric. 
(Briggs, 12) 
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Bacon’s influence on a history of ideas cannot, of course, be reduced to the loaded question of 
mastery, but its polarizing effect on a long history of venerations and admonishments is testimony to 
how often this theme has been used to help explain the spirit of science, evolving power structures and 
human/nature relationships.  Twentieth century interpretations have revisited Bacon’s “mastery” in its 
most conspicuous forms, with the inclination of turning Bacon’s “great authority” into a “kind of place-
holder for a particular ethos or way of thinking [standing in for an] entire history in which nature moves 
from a position of authority over humanity to a position of subservience, and ultimately slavery” 
(Desroches 16).   Evolving alongside these, however, there is a lesser-known genealogy in response to 
this recent brand of critique, responses which have aimed to correct, contextualize, delimit or enrich a 
more complex rhetorical handling of his idea of mastery (or should I say rhetoric of mastery?).  Coming 
from work within rhetorical studies and other disciplinary perspectives, these responses provide us with 
a review of differing perceptions of Bacon’s mastery, and some necessary groundwork supporting more 
pressing perspectives on Bacon’s mastery a set of rhetorical strategies, or whole strategy linked to his 
revival of rhetorical invention as a leading concept in his thought. 
 First you might consider what Dennis Desroche calls the “rhetorical threads in Bacon’s thinking” 
which have been speciously teased out when evaluating Bacon’s sense of mastery as the beginning of 
more modern “technological abuses of nature” (in Forces of Nature, 2012) (15).  The first tends towards 
a myopic focus on a patriarchal rhetoric that simultaneously devalues nature and the feminine,116  the 
second to find Bacon to exalt ‘objective’ and ‘instrumental’ knowledge while reducing nature to 
pragmatic social or economic use value, and the third to unearth Bacon’s sanctioning of anthropocentric 
and exploitative styles of government (15-16).117  Desroche, like numerous ‘defenses’ familiar to 
rhetorical scholars such as Keroetge, Vickers, Soble, Mathews, and Parry, diagnoses these readings as 
evolving “bad habits” with the tendency of picking up only one end of the “rhetorical thread” of a 
“command/obey” imperative.  Rhetorical scholars have instead secured this well-known 
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‘command/obey’ trope as a fundamental tenet supported by a wider set of rhetorical strategies with 
prominent effects on Bacon’s audiences or on subsequent discursive practices (12).  Desroches 
reiterates the basic pedigree of this defense in the following claim:  
Bacon feels compelled, furthermore, to point out in both the “Preface” and the “Plan” of “The 
Great Instauration,” that “Nature to be commanded must be obeyed,” repeating this suggestion 
yet again in Book II; “man,” ultimately, must be construed as the “servant and interpreter of 
nature.” Thus nature may indeed be the “spouse” of science, but which spouse it is …is not 
easily determined if we remain sensitive to [limited] rhetorical dynamics of Bacon’s thought.118 
(20)  
Appealing to modern readers to account for “both ends of this rhetorical thread” or what he calls a 
“kind of doubleness of rhetorical strategy” that is “persistent throughout Bacon’s body of work… but 
routinely disregarded by scholars both within and beyond the confines of Bacon commentary,” 
Desroches argues that the command/obey trope is a baseline rhetorical strategy that manifests in a 
number of related ‘double strategies’ supporting Bacon’s method for learning, and epitomizing his 
broader vision for new forms of scientific advance and new forms of human/nature relationships (18). 
These ‘double strategies’ have been exhaustively analyzed in terms of the role Bacon granted his 
imaginative prose, or in terms of key metaphors that scaffold or complicate premises of Bacon’s new 
natural philosophy (Desrosche 15).119  As John Briggs stated succinctly, there is a whole body of work 
that has “testified to a more general tendency … to attribute immense suasory energy to poetic and 
rhetorical fictions” as substantial parts of Bacon’s “rational” program (11).   For Desroche, a richer set of 
dueling metaphors profiles not only Bacon’s obvious reliance on the occasional rhetorical strategy but 
reveals the basic conception of mastery as an adaptation of a “dialectical wisdom” that calibrates a 
philosophy between two human drives:  a “violent race” to command nature by scientific or 
instrumental means and a slower “cultivation” of nature for social good (18). 120   Desroches typifies 
many interpretations that focus on how Bacon ‘moderated’ his drive for mastery in some way, usually 
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by according Baconian metaphors of ‘care’ and ‘cultivation’ with essential roles in shaping Bacon’s 
articulation of the relationships between humans and nature as guided to some extent by his rhetoric.   
We can expand on Desroches’ view by situating this command/obey trope as not only a 
‘dialectical wisdom’ but as a wisdom that draws us deeper into a number of rhetorical strategies that 
Bacon set to work supporting this central trope in his writings.   Indeed, there are a number of 
exemplary arguments showing (as Briggs, Soble, Vickers and others worked diligently to prove) that 
Bacon actually worked to ‘cultivate’ a number of rhetorical and persuasive conditions that were 
overwhelmingly successful in not only creating the Baconian method as a “new art of inquiry” that 
would truly interpret and “command” nature, but do so in a way that would cause most of his closest 
followers to “speak of nature with a good deal of humility and respect” (see Vickers 353-7, and Soble 
461-2).   We can examine these rhetorical and persuasive conditions briefly through the lens of a 
number of historical analyses that have traced the effects of Bacon’s rhetorical strategies on subsequent 
discursive practices.  In order to keep their divisions clear, we might classify these as historical 
expressions of a rhetoric of revelation, a rhetoric of instrumentality, and a rhetoric of reflection.    
The first category, a rhetoric of revelation, was skillfully articulated by Briggs in part to counter 
many scholarly commitments to reading Bacon as “the essence of modernity” by showing how Bacon’s 
rhetoric constructed a set of terms for discovering a ‘new nature’ of secrets, violence and revelations 
that was unapproachable with traditional logic, but that could only by “mastered” rhetorically by turning 
nature into a “providential code” (viii).121   This code served as an “organizing principle […for] the 
relation between his science and his rhetoric,” as the latter became a means to a “profoundly 
restorative” end where all new discoveries and innovations could only seen to take place within the 
“unifying idea of God’s role in history” by any orthodox  reading of Bacon’s philosophy (viii-ix).  In other 
words, Bacon’s rhetoric transformed God into a “code-maker who makes nature decipherable to the 
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‘sons of science’” -- and this “paradigm” helped others work out scientific discoveries within a rhetoric 
of revelation, revealing nature’s (and God’s) secrets to be “mastered with religious care rather than 
merely Herculean force” (ix, 1-2).122  
The second category, drawing some of the most renewed interest, can be loosely grouped as 
rhetoric of instrumentality which, to put it simply, emphasizes that Bacon’s major influence on his age’s 
attraction ‘truth’ was inseparable from his developing a more sophisticated sense of both 
instrumentality and rhetoric as indispensible categories leading the ascent up this famous ‘hill of truth’.    
In other words, rhetorical and instrumental processes figure prominently in his methods of interpreting 
nature, and as forces he sought to control or amplify in his larger program for advancing learning and for 
social betterment.  Scholars have tended therefore to emphasize that what Bacon’s methods worked to 
master was not something like a novel scientific objectivity, but what Ronald Levao called the “Mobility 
of Science” defined in the distinctive manner Bacon aspired to both inspire a new attraction to truth and 
to “produce a peculiar wavering about the plurality and contingency of our approaches to truth” (2).123    
Levao charts how Bacon does this as he consistently “mingles” “epistemic aggression” with other 
rhetorical and instrumental approaches to truth in ways that were designed to create “intellectual 
tolerance” to other methods, arts, and even cultures -- and most importantly, in order to promote 
further thinking about how these unavoidable mediations of truth can be leveraged to sway an 
emerging scientific knowledge towards social good.  Keep in mind that, as Thomas Kuhn and Sophie 
Wolfe both argued, Bacon also saw a deeper theoretical connection between rhetoric and early-modern 
instrumentality as theoretical lenses for understanding power, knowledge and social change.  Bacon 
often sees machines through the lens of rhetoric, and vice versa, since “machines foreground the 
intermedial nature of human knowledge and interaction… [and] provide a theoretical took kit …to 
analyze non-mechanical forms of mediation, from translation and rhetoric to diplomacy and the art of 
perspective” (Wolfe 5).   Jessica Wolfe, Sophie Weeks, Paolo Rossi, Antonio Perez-Ramos and others 
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have discussed at length how Bacon considered machines and instruments as “alternatively viewed as 
agents of truth and agents of deception,” as well as ‘artificial helps’ that can “imitate, supersede, or 
travesty the senses” (5).   Bacon searches out new ‘artificial helps’ from elaborate new systems for 
representing nature, notations of new and old experiments, complex tables of instances, technical 
models, prosaic and poetic descriptions -- and his thoughts on instrumentality align with many other 
Renaissance thinkers obsessed with how techniques and artes mechanicae seemed to definitely alter 
ancient epistemological debates.   In this vein, Bacon does treat machines and instruments as the 
potential for new forms of control over nature, not only for clarifying representations of nature, but 
forms of power he discusses in familiar rhetorical terms as the Greek characterizations of mechanical 
power, and largely as a species of metis, since machines are not only perceived as the adversary force to 
nature, but are viewed as potentially an improved form of cunning (we might master) or a subversive 
tactic of the weak to triumph over the strong (see Perez-Ramos 48-9, Wolfe 8-12).  As Bacon said in 
Book Two of The Advancement, “if my judgment be of any weight, the use of history mechanical is of all 
others the most radical and fundamental towards natural philosophy…” (I, XI).  
Thirdly, Bacon’s influence on a rhetoric of reflection is the most conventional perspective in 
rhetorical studies.  The focus here is on examining how Bacon re-conceived rhetoric as a serious art with 
the responsibility of arbitrating between imagination, reason, the will, character and virtue.  The more 
generous readings of his functional definition of rhetoric as “the application of reason to the imagination 
to move the will” have thus tended to value how Bacon granted rhetoric a new role in relation to the 
intellectual faculties, one that opens up his audience to timely historical process of enlightened 
reflection on the emergence of science, or taking this somewhat further, to valuing Bacon’s program as 
advancing a type of “scientific rhetoric” that asks us to think about the advance of science as 
inextricable from rhetoric as an intellectual art, and vice versa.124   This is essentially what Bizzell and 
Herzberg called a “critical epistemology” that divided the mind into faculties like reason, memory and 
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imagination, and then granted rhetoric a role in guiding these faculties in their imperfect perceptions of 
nature (where rhetoric is leveraged in an analytic role), as well as in guiding the four intellectual arts of 
inquiry and invention, judgment, memory and delivery (where rhetoric is leveraged mainly to moderate 
the faculty of the imagination and motivate the will towards reason) (623).  Here rhetoric is repurposed 
in potentially “taming” the excesses of imagination, but also in a role that guides or ‘tames’ reason in 
some instances (more on this below), especially as it serves to guide a more practical and moral version 
of science that Bacon both elevated and at times called “a monster, being strangely gazed at and 
admired by the ignorant and unskillful” (XXVIII, “Sphinx or Science,” Wisdom of the Ancients, 409). 125         
It is not difficult to see in each set of historical evaluations how Bacon’s uses for rhetoric take on 
some elements of this theme of mastery, or that Bacon drew out these potential designs for rhetoric to 
‘tame’ or ‘ground’ the new methods of experimental science in discriminating ways.  But when thinking 
about Bacon’s ‘scientific rhetoric’ as integral to his aggressive pursuit of scientific discoveries, we should 
note that his ambitious pursuit of a “higher science” also emphasized a more aggressive rhetoric of 
invention, one that, as I will argue in the upcoming section, is something Bacon deploys in order to 
articulate the ways his new “higher science” can take some control of a great “common world” (AL, XIV, 
6).126  What this emphasis would add to Bacon’s discerning rhetoric of reflection, instrumentality and 
revelation is a key rhetorical dimension of his thought that hinges on some his more explicitly 
‘manipulative’ rhetorical theories and strategies, which we can categorize as his theories and methods 
for an inventive art aimed at configuring human/nature relationships.   As Desroche said well, Bacon 
often seemed to engage with a more “domineering” rhetoric precisely because “nature was a 
force…that, precisely because of its clear superiority over humanity, could not otherwise be engaged” 
(Desroches 18).  As Briggs and Stephens have commented, for Bacon, nature’s vast impact on the 
conditions of life require us to strive for a version of rhetoric that is “clearly rational and manipulative,” 
and as Briggs said, Bacon’s rationale for the more manipulative aspects of rhetoric (which both authors 
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ultimately disregard) is something guiding his double aim to “perfect Aristotle” by making the “old 
rhetoric a respectable tool” for science, and to invent a “a new, more powerful art of ingenious 
presentation and persuasion” (Briggs 14).  As I see it, Briggs and Stephens put it very well, saying that 
these crucial components of Bacon’s rhetoric are articulated in such a way that it often “appears that 
the more Machiavellian Bacon’s tactics become, the more they can be justified as components of an 
enlightened style” (12).127   Keep in mind, however, that in a genealogy of ‘mastery’ it is the most 
influential admirers of Bacon such as Vico, Leibniz, and Hobbes who targeted these more 
“Machiavellian” or technocratic aspect of Bacon’s rhetoric to be rejected from an ‘enlightened 
Bacon.’128   We might today, however, find some place for Bacon’s enthusiasm for a form of rhetorical 
invention that he thought might impact the inventiveness of his culture, which he both admired and 
diagnosed as problematic.  As I will discuss in the upcoming section, Bacon seemed to think an inventive 
rhetoric would appeal not just to the intellect of the Renaissance man, but should create forms of 
persuasion that affect, as Wallace put it, the “whole man” by a certain spirit of science and an age of 
production (Wallace, 132).129   We can look at ways that Bacon diagnoses certain exigencies and 
mentalities he sees as hindering an art of invention, and how he stipulates a role for an inventive 
rhetoric that takes on a wider role of moderating, enhancing or conditioning the appetites and 
ambitions that undergird an inventive culture.  Indeed, certain perspectives on an ‘inventive art’ and 
specific ‘precepts’ laid out for rhetorical invention seem integral to his most ambitious ideas about a 
“higher science” that he envisioned as potentially shaping the wisdom of a “great common world” (AL, 
V, 6-7).    Again, characteristically, Bacon pursues a ‘higher science’ that is not beyond human control 
but within the reach of a ‘scientific rhetoric’ that grants key roles to an inventive ‘art’ that can be 
deployed to ‘master’ some of rhetoric’s most common and ‘universal’ powers captured in the human 
drives, ambitions and appetites as they affect social domains.  He recognizes, at least, that if he is to 
correct certain impediments to invention and to extend his ‘command/obey’ tenet deeply into the 
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‘middle propositions’ of everyday people (and a class of merchants and artisans in particular) than these 
forces also play a crucial role in bringing nature to culture.   In other words, as I will argue in the next 
section, to bring his theory of nature to culture, Bacon needs the inventive ‘arts of the possible’ – and 
this rounds out a type of ‘mastery’ turned to an ecology of persuasive forces that can be guided to some 
extent by an inventive art.       
The Precepts of Rhetorical Invention   
 
One of Bacon’s most appealing metaphors to scholars in recent years is of the ‘inventive 
animals’ which he used to mark differences in historical approaches to knowledge production and 
understandings of nature.130  The metaphor emphasizes that Bacon’s “art” would be a “middle way” 
hinging on its openness to several interdependent methodological goals, and as Nieves Matthews put it, 
resisting simply “severing poetry from science, art from technology, imagination from reason, the divine 
from the natural world” (Matthews 409).  Madeleine Muntersbjorn most recently translated the excerpt 
thusly: 
Those who have handled the sciences have been either Empiricists or Rationalists. 
Empiricists, like ants, merely collect things and use them. The Rationalists, like spiders, spin 
webs out of themselves. The middle way is that of the bee, which gathers its material from 
the flowers of the garden and field, but then transforms and digests it by a power of its 
own.131  (1:95, New Organon) 
While the ants discover but don’t invent, detecting things without really transforming them, and the 
spiders construct only of what comes from their own entrails, the middle way of the bee is distinctive as 
invention -- through a process of gathering and transforming nature into a “nourishing product” 
(Muntersbjorn 2).   This metaphor is a nice entry point to discussing the ways Bacon thinks about 
invention rhetorically, particularly as he considers a forms of influence over range of behaviors he thinks 
of as ‘transforming and digesting’ nature.  The bee metaphor in fact seems to underscore several ways 
Bacon repurposes an inventive rhetoric that, to some extent, leads or “handles” the other sciences by 
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creating the rhetorical conditions necessary for the advance of the combination of methods within his 
larger program – which of course was an arrangement of methods much grander in scope and design 
than the scientific methods of inquiry associated most closely with The Novum Organum.    
 Bacon’s philosophical and rhetorical system surfaces in its greatest detail in two main texts:  his 
first philosophical treatise The Advancement of Learning (Partition of the Sciences) (1605), which 
contains a review of the state of learning of his age and an important revision and restoration of rhetoric 
(as well as the subsequently expanded and translated version De Augmentis Scientiarum, 1623), and the 
Novum Organum (1620).  This “new instrument, or new instrument of science” focused on “True 
Directions Concerning the Interpretation of Nature,” explicating components of a scientific method as 
the mental and technical process of interpretations designed to replace the old reliance on 
resemblances well documented by Foucault.132  We should remember, however, that Bacon kept this 
method open to several other approaches to understanding and manipulating ‘nature’ in his expansive 
plan, summarized (but never completed) in six parts dedicated to: The Divisions of the Sciences, The New 
Organon: or Directions concerning the Interpretation of Nature, A Natural and Experimental History for 
the foundation of Philosophy, The Ladder of Intellect, The Forerunners: or Anticipations of the New 
Philosophy, and The New Philosophy: or Active Science.133   The “Preface” to the Novum notes that his 
new “art” of interpretation will indeed be both the “only way” to “command” nature, and yet not ready 
in its design to disrupt valuable debates of philosophers or to the bringing “profit to teachers of rhetoric 
and civil servants” -- for he claims that his radically new art will not be “ready at hand” for any of “those 
purposes” (1-2).  In a signature mix of arrogance and diplomacy, he invites these different “groups of 
philosophers” to collaborate in his new “way of doing philosophy” unless of course they have no 
“mental powers needed to understand it” or they “prefer cultivation rather than discovery” – the latter 
being the “only way to health” and the only way “to penetrate further, to conquer nature by works, not 
conquer an adversary by argument, to look not for nice probable opinions but for sure proven 
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knowledge” (1-2).  While Novum then focuses fairly tightly on a method of ‘true interpretation’ through 
three main stages, “A Natural and Experimental History,” “Tables and Arrangements of Instances,” and 
“Induction,” and succeeded in granting what Foucault called “the great privilege” to empirical 
observations in the sciences, Bacon also establishes his focus on a future realignment of the two greater 
methods for two approaching nature: “the interpretation of nature” and “the mind’s anticipation of 
nature.”  While the prior is addressed only a little in Novum, and usually as an impediment to Bacon’s 
ground clearing methods for interpretation, it’s worth remembering that Bacon returns to these 
problems of anticipation in more generous ways as the ‘forerunners’ of the sciences, especially in 
relation to his specific and unwavering “anticipation” that “the art of invention grows with inventions” 
(Advancement XIII, 10). 134    
This anticipation directs Bacon to a set of impediments to invention that leads him to writing 
several precepts for an inventive art that deploys some of his more ‘manipulative’ rhetorical strategies. 
While there has been some insistence that Bacon saw rhetoric as an art that “neither discovers nor 
invents” but “only discovers or recovers” (as Carolyn Miller and Janice Lauer have claimed, saying that 
Bacon made rhetoric neither generative nor epistemic but “managerial”), rhetoricians studying Bacon 
extensively have typically found the relationship between invention and rhetoric to be more 
complicated, pointing out that Bacon presents a “significantly altered view of invention which could not 
help alter views of rhetoric, if widely adopted” while disagreeing over whether he presents a 
“denigration of rhetorical invention …which ultimately constricted the range of rhetoric,” or whether 
there is a relationship between rhetoric and invention that establishes the “curious” tension between 
his “apparent contempt for the art” and his granting it “a far more extensive role than any other 
philosopher ever assigned to rhetoric” ( 32-36). 135   Following this work, we can examine how Bacon 
responds to a number of historical impediments in the Advancement in particular, where, as he says 
initially: man seems to pass over the art of invention with “cuique in sua arte credendum,” or with his 
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own a skill or craft to which we give him credit (Advancement, XIII, 2).  He argues that Cicero had 
correctly diagnosed this problem of tacit knowledge in craftsmen, but as he found no remedy, it 
returned as a more powerful and elusive problem affecting an intellectual ‘stagnation’ of sciences of 
discovery, a tacit instrumental reason of the craftsmen and merchant class, and a cultural disregard for 
other cultural and technological intelligences (see Book 2, sections XII-XV). 136  Bacon saw this problem 
compounding because it could not be adequately diagnosed or addressed by those thinking about the 
most “infinite particulars” that occupy physicians, or by those thinking about tradition in terms of 
universal rules or theories.  It could, however, be remedied by a process that can produce or “maketh 
the artsman differ from the inexpert” and by those thinkers who can generate and work with “the 
middle propositions” taken from both tradition and experience and most often used in discourses by the 
productive merchant and artisan class (XIII, 2).  It is here that Bacon begins to take up this problem as a 
rhetorical challenge on a number of fronts: (1) to address the famous “excluded middle” of Aristotelian 
logic of truth, falsity and non-contradiction, (2) to address the historic “consecration of invention” by the 
Egyptians, Greeks and Romans (who “ascribe the first inventions to men” leading us to “believe that 
Prometheus first stroke the flint and marveled at the spark” rather than having “expected” it), (3) to 
address the present effects of this legacy on a growing artisan and merchant class, and the effect on a 
political ethos that Bacon thinks is rife with colonialist arrogance about other culture’s technologies (like 
the widespread belief that “the West Indian Prometheus had no intelligence,” and (4) to address the 
allure of future inventions as a motivational force (XIII, 2).137   In other words, as Bacon sees it, this 
problem of invention affects the present use of traditional knowledge, the present culture of 
invention/production, and his program’s potential to advance and have some control of the future.   
These exigencies are the grounds that open up several key connections between rhetoric and 
invention – connections which have their ultimate stake in remedying scholastic and cultural 
relationships with ‘nature,’ an idea Bacon most pointedly asserts when he argues that the historical 
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impediments to an inventive art are what have “wronged, abused and traduced” nature in section XII. 3, 
where he accuses Plato and Aristotle’s logical induction as leading to both faulty principles of science 
which “pretended to be invented” and to the “fouler problem” stemming from how this missed the 
“duty of art to perfect and exalt nature” which they “contrariwise have wronged, abused, and traduced” 
(XII, 3).  The longer passage reads:   
The induction which the logicians speak of, and which seemeth familiar with Plato, whereby the 
principles of sciences may be pretended to be invented, and so the middle propositions by 
derivation from the principles; their form of induction, I say, is utterly vicious and incompetent; 
wherein their error is the fouler, because it is the duty of art to perfect and exalt nature; but 
they contrariwise have wronged, abused, and traduced nature. (XII, 3) 
As Bacon sees a tightly knit logic of invention and this neglect of the ‘excluded’ middle as major 
impediments to Bacon’s ‘art,’ we can foreground the rhetorical domain between true and false 
propositions as the frontline of this problem, which Bacon says has not only has been wrongly treated 
and neglected, but missed the potential opportunity and “duty” to “perfect and exalt nature.”  
It is said often enough that Bacon presents the first great argument that there is a “need for a 
philosophy of invention” and that this is what gives formal structure to the processes of production, 
invention, and ‘technology’ as the forerunners of the science of interpreting nature, of the advancement 
of learning, and of what creates the major impact of humanity’s presence in nature (Scharff and Dusek 
25).  We can, however, focus on the dynamic in Bacon’s thought that stems from his admiration for how 
the ancients enhanced a culture of invention, such as his condoning of the Egyptians who “deified their 
inventors” and the Greeks who were “unlucky” enough to have made only as many discoveries as other 
“irrational animals” but keen enough to kindle a cultural enthusiasm for the inventions they produced 
(25-26).   Throughout his work Bacon’s more ‘domineering’ rhetoric most often appears in relation to 
this enthusiasm for the impact of ‘productive works’ on a ‘culture of inventiveness,’ a trend which is 
evident from his earliest Essays, particularly in his tendencies to shift his discussions of the exigencies for 
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creating new forms of inquiry and discovery that mediate nature and the ‘truth’ to discuss shrewd 
rhetorical strategies for how to moderate, enhance, or condition the human appetites with these 
mediations.  These tendencies surface in Bacon’s earliest Essays (first published in 1597), where he 
began to map out some of the strategic ways rhetoric might affect what he desired to change most: man 
in relation to the physical world, man in relation to himself and his morals, and man in relation to truth 
and knowledge.138  From the first essay “Of Truth,” we see Bacon seeking to inspire a novel attraction to 
the ‘hill of truth’ while reflecting initially on the value and costs of truth and lies for pursuits of 
knowledge in relation to a range of civil affairs.  Bacon opens with the exigency that we think seriously 
about both moderating the “appetites” (which he calls a well-known “naked truth” made apparent by 
the mixture of truth and lies best achieved by poesy’s affecting of pleasure and commerce’s affecting of 
advantage) and enhancing their worth as persuasive social effects.  He opens the essay by swerving past 
any binary truth and falsity, answering the question “what is truth?” with a retort that it is not as simple 
as what those “discoursing wits” find when bringing a certain “delight in giddiness, and count it a 
bondage to fix a belief; affecting free-will in thinking, as well as acting” (we can safely assume these wits 
are in the veins of scholasticism as well as classical rhetoric) (3).  Bacon will never simply discount these 
“discoursing wits” but only admonishes them here as “having not so much blood in them as was in those 
of the ancients,” and while he begins delimiting a role for the “natural though corrupt love for lie” and 
the process of “fixing belief,” he also grants that no “man would doubt” that man’s mind would be 
“poor shrunken things” without the “role of vain opinions, flattering hopes, false valuations and 
imaginations. […as] it is not the lie that passeth through the mind, but the lie that sinketh in and settleth 
in, that dothe the hurt” (3-4).  In the Essays, rhetoric is what makes people “able to contend” and there 
are frequent justifications and adaptations of the Sophists techniques as means to seize desires as a 
“shew of advancement,” and appeals to enhance the “the Georgics of the Mind” as the poetic and 
rhetorical powers directing the social impact of affections (love, beauty, praise, honour and reputation, 
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friendship, etc) and vices (usury, riches, suspicion, envy, anger, etc).139  With these relatively well-known 
tendencies to play with this ‘naked-truth,’ Bacon also introduces an inclination to contemplate these in 
relation to new forms of cultural and ‘technological’ conditioning, and to strategize about how these 
social motivations of his present (those which he claimed could be known in the “open day-light”) might 
influence, or be influenced by a new ‘hill of truth’ that could be known only by the lens brought by new 
“candle light” (3-4).   
These tendencies introduce us to the ‘realist Bacon’ that Nietzsche valued in the opening 
epigraph, as Bacon establishes the rhetorical conditions he thinks are necessary for guiding not just 
more ‘truthful’ interpretations of nature, but for guiding forces of persuasion that he sees as necessary 
conditions stemming nature as a force which deeply impacts the conditions of everyday life.   Keep in 
mind that this tension is cathected by Bacon’s deep predilection for thinking about all his theories and 
methods as fundamentally aligned by what we might call, following Sophie Weeks, the “arts of the 
possible,” which he draws explicitly from his revised theory of nature as a set of ‘powers’ or ‘appetites’.   
Bacon uses the term ‘art’ generally, as Jonathan Bennett said, as any “human activity that involves 
techniques and requires skills,” but he also rethought the meaning of ‘art’ by affiliating it closely with his 
theory of ‘nature,’ creating a relationship between art and nature that sheds light on all the intellectual, 
political and mechanical skills and techniques Bacon articulates in his ambitious work.140   This 
“art/nature distinction” is a commonplace in the secondary literature (i.e. Newman, Rossi, Weeks) 
taking up how Bacon redefines art and nature by making “nature bound” the common-ground for 
notions art, technique, skill, mastery and even government as, what Sophie Weeks calls, the 
fundamental “arts of the possible” (101).  He does this specifically by defining the potential operations 
of all arts against the backdrop of his detailed theory of matter as the source of all operative power141 
(101-2).  Bacon’s theory of nature is a kind of material monism explicated in natural-philosophical and 
cosmogonical terms, and it aims largely to reverse treatments of matter as passive, considering matter’s 
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substratum (the atom) and its power (or potency) to instead be “appetitive” – which means that he 
considers the potency of all matter to “hide within its folds the power to bring into being all potential 
worlds” (108).  Bacon patently resists Aristotle’s distinctions between the natural and artificial, saying 
“artificial things differ from natural things not in form or essence, but only in the efficient…or in their 
motive power,” and while studies have obsessed over the sources of this difference, such as the way 
Bacon enhances the status of machines (i.e. Rossi) or revises alchemy to account for closer similarities 
between artificial and natural processes (i.e. Newman),  Weeks shifts attention to examine how Bacon’s 
theory of matter defines a flexible and open-ended art that seems to underlie or cohere many the 
different methods that cut-across Bacon’s programs in the Instauration (102).142   In other words, we 
might say that a definition of ‘arts of the possible’ makes new processes of discovery and invention 
inseparable sides-of the same coin – and as we know, inventione is often translated haphazardly as 
meaning either.  Bacon, much like Heraclitus, thinks ‘nature loves to hide’ and must be discovered, but 
also that the enfolded power of nature that grows and multiplies is “the true moderator of hope and 
works,” which, on one hand, inspires Bacon to discuss a how we can “moderate” an unfolding of matter 
(Plica Materiae) through works like alchemy and machines that alter simple motions, cardinal virtues 
(dense/rare, heavy/light, etc.), forms, and more complex processes in nature, and on the other hand, 
inspires Bacon’s conclusions that we need an art of invention to moderate, enhance and condition the 
rhetorical forces in a culture where “there is no true rest,” there is only “relative stability,” and only 
“dynamic tensions” (116).143  In other words, Bacon’s theory of matter not only underpins his discussion 
of the origins of the world, but the “great sum” of nature’s processes is an “operative analogue” for arts 
that are powerful enough to balance nature free and nature bound, since to control matter’s appetitive 
power is to manipulate its “desire to change,” and to master the opposing forces of concord and discord 
that stem from matter’s basic appetites (112).   To some extent, as the great English materialist, all of 
Bacon’s methods are extension of this art of curbing the appetites of matter -- whether through powers 
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of the alchemist, the craftsman, or the machinery of the rhetorician – all are for Bacon are processes of 
moderating nature free into nature bound.  Weeks goes on to argue that Bacon’s statement that “these 
words, nature, art and violence, are a kind of trivial shorthand” for a more expansive effort to make it 
seem possible to his audience that these concepts are fare “more elastic” than people realize, and that 
his own project on the whole is orientated to nothing less than “the effecting of all things possible” 
(105). 144   
If we follow these trends somewhat further into Bacon’s work, we can pull together two specific 
“precepts” for Bacon’s inventive rhetoric.  These both surface in response to the aforementioned 
impediments to an inventive art and culture of invention, and in response to the ways he thought 
Platonic philosophy and Aristotle’s inductive methods have ‘infantilized’ what he called “the footsteps of 
seducement” (XII, 3-4).  Bacon thought a more “divine and human truth” cannot be “enchained in those 
bonds” of syllogism, or even in words, propositions or argument alone, but could be deployed to align 
“the subtlety of nature and operations” through an art that “collects and concludes upon the reports of 
the senses” (XII, 3 - 4).  The first precept for this inventive rhetoric stems from the role Bacon grants to 
rhetoric in not only moderating the ‘anticipations,’ but in defining his ‘great anticipation’ that the ‘art of 
invention grows with inventions’ operationally, so that this anticipation is designed to repurpose the 
traditional goal of ‘mastering the anticipations’ in a new way, leading Bacon to an inventive rhetoric 
designed not only to moderate the imagination but to enhance a ‘presence-making’ function of rhetoric 
that strategically ‘manipulates the icons of reason’.  The second deals with a traditional domain of 
rhetorical invention but presents a required shift from discovering a range of rhetorical topics to 
inventing social uses for commonplaces, a shift from contemplating the nature and role of “suggestion” 
and imagination in guiding reason, to inventing forms of judgment and action that work on the powers 
of “seducements,” a set of rhetorical moves which also results in Bacon’s invention of the ‘greatest 
human ambition’ as what must be trained for the ‘mastery’ of nature to be effectively pursued.   
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Precept One:   Anticipating Invention and Manipulating the Icons of Reason 
 
The first precept stems specifically from Bacon’s anticipation that “ars inveniendi adolescit cum 
inventis” from the Advancement, which is translated more fully as “I regard that the mind, not only in its 
own faculties, but in its connection with things, must hold that the art of invention may advance as 
inventions advance” (XII, 10).   Beyond the obvious interpretation of this quote as Bacon’s prompt that 
the advancement of learning was falling in-line behind the advancement of experimental science, this 
particular anticipation is presented as a unique exigence that requires him to think through and leverage 
a new and function for what he called ‘the anticipation of nature.’  Throughout his work ‘anticipation’ 
means, as Jonathan Bennett notes, “something like ‘second-guessing, getting ahead of the data, jumping 
the gun’. Bacon means it to sound rash and risky; no one current English word does the job” (3).   While 
the anticipations are often seen as a sort of ‘out of place art’ in Novum, Jürgen Klein notes that Bacon 
also clearly articulates a role for the anticipations in an intermediate function between his interpretive 
theories of induction and his most speculative philosophy, in a role that aims at finding a ‘middle way’ 
among the more rationalists and speculative theories of the past, and designed to moderate or temper 
his own enthusiasm for technical modes of interpreting nature (Klein).145  In other words, Bacon situates 
a role for anticipation that might moderate and redirect these past extremes and the extremes in his 
own thought -- and this revised role for the anticipations is taken up in affiliation with his ideas on 
rhetoric as intimately connected with the imagination (as something to be both tempered and enhanced 
in his larger program of the Instauration and in its aim to influence social and civic action).  As he put it 
in axioms 26-29 in Novum, because anticipations “aim … to be master of what people believe but not of 
the facts” and they “have much more power than interpretations do.”   Bacon maintains that he both 
needs them to get his larger ideas across, and needs to find ways to moderate and repurpose the 
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anticipations that have the scholastics and ancients have been overly driven to “master.”  The full 
selection reads:   
26. To help me get my ideas across, I have generally used different labels for human reason’s two 
ways of approaching nature: the customary way I describe as anticipating nature (because it is 
rash and premature) and the way that draws conclusions from facts in the right way I describe as 
interpreting nature. 
27. Anticipations are a firm enough basis for consent, for even if men all went mad in the same 
way they might agree one with another well enough. 
28. Indeed, anticipations have much more power to win assent than interpretations do. They are 
inferred from a few instances, mostly of familiar kinds, so that they immediately brush past the 
intellect and fill the imagination; whereas interpretations are gathered from very various and 
widely dispersed facts, so that they can’t suddenly strike the intellect, and must seem weird and 
hard to swallow—rather like the mysteries of faith. 
29. Anticipations and dialectics have their place in sciences based on opinions and dogmas, 
because in those sciences the aim is to be master of what people believe but not of the facts. 
While the Novum typically presents the anticipations as divergences from his own innovative methods 
for ‘true interpretations’ of nature, they also prompts him to think openly about how more 
commonplace mental faculties and instrumentalities act as forces mediating nature, and how rhetoric 
may serve as an art that ‘harnesses the anticipations’ and gains greater influence over the “processes of 
everyday life.”  This claim is clearest the Preface to the Novum, where he argues for creating a ‘middle 
way’ calibrated between “those who have taken it on themselves to lay down the law of nature as 
something that has already been discovered and understood…[and those] gone the opposite way, 
asserting that absolutely nothing can be known—having reached this opinion through dislike of the 
ancient sophists, or through uncertainty and ﬂuctuation of mind, or even through being crammed with 
some doctrine or other” (1). 146  In this broad terrain, Bacon states that the ‘middle way’ will draw on 
rhetoric to affect changes to the thinking and practices of everyday life through a “method [that] is hard 
to practice but easy to explain”-- since rhetoric is especially relevant in a diagnostic role that analyzes 
the powerful fallacies in the idols of the mind, and in a motivating/productive role that supports and 
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structures the imagination.  Both functions of rhetoric are aimed at harnessing certain pervasive types 
of ‘anticipation,’ which directs Bacon to the realm of invention that seems to guide a number of social 
pursuits and ambitions – and to seek out new ‘degrees of certainty’ about how such pursuits might be 
guided.  
Bacon’s thoughts on how to reach certain “processes of everyday life” are both clear-cut and 
uncharacteristically nebulous at times, but we can begin clearly enough with Marc Cogan’s lucid 
discussion of how Bacon parses idols and imagination into separate concepts from the more neutral 
term imagines.  Bacon does this in an attempt to redefine the function of the imagination as “a mental 
faculty distinct from the senses, and distinct also from both reason and memory… functioning in an 
intermediate position between the senses and the rational faculties” (214).147   As such, the function of 
the imagination was reconceived largely in rhetorical terms “as possessing the power of recombining 
images or parts of images into forms which need not exist in nature, but can be willful, arbitrary or 
playful” (214-215).  His rhetorical structuring of the imagination can, however, be interpreted as 
something more ‘willful’ and strategic in terms of how it aims to address the stagnation Bacon saw with 
the ‘inventiveness’ and practical reasoning of everyday life.  Cogan points out that Bacon argues for a 
rhetorical imagination that differs from poetry, which was most often the source of imaginative power, 
but which seemed increasingly “unconscious,” a source of an entire range of errors in “wishful thinking 
and speculation,” and increasingly ill-equipped for the age (214).   We can take Cogan’s point a step 
further by noting how Bacon addresses the imagination as ill-equipped to address the specific 
impediments to invention and the unavoidable powers of the anticipations (214).  Cogan argues that 
Bacon looks to foreground the a new role for rhetoric as moderating the imagination by selecting what 
images are presented to the will from the senses and passions, doing so with rhetorical strategies which 
sometimes follow the “precepts of reason,” while sometimes “ignoring the directions proposed by 
reason … directing the will on its own irrationally” (216).   This is evident in what Cogan calls one of 
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Bacon’s “most important” passages on rhetoric, in a well known collaboration in Rhetoric Society 
Quarterly: 
Reason would become captive and servile, if Eloquence of Persuasions did not practise and win 
the Imagination from the Affection's part, and contract a confederacy between the Reason and 
Imagination against the Affections. For the affections themselves carry ever an appetite to good, 
as reason doth; the difference is, that the affections beholdeth merely the present; reason 
beholdeth the future and sum of time; and therefore the present filling the imagination more, 
reason is commonly vanquished; but after that force of eloquence and persuasion hath made 
things future and remote appear as present, then upon the revolt of the imagination reason 
prevaileth (3:410-1 1) 148 
Cogan rightly points out that Bacon presents a ‘give and take’ between reason and imagination in 
guiding the will to action, but to suggest that Bacon gives imagination a leading role that can “usurp” 
reason either “rationally” or “irrationally” also seems to support a familiar way of overlooking how 
Bacon leverages more specific “precepts” and strategies for an inventive rhetoric on the so-called 
‘irrational’ side of this equation, and disconnect this effort from the explicit exigencies associated with 
the impediments to invention he saw in his day. We know from Bacon’s famous definition of rhetoric 
that “the duty and office of rhetoric is to apply reason to imagination for the better moving of the will,” 
that Bacon’s striking innovation in rhetorical theory was in explaining the “nature of rhetoric…in terms 
of its relation to, and effect on, a given set of human faculties” and also its “intimate connection to 
action” (213).  But when we focus on how Bacon aims to alter and control the “will” in the context of an 
age of production, we must consider how he engages a wide range of social motivations and more 
specific actions of a merchant and artisan class he considered to be afflicted with a tacit knowledge of 
invention.   
The example of the ‘presence-making function’ of rhetoric seems enough to bear out why 
distinguishing our first precept for rhetorical invention would be something worthwhile, as what is 
“collected and concluded upon” by the sciences becomes, to some respect, the contents of rhetorical 
107 
 
invention in a fairly traditional sense.   Bacon bears out this ‘presence-making function’ for rhetoric in 
response to both the aforementioned exigencies and to particular limitations of scientific 
representation, which Bacon thinks grants rhetoric a new role in influencing the “next degree” of 
scientific depictions in order to correct a major defect in the new science’s contraction and 
intensification of the faculties of reason (Cogan 225-227).   Cogan’s own work in “Rhetoric and Action” 
brings us to this ‘presence-making function’ as precept for Bacon’s rhetoric when he notes that Bacon 
was concerned with all of the operations of the imagination, including the strong influence on it by 
“what can be called ‘presence’ by things (or their images) which [become] immediate and vivid” 
(217).149   With a new science driven to bring abstract and distant discoveries to the center of human 
knowledge, Bacon grants rhetoric a strategic public role in moderating “the competition for the 
attention of the imagination, and thus for control over the objects the will chooses (and the will itself)” 
(218).  He does so by giving rhetoric a role of selecting and moderating the “unqualified ‘making 
present’” of abstract or remote things brought to public’s attention by scientific discoveries (218).  
Cogan notes, however, that while rhetoric shares with poetry the ability to shape the impressions of the 
senses and the urgings of the appetites into a meaningful public ‘presence,’ a more distinctly 
“manipulative” and prescriptive art would now be required by a “manipulation of the tokens of reason” 
into “lively representations” that create a public “imprint of goodness” through “verbal embellishments” 
and “adornment of words” (220-221).  Weeks points to a more specific example in the Advancement 
where Bacon thought one aspect of the hidden facets of nature was “evidenced by the occurrence of 
marvels” because, as he puts it, they are useful for “leading the intellect from what does exist to what 
may exist” (106).   Marvels are “irregulars of nature” or “Pretergenerations” and are of interest to Bacon 
in particular for two related reasons:  because they are an example that bears out his relentless efforts 
to find the ‘nearest passages’ between art and nature, and because they have clear social consequences 
demonstrating how his theory that matter’s dormant powers can be drawn out by an art that functions 
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as “operative analogue of the primary cosmogonical contraction exercised in Cupid’s restraining and 
binding of matter’s absolute potency” (104).    Cogan sees this art of ‘moderating nature’s potency’ and  
“the entire presence-making function of rhetoric to depend on …elocution,” and while he is right that 
Baconian rhetoric on the whole resists classical ways of distinguishing the art into five canons, it remains 
useful here to think of this presence-making function as a type of invention because this maintains the 
relationship between this strategy and the aforementioned exigencies, and because elocution in fact 
seems to be the ideal office of rhetoric’s presence-making function (which Bacon unquestionably 
mastered in his day), while invention would emphasize this function as a teachable (and hence public) 
and evolving art that looks to make evolving forms of scientific discovery into inventive forms of 
influence that direct social action aimed at a better future.   
As is often the case in histories of rhetoric, the connections between rhetoric and a ‘new 
science’ are made in ways that either demeans the art, or as Bacon seeks to do here, made in ways that 
deepen our sense of rhetoric’s potential and power by emphasizing how it might direct a new science to 
the improvement of human life in thought and action.150  What we can qualify as Bacon’s first precept 
for invention is thus a role he gives rhetoric in moderating a socially widespread form of ‘anticipation’ 
arising from popular representations coming from a new science of discovery, and moderating a 
particular type of social ‘seducement’ (like speculation in particular) or an allure about the future more 
generally through process of invention. To cite Cogan once more, Bacon responded to the problems of 
the ‘unconscious’ imagination with an “unconventional strategy”:  he “invented…the art of rhetoric…for 
this end: to fill the imagination with manifestations and likeness that bring aid to the reason, not 
oppress it. [A process that proceeds] after eloquence and force of persuasion have made things future 
and remote appear as present, then upon the revolt of imagination to reason, reason prevails” (218).151    
We might here claim then, that Bacon’s first precept emphasizes an inventive rhetoric as a pragmatic 
response to the anticipations he both needs and seeks to moderate -- a particular role for rhetoric in 
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moderating these already persuasive conditions from science’s “bringing the remote and the future to 
the present” in order to make this something present at hand to philosophers, rhetoricians and 
teachers.   In a present when ecological crisis brings so-called ‘icons of reason’ and ‘marvels’ to public 
awareness at every moment, Bacon’s first precept seems to resonate with an almost obvious 
responsibility.   In one sense then, Bacon sees rhetorical invention play the role of technê that crafts new 
knowledge by providing a technique for moving the imagination from the affectations or anticipations to 
a deeper form of reason.    
 
Precept Two:  Commonplacing and the Ars Nova: From Ordinary Invention a Noble Ambition     
 
Bacon’s famous definition of rhetoric is rarely cited in full form.  In reference to his so-called 
“descent” into classical ideas on rhetoric, Bacon states: “Notwithstanding, to stir the earth a little about 
the roots of this science, as we have done of the rest, the duty and office of rhetoric is to apply reason to 
imagination for the better moving of the will” (XVIII, 2). “To stir the earth a little about the roots of this 
science” is of course his reference to “that part which concerneth the illustration of tradition, 
comprehended in that science which we call rhetoric, or art of eloquence, a science excellent, and 
excellently well labored” (XVIII, 1).  A second precept for an inventive rhetoric surfaces as Bacon 
discusses new uses for the commonplaces in The Advancement and De Augmentis, as he distinguishes 
their traditional role in supporting discovery from their potential role in supporting forms of invention 
that would be integral to the Ars Nova in his larger program.  In Book Two, where Bacon gives his most 
sustained attention to rhetoric, Bacon distinguishes a form of invention in terms of the “present use” of 
commonplaces, elenchus as forms of preparation and suggestion, granting the latter a special place as 
part of ‘true judgment’ of nature (that is, as he calls it, invention and judgment in one act), which he 
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thinks must give direction to processes of “ordinary invention” and the ambitions of the artisan and 
merchant class (Wallace 90, XIII.6). 152 
Bacon initially emphasizes a key distinction between two kinds of invention “much differing - the 
one of arts and sciences, and the other of speech and arguments,” and he claims initially that arguments 
are typically not thought of as invention, but as a form of discovery that applies “remembrance” to 
discover past suggestions (a pursuit he refers to as “chasing…deer in an enclosed park”) (XIII.6).  He 
promptly, however, argues that the discovery of a past “suggestion” with a present application or 
purpose should indeed “be called invention” simply because “the scope and end of this invention is 
readiness and present use of our knowledge, and not addition or amplification thereof” (XIII.1 and 
XIII.6).   It is in Bacon’s exploration of this ‘present use’ of commonplaces that Bacon finds a unique 
alliance between the inventive arts ‘of sciences’ and ‘of arguments’ as they support a ‘true art of 
judgment’ for nature.   To “procure the ready use” of commonplaces as a form in invention, Bacon 
distinguishes preparation and suggestion as two courses, the first of which is more like “diligence” and 
in fact “hardly knowledge,” while the second is regarded as a type of “artificial erudition” (XIII, 7).   He 
sets out to help both ‘courses’ mature beyond “childhood,” focusing mainly on admonishing Aristotle for 
reducing the “preparations” offered by the Sophists and Demosthenes from a “rich wardrobe” to “a pair 
of shears,”153 and for undermining the potential in the “suggestions” as forces of “seducement” and 
“impression” (XIII.7- XIV.2).    
 Bacon thinks ‘diligence’ goes a long way in supporting an culture of learning, and that the 
contributions of a “storehouse” and “commerce” of arguments should be restored to what “the ancient 
writers of rhetoric do give …in precept, that pleaders should have the places, whereof they have most 
continual use, ready handled in all the variety that may be;  as that, to speak for the literal interpretation 
of the law against equity, and contrary; and to speak for presumptions and inferences against testimony, 
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and contrary” (XIII, 7). 154    Initially, Bacon presents a customary concern with cultivating the 
‘wingspread’ of rhetoric through commonplaces that might support a moral education, considering a 
wingspread of rhetoric that includes: 
 Those points which are within our own command and have force and operation upon the mind, 
to affect the will and appetite, and to alter manners: wherein they ought to have handled 
custom, exercise, habit, education, example, imitation, emulation, company, friends, praise, 
reproof, exhortation, fame, laws, books, studies: these as they have determinate use in 
moralities, from these the mind suffereth … because it were too long to prosecute all; and 
therefore we do resume custom and habit to speak of.  (XXII, 7) 
Rather than taking a ‘pair of shears’ to this wingspread, however, Bacon shows keen interest in 
exploring what the commonplaces might do to advance the ambitions supporting (his notoriously 
ambitious) program.  When he turns to discuss “this part of invention, concerning the invention of 
sciences” he claims to have “digested it into two parts: whereof the one I term experientia literata, and 
the other interpretatio naturæ; the former being but a degree and rudiment of the latter” (XII. 5).  This 
re-introduces a “rudimentary” connection between his two greater methods for inquiry, which here 
becomes the inquiry into ‘literate’ or ‘learned’ experiences of nature (too often reduced to his 
compilation and arrangements of experiments), and the inquiry through new systems of interpretation 
of nature.155  The ‘literate experiences’ are concerned with many forms of experimentation that 
generate new and unknown effects, an ethos which Bacon brings to the ‘ready use’ of the 
commonplaces in argument.  This becomes a more specific strategy as Bacon transitions from a section 
dealing with general topics (which he deems sufficient as school topics) to the particular topics (places 
of invention and inquiry in areas of particular knowledge), where he delineates some ideas for 
manipulating the latter as places of “seducements” and “impressions” affecting merchants and 
craftsmen, arguing for manipulating the forces so they become inseparable to the role of man as not 
leveraging not only new arts of interpreting nature, but new arts of “judgment” (XIV.1-4).   
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Section XIV in particular follows up on his claim that “the art of invention grows with inventions” 
and demonstrates how specific topics might be designed to lead a type of judgment where judgment 
and invention are two parts of the same action (“the mind which inventeth, judgeth – all as in one 
sense”) (XIV.1).   Here Bacon argues that man, in order to ‘truly’ experience and interpret nature, 
requires a more assertive handling of both preparation and suggestion to prepare the ground for such 
judgments.  Suggestion in particular is singled out as integral to a “real and exact form of judgment,” 
noting that suggestion should create forms of “impression” in a dialectic process involving “the invention 
of the mean, and the judgment of the consequence, where the first is exciting, the second is examining” 
(XIV.1).   Perhaps our best example of Bacon’s characterization of this art of judgment is in his own 
evaluation of Aristotle’s treatment of rhetoric – which is much more than a simple admonishment.  After 
repudiating the sophists to some extent, and defending rhetoric against a “great injustice in Plato… 
resembling it to cookery,”156 Bacon proceeds to discuss the deficiencies of Aristotle’s placement of 
“rhetoric as between logic on the one side, and moral or civic knowledge on the other, as participating 
of both” (XVIII.5).   It is here that Bacon thinks Aristotle brags of the worth of rhetoric, while cheapening 
it, saying: “Malum est, malum est (inquit emptor): sed cum recesserit, tum gloriabitur” (My wares are 
excellent, the seller cries, And with bold face extols them to them to the skies… but having got them, 
Brags of their worth, and says How cheap I bought them!) (XVIII.6).   Pointing to three specific defects in 
Aristotle’s labor here he says: “one, that there be but a few of many; another, that there elenches are 
not annexed; and the third, that he conceived but a part of the use of them: for their use is not only in 
probation, but much more in impression” (XVIII, 6).  As Bacon works to extend and deepen Aristotle’s 
treatment of rhetorical proofs, he also elevates a strategic use of the force of impression, and 
exemplifies how it can be integral to the form of judgment he seeks to define.  He does so by deploying 
a sophistic strategy he detailed in twelve sophisms of good and evil, or what he calls “the colours of 
good and evil,” which he once again argues are commonly accepted not for their truth but for their the 
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powers of impression (XVIII.6-9).    Here he praises and blames Aristotle in the same pages, but his 
accusation of Aristotle is strategically barbed.  He accuses him of a major violation of his own golden 
mean by excessively reducing rhetoric’s “many forms” and their potential “differences in impression” to 
that which is “flat,” at which point the accusation sharpens on Aristotle’s legacy as “evil,” “pleasing to 
his enemies” and in violation of the wisdom of the ancients, particularly his prized figures of moderation 
and morality in science: granting what “Ithicus and Atreus’ sons much wish” (XVIII, 6).   The irony is in 
how Bacon uses this “colouring” of Aristotle as ‘moderate to excess’ in order to push the limits of 
rhetoric in the name of moderation (or in the name of his inventive ‘middle way’).  After creating an 
exigency for annexing and expanding Aristotle’s rhetoric, Bacon proceeds to develop the elenches, and 
broaden the role of commonplaces as forces of ‘suggestion’ into the realms of both “scientific 
invention” and “ordinary invention,” particularly as Bacon focuses on taking some command over 
suggestions as a forces of “seducement,” “impression” and “insinuation” that might affect the ambitions 
caught up in artisan and merchant class.    
In making this argument, Bacon claims to more “attentively observe how the mind doth gather 
this excellent dew of knowledge, like unto that which the poet speaketh of, Aërei mellis cælestia dona, 
[Virgil’s bee] distilling and contriving it out of particulars natural and artificial, as the flowers of the field 
and garden, [finding] that the mind of herself by nature doth manage and act on induction much better 
than they describe it” (XII, 3).157   In plainer terms, Bacon avows his interest in how the faculties of the 
mind (and soul) behave when engaged with inventive thinking, particularly with how an artisan and 
merchant class searches for available materials and likely ‘places’ from which to “abstract, apprehend 
and come up with new ideas” (Wallace 89).  Karl Wallace studied Bacon’s interests in this new rhetorical 
territory, arguing that he was drawn to analyze how the invention of an idea takes shape in ways that 
are “logically and temporally prior to the invention of its word and statement,” in any processes that 
either “opened the understanding” and “forged discourse” for a new idea, processes which Bacon 
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distinguished as cites of “ordinary invention” rather than “scientific invention” (90).  Guided by his belief 
that nearly all fields of knowledge should be collaborative and progressive in nature, and driven by a 
sense of inventiveness and even perfectibility, Bacon is deeply interested in how invention is driven by 
what he calls “insinuation,” not-fully discursive process of “bending and turning in a manner that was 
perceived to be an accommodation to the matter at hand, and action or movement that was fitting or 
appropriate” (90). To put this more plainly, Bacon saw men driven by the appeals of pragmatism and 
utility, particularly around inventions and commerce, which he saw as deeply impressing most men.  He 
sought to intervene in these forces of impression with a form of invention which must be “exempted” 
from the reduction of propositions to middle terms or principles “to be agreed by all” or “elected at the 
liberty of every man’s invention” but instead created by “a seducement that worketh by the strength of 
the impression, and not by the subtlety of the illaqueation - not so much perplexing the reason, as 
overruling it by power of the imagination” (XIV, 8).  Voicing his fondness of how religion kindled 
admiration of a world blessed with many ‘gifts of man’ (empires, architecture, agriculture, servants…), 
and believing that the forces of mechanical inventions (especially Printing, Gunpowder, and the Nautical 
Needle) had tipped the balance from human’s potential power to simply guide nature’s course, to a 
belief in humanity’s potential power to “conquer or subdue her,” Bacon argued the need align these 
new forces of impression towards a more noble ambition.  Bacon considered the nature of human 
ambition in three nobler kinds: a restless striving to augment personal power (the least noble ambition), 
the currents of nationalism or patriotism, and the greater “endeavor to restore and exalt the power and 
dominion of man himself, of the human race over the universe… [which] rests only on knowledge” 
(Scharff 26-7).  This quote reiterates that Bacon thought man’s “greater ambition” is some form of 
‘mastery over’ nature, which lacks much of the context of Bacon’s thoughts on how rhetoric might be 
responsive to new forces of ‘impression’ creating this ambition.  Indeed, Bacon’s aim of creating 
invention and judgment in one act seems inseparable belief that rhetoric must create forces of 
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impression that guide or create this ‘noble ambition’ of mastery.  Bacon, in fact seems to think that the 
ambitions might be what make humans more seamlessly a part of nature’s forces, that is, if the aim of 
mastery is rhetorical in nature, aimed at guiding forces of invention so that: “No force of action is limited 
to what he knows. No force avails to break the chain of natural causation. Nature cannot be conquered 
but by obeying her” (27).  It is a the addition of an inventive rhetoric to his instrumental, reflective and 
revelatory rhetoric that grants us a fuller and more specified sense of Bacon’s claim “Nature to be 
commanded must be obeyed; and that which in contemplation is as the cause is in operation as the 
rule.”   
 
Bacon’s Ruse of Mastery 
 
This enduring ‘ruse of mastery’ charted at the beginning of this chapter has, perhaps, had the 
most unwelcome consequences in its influence on a recent history of ecological thought and 
environmental critique, which has for almost half a century shrouded much of Bacon’s fusion of  
‘scientific-rhetoric’ under the critiques of his trope of mastery.  Can we, however, imagine a recent 
history of ecological thought drawn to strategic aspects of Bacon’s rhetoric and its handling of mastery?  
Would it not have curbed the excessive focus on critiquing technoscience, ‘mechanization’ or 
‘instrumentality,’ the many returns to some version of organicism, or the absolutist attempts at 
overcoming, re-writing or reuniting the antithesis between nature and man? 158   Would not the 
attempts of many deep ecologists to radically restructure society with ideas of ‘ecocentrism,’ ‘inherent 
worth,’ ‘holism,’ ‘preservation,’ and ‘limits’ have taken on qualities of pragmatism, agency, and 
reflective instrumentalism aimed at progressive forms of rhetorical, scientific and technological 
intervention?   Would Bacon not only help us think about the spirit of science in an age of production, 
but the spirit of science in our age of consumption?  Let’s briefly consider this thought experiment about 
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how Bacon’s influence might have re-directed these pursuits – since this kind of thinking would also only 
follow Bacon’s precepts that we need to harness an evolving anticipation of nature, need rhetoric to 
move the will and moderate some forms of speculation, and to work diligently towards turning what is 
now commonplace into something of present use for influencing the judgments of nature.  
We might start with the question of beginnings, with where one starts as an ‘ecological thinker.’ 
Our current age of ecology has repeatedly sought out the roots of our crisis – particularly since the 
‘second wave’ of environmentalism in the 1960s, as Carson’s and Bookchin’s popular critiques of 
modern chemistry and technology inspired many subsequent challenges to the deeper beginnings of a 
‘crisis’ that involve the emergence of modern science and technology and the anthropocentric 
philosophies, religions and elements of Western culture.  Lynn White Jr. raised such concerns most 
poignantly, stirring up many attempts to remedy these problems of scientific and cultural “arrogance” 
spiritually, philosophically and morally.  Pointing to the Baconian ethos as one of the great sources of all 
our ecological misfortunes has thusly steered much in ecological thought afield from such “arrogance,” 
and swayed many to an unfortunate set of debates between more “anthropocentric ecologists, who 
contend that the value of our nonhuman surroundings derives from their role in fulfilling human 
interests, and ecocentric ecologists, who contend that the nonhuman world holds ultimate value in and 
of itself” (Whiteside 2).   We’ve witnessed decades of such debates framing the contributions of Muir 
and Pinchot in the early 20th century, or swaying the good efforts of thinkers like Barry Commoner and 
Ralph Nader, who today are proclaimed as “anthropocentric survival environmentalists” positioned 
against most ecologists focused on maintaining quality and “integrity” of the earth’s systems (Sessions 
XI).   Bacon’s theme of mastery is perhaps an act of “arrogance” but it is neither the beginning nor the 
amplification of a crude anthropocentrism, or of a crisis.  Instead, his well-known struggle with tradition 
is testament to the best kind of ‘present-use’ of conventional wisdom, one gearing much of antiquity 
towards the concerns of science, society and (if we allow it) ecology.  We could say that, to some extent, 
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the beginnings for Bacon remain the classical strains of Western thought, but his interests are especially 
in the evolution of human/nature as an arrangement of persuasive forces and inventive arts, particularly 
in the present use of the ‘arts of the possible’ which seemed at the time to grant the rhetorical 
conditions and techniques of ‘mastery’ more responsibility to human agency in relation to nature.  If 
Bacon deserves ‘critique’ it is that this mastery was not forceful enough in its conception as a ‘scientific 
rhetoric’ that articulates such responsibilities for a subsequent history of ecological thought.  He did 
nonetheless revise and restore the ancients with the aim of granting some present control over the 
forces of ‘fate’ and ‘nature’ – so that this “nature” that “loves to hide” must not only be discovered, but 
unfolded as “the true moderator of hope and works,” through an evolving art of invention to moderate, 
enhance and condition the rhetorical forces in a culture where “there is no true rest,” there is only 
“relative stability,” and only “dynamic tensions” (116).159    
It also seems necessary to re-pose the question of authority, particularly by weighing the trend 
of ‘resentment’ towards Bacon we began with in this chapter against the opposing trend in the 
venerations of Heidegger, whose philosophy was entrenched into countless environmental discourses 
promoting (or bemoaning) his relevance to ecological thought over the past 50 years.  In “Thinking with 
Heidegger: Rethinking Environmental Theory and Practice” (2005) Kevin Michael DeLuca sums up this 
trend promptly, claiming that the surge of environmental scholars looking to reform or deepen 
environmentalism through Heidegger’s work since the late 1960s is enough to “displace  a 
preoccupation with Heidegger as the thinker of the Truth of Being” while at the same time pulling 
Heidegger into “a confusing array of reform environmentalists, deep ecologists, social ecologists, 
ecofeminists, wilderness advocates, social justice activists, social constructionists, and Christian 
ecologists” (68).   Deluca argues that the only way to “think with Heidegger” is above all: “thinking 
Heidegger in distress: in the distress of machination; in the distress of the technological enframing of the 
earth; in the distress of the environmental crisis” (68).   Or as it was put more recently in the collection 
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Heidegger and the Earth: Essays in Environmental Philosophy (2009) “thinking ecologically” means 
“thinking about the earth in our time-- means thinking catastrophe, it means thinking the possibility of 
utter annihilation not just for human beings but for all that lives on this planet and for the living planet 
itself” (viii). 160  Such “catastrophe readings,” according to Feenberg, usually hinge on an ontological 
account that explains technology as a violent mode of revealing distinct from, and somehow similar to, a 
more ancient and authentic techne, while assuming that somehow ‘saving’ this involves following what 
Feenberg calls the “apparently naive questioning” based on the difference between modern and ancient 
techne --  a process he readily encourages, saying: “these are naive questions, but they are reasonable 
questions [...worth taking] seriously and attempting to fill in the gaps” (Heidegger and Marcuse 25).  
Compared to this emphasis on a more authentic bond with the earth, with techne, or the emphasis on 
meditative thinking on crisis, lost wisdom, instrumentality and now even ‘catastrophe,’ Bacon seems 
unconcerned with ‘authenticity,’ and instead asks for a mix of reflective, pragmatic, instrumental and 
rhetorical thinking, an equation that he presents as open ended, requiring “endurance” and a lengthy, 
wise and industrious “suffering” to “overcome both fate and nature” (XXII 3).  As an older and even 
more polarizing figure than Heidegger, Bacon’s authority has evolved as a symbol of science and reason 
for the Royal Society, through the admiration of philosophers and scientists like Descartes, Hobbes, 
Rousseau, Kant and Darwin, and through the condemnation by many romantic era thinkers, the famous 
scolding by Victorian historian Thomas Macaulay, and the environmental critiques of the 20th century.161   
As the ‘father of modern science’ within a ‘scientific revolution,’ this characterization is one hardly dares 
to venture today and a perspective that, as Brian Vickers argued, brought “precious few benefits to 
anyone” (1-2, 120).162   In today’s intellectual climate, Bacon’s authority seems worth re-engaging 
instead as another ecologist’s challenge, one striving to inaugurate the challenges of rhetorical mastery 
at the cusp of the 17th century that granted a new responsibility to take on instrumental, pragmatic, 
rhetorical and reflective thought.  Bacon’s refrains about rejecting a known teleological natural order to 
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which man's arts and actions were alleged to conform, about the truth values of empirical methods and 
experiments, and the progress of mechanization and mathematization of nature, all come to play in the 
context of this authoritative idea:  that this period in history required man to drive for a fuller ‘mastery’ 
not only turned ‘inward’ towards ‘mastering the self,’ but in an outward turn to controlling ‘nature’ 
through a scientific and rhetorical process.  
Bacon also compels us to take on the challenges of thinking about “nature” as a critical category, 
in ways that sidestep the well-known perils of either flirting with biologism or essentialism, or with the 
opposite trend in more deconstructive strategies that presently theorize nature in seemingly endless 
terms as complex networks of meanings, seeking (it seems) only to find as many ways as possible to 
think of nature in terms of ‘relatedness’ or ‘interconnectedness’ (Wolfe 2).   Bacon’s theory of nature as 
always/already a dogmatic force on human culture led him to emphasize not only discovering the 
multiple-meanings of nature through processes of interpretation and experiment, but to inextricable 
processes of invention aimed at moderating, enhancing and conditioning human appetite through social 
persuasive technologies.  This is not some distant memory of social construction, but the articulation of 
a symbiosis between discovery and invention, sciences and rhetoric, which should requires anyone 
studying nature through the sciences to study rhetoric, and vice-versa.   
Finally, this great effort to establish the spirit of a ‘scientific rhetoric’ in an age of production 
also established distinctive mix of arrogance and human agency that helps us think through a spirit of 
science in an age of consumption.   John Bellamy Foster recently argued in The Ecological Rift, that 
“Bacon’s complex notion of the domination and subjugation of nature” might indeed be the beginnings 
of the “notion of sustainability insofar as it demanded that society follow ‘nature’s laws’” (496).  He goes 
on to say:  “The Baconian ruse was that nature could be mastered through its own laws.  But nature’s 
laws if followed completely nonetheless put restrictions on production – those necessitated by 
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reproduction and sustainability” (emphasis his, 496).   Foster marks Bacon as a thinker of sustainability 
in a traditional sense, as thinking about how the human creative processes might align in with finite 
natural energies or ‘potencies’.  But, given his emphasis on rhetoric, and rhetorical invention in this 
chapter, the Baconian challenge might be to not only think about reaching nature’s limits in relation to 
logical limitations of global production processes, but to also connect this to a type of mastery aiming to 
steer appetites and ambitions as an ecology of persuasive forces.  From this angle, Bacon’s challenge is 
not an intervention aimed at limiting these forces, but calibrating how to moderate, enhance and 
condition new (noble?) ambitions, expanding into everyday realms of a ‘merchant’ and ‘artisan’ class.  
In closing, consider two examples of ecological interventions that resonate with this Baconian 
spirit of ‘scientific rhetoric’.  The first example is brief, as the series of essays in Sanford Kwinter’s Far 
From Equilibrium are presented plainly as “A New Organon (after Aristotle, Bacon, and Brecht)” because 
they attempt to turn a “subtle coup” in the field of architecture into an “organon, that is a system of 
investigation, invention and technique” (46-7).  Kwinter argues that architecture is being supplanted by 
design as “an organon in the making” with research that takes on a “more classical formulation” of 
investigation that extends more deeply into “real logics present in the human or non-human 
environment and their conversion into potential” (47).   The dominant logic or ‘science’ of architecture is 
to be supplanted by research that marries “design science to philosophy” aimed at the creation of 
buildings and spaces that work on the principle of “design from within,” unfolding the “real logics” of 
nature into design techniques that intervene in the “real domains” of subjectivity impacted by our living 
environments (47-57).  His essays propose that design must theorize and enact techniques of invention 
based on “productive power” that makes “environmental effects” – a power that “coerces without 
observable violence” and which works “within a broad ecological model” (19).   His manifesto is thusly 
asserted as a kind of Baconian ethos bent on mastering new modes of inquiry, invention and techniques 
designed to marry certain persuasive logics with ecological ones.   
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A longer example involves several key shifts in the recent history of climate science, climate 
modeling and the attendant environmental discourses, which might serve as a protracted example of 
how a number of Bacon’s ideas slowly returned to shape this terrain today.  Today’s climate science and 
the disparate endeavors to develop prediction technologies about climate change and our impact on the 
planet can be thought of, as Denis Loveridge recently put it, evidence of an evolving “art of foresight” 
we would identify with “anticipation, appreciation and learning” (5).163   Loveridge argues, however, that 
many disciplines, corporations and agencies like UNEP (the United Nations Environment Program) have 
demonstrated that potential of such foresight is routinely short circuited by both the form of climate 
science itself, and by procedural forms of decision making that have become central to many of the 
forums for national and international planning today.  There is, however, evidence in our recent history 
of climate science where Bacon’s concerns with developing a ‘scientific rhetoric’ with certain precepts 
for an inventive art have resurfaced as a somewhat inevitable solutions to recurring problems with the 
climate science.  
Consider first the well-known set of debates that emerged after Jay W. Forrester’s World 
Dynamics and the Club of Rome’s popularization of systems dynamics based “World” models of the late 
60s and early 70s, designed to simulate and predict the interactions between populations, economic and 
industrial growth, agricultural systems, and ecological systems. 164  The most publicized was World3 
developed from 1970-72 at M.I.T. and applied as part of “The Club of Rome” study that ran the model 
and then published the well-known book Limits to Growth.  The predictions that the model and 
simulations helped to generate about accelerating population growth and resource use have (until the 
past two decades or so) been repeatedly cited as an authority by environmental advocates, policy 
makers and politicians.  However, both the models and the subsequent arguments in Limits to 
Growth immediately generated severe criticism ranging from accusations of gross-oversimplifications (in 
terms of both the amount of data used and the assumptions about what factors determine future 
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ecological collapse), to ideological and political biases (particularly for Malthusian and Marxist brands of 
pessimism), or more generally as "an attempt to substitute mathematics for knowledge and 
computation for understanding" (Cole 12).   The critiques in the subsequent Models of Doom: A Critique 
of the Limits of to Growth (1973) by a panel of scientists, mathematicians, economists, social 
psychologists, engineers, and political scientists focused on the limitations to forecasting that input 
precarious historical data (drawn from 1900 to 1970) and the encoding of what was termed “avoidable 
assumptions and political biases” into, what were called, “deceptively neutral models” – a critique more 
crassly described as too overtly rhetorical in design, stated simply as: “garbage in, garbage out” (Cole 
15).165   
The legacy of many similar large “causal models” that use statistics to “describe” the 
development of the phenomenon to be predicted but also to “explain” these, would be that experts 
were left to try and enhance or dampen the explanatory powers of models with (a much maligned) 
candor about degrees of uncertainty, noting likely variations, fuzzy curves, fuzzy scales, parallel 
scenarios, and verbal explanations that inevitably rely on terms such as ‘probable,’ ‘likely,’ or ‘very 
likely,’ a lexicon which has ‘almost certainly’ gained more infamy in the past decade than these early  
“World Modelers” would have predicted. 166   The unavoidable return to this “rhetoric” isn’t surprising, 
since the roots of the models lie in cybernetics and systems theory work from twenty years earlier that 
initiated the symbolic language of systems dynamics for representation for systems inputs/outputs and 
regulatory feedback loops, in which many to point out that the relationships are “merely” symbolic, and 
to point out that the models were always designed to affect policy, and to deal with large scale data in 
easy to interpret economic and social terms that also reinforced the well publicized critiques (and still 
do) that led to an eventual stigma for the group.  The eventual breakdown of the science and rhetoric of 
these "big simulation" projects has, however, been followed by advances in scientific data collection and 
modeling practices and a striking spirit of inventiveness to changing the rhetorical form and function of 
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climate data.   Consider first A.I.’s impact on environmental sciences, and new geographic information 
system (GIS) software which came into use in the models currently employed by the U.N. and the World 
Meteorological Organization, and led to new practices in the communal and distributed “use” of models 
where more attention was granted to using postulates in A.I. to give rhetorical structure to ‘decision 
making forums’ that address the rhetorical problems of older modeling practices, their reliance on 
expert ‘explanatory powers’ and the subsequent confusions of deliberative practices.  Generally, this 
involves opening up model building to more expansive networks of users responsible to provide 
feedback and data, while asking experts to design visuals, interfaces and usability (similar to precept 
one: manipulating the icons of reason).   The recent collection Artificial Intelligence Methods in the 
Environmental Sciences (2008) is one of the first comprehensive reports on the impacts of (AI) methods, 
including neural networks, decision trees, genetic algorithms and fuzzy logic, and the collection stresses 
important considerations in applying these advanced rhetorical methods or techniques as means to 
mediate between traditional models, new computational powers, and several more “artful” human 
abilities to recognize patterns and “persuasively and responsibly” explain the fuzzy logic involved in 
terms generated in part by the programs (7).  With programs that integrate user observations of 
empirical data (from national environmental agencies and government research groups, to farming 
collectives, environmental watch dogs, and aboriginal communities in remote northern areas) while 
applying A.I. techniques such as “fuzzy logic” to encode imprecise verbal cues like “very probable” or 
“less water” that were once left to concerned natural and social scientists like the Club of Rome, A.I. 
techniques are aggregated to yield more firm “final answers” that shore up “user-friendly automated 
decision-support systems that model what a human expert would do under similar circumstances” (10).  
There are numerous emerging examples of tools applying new software programs aimed at mediating 
the data’s ‘uncertain terms’ so that the models outputs influence more robust decision making, and thus 
remove some of the impediments to inventive forms of adaptation and mitigation.167   
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The most striking example foregrounding the reformulation and increasing acceptance of a 
‘scientific-rhetoric’ is evident in the evolving practices of climate science in our current “data-deluge,” 
which Chris Anderson (in)famously suggested means that we can potentially “flip many modeling 
practices on their head by first trolling through massive amounts of data, which can be analyzed 
mathematically, without hypotheses about what they might show” (WIRED June 2008).  Here the 
popular prediction of an “end of models” is prefigured by the trend that we can “punch as many 
numbers as possible into the biggest computing clusters the world has ever seen and let statistical 
algorithms find patterns where science might not” (Anderson).   In climate forecasting this has meant 
more reliance on what is popularly referred to now as ‘the cloud,’ and led to open-source software Grids 
and visual representations tools that make for easier calibration of risks, resource scarcities and 
excesses, and for making this data more persuasive for the economic calculus used for forecasting 
investment and general trends.  The challenge here is no longer well-understood as a problem of 
representing large amounts of data based mostly on science you can’t see, or of problematic user 
inputs, but to model and re-code the more freely roaming climate information through risk 
management software in insurance firms and banks that help generate both carbon credit portfolios and 
Event Linked Futures (ELFs). Various emissions and green commodities trading programs thus rely on 
recoded climate data as “risks” (climate change and severe weather or natural disasters) and “scarcity” 
(drought, famine, agricultural short-falls, post-peak oil, etc).  The most pertinent example is the move to 
code climate predictions as part of the emerging carbon trading markets like CCX in Chicago (Chicago 
Climate Exchange), or the European Climate Exchange, both of which rely on voluntary compliance of 
data collected through ‘the cloud’ and the reshaping of this data by open-source software Grids and 
visual representations tools that make a functional calibration of risks, resource scarcities and excesses 
into the economic calculus models designed to both forecast investment and to encourage carbon 
trade-offs.  Not unlike the coterminous trends in science and economics during Forrester’s day, 
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increasing access to such data, to new visual representations of risks, and calibrations of these into a 
new algebraic form, has opened up a new economic calculus made to help traders assess the 
frameworks for valuation and risk, such as the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS)’s 
data viewer, which portrays transactions, and trading schemes within the cloud, and allows for easy 
comparison of this in production of graphs, data and downloads.   
A more explicitly rhetorical response to the rapid commonplacing of this data (or these 
rhetorical-technical conditions) is the oddly coined “Gort Cloud,” which allows public access to the cloud 
of climate data and to connect with a large-scale interconnected social network described as "a vast, 
largely invisible and growing (environmentally-aware) ‘community’ that sieves, measures and exchanges 
information on environmental (green) products and services"(Seireeni and Fields 4).  According to 
Seireeni and Fields, the authors and publishers of the book, The Gort Cloud: "the community includes 
NGOs, government agencies, certifying groups, academics, eco-tech specialists, business alliances, green 
media including green business news, sustainable designers, ... other social networks, conferences, 
trade shows, events, competitions, green blogs, special interest groups, and trendspotters — to name 
just a few" (3).   The effort is to make the climate data influence marketing and brand-building 
experiences of sustainable businesses in America and Europe.  The Gort Cloud has a flexible and highly 
rhetorical set of “limits” to growth, and is designed largely as an attempt to encourage responsible 
production and (more so) consumption patterns while representing much more faith in virtual economic 
growth.  This raises entirely different sets of questions about the “Garbage in, Garbage out” critique or 
Limits to Growth, because its audience largely engaged with using the data to shape the ambitions of 
consumers whose confidence is now also asked to be measured not only in profits but in carbon 
footprints, green job indexes, and other small scale measurements meant to rethink what is responsible 
in the way of production and consumption (in ways that remind us of both is first and second precept).   
126 
 
Can we not think of this recent history from a systems dynamics approach to climate modeling 
and scenario building to more sophisticated and “scientifically relevant” GCMs or Global Climate Models 
as the new grounds for a whole strategy of rhetorical work?  Would this not help bring imagination to 
the procedural approaches used today by groups like the IPCC, rebuttals to the policy makers that still 
see too much uncertainty, or an argument about what is ‘true judgment’ to the logic of the scientist and 
mathematicians that say the climate problem must be fully described or for the models to be fully coded 
to function (Loveridge 55).  Indeed, if Bacon was a leading figure of ecological thought in recent decades, 
would we live in a world where the recent issue of “Nature” (July 2013) closes with another appeal for 
“better modelling” after it describes how “the amount of Arctic sea ice declines at an unprecedented 
rate, the thawing of a 50-gigatonne (Gt) reservoir of methane, stored in the form of hydrates... is likely 
to be emitted as the seabed warms, either steadily over 50 years or suddenly... [and cost an] extra 
$60 trillion ...the scenario with no mitigation, or 15% of the mean total predicted cost of climate change 
impacts (about $400 trillion).”  Wouldn’t the pursuit of ‘mastery’ here be a distinctly rhetorical 
response?   
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 Chapter Four) Darwin’s Ecology, Huxley’s Ethics:  Artificial Selection and Rhetoric 
Introduction:   
As Thomas Lessl recently put it in Rhetorical Darwinism (2012) “it would be hard to miss the fact 
that the concept of evolution lives a double life, that it references a body of technical knowledge 
developed through careful scientific study but also evokes a cluster of more intangible meanings at once 
emotive, ideological, perhaps even religious, that move in orbit around the notion of progress” (XI).168   
What Lessl studies as “rhetorical Darwinism” is the “persuasive work” that continues to bring Darwin’s 
ideas to various public arguments in ways that flirt with familiar forms of Social-Darwinism that drew 
analogies from the language or concepts underpinning evolutionary biology to apply them to individuals, 
races, collectives or corporations. This genre of work aiming to rectify certain rhetorical or ideological 
uses of Darwin’s texts (among which perhaps Richard Hofstadter’s work still stands out as the model) 
has of course long been a topic of popular argument and focus of study for rhetoricians.169  This chapter 
works in a similar vein, drawing our attention to the principle ways Darwin has been taken up as an 
integral figure to ecology, ways which we can initially think of as granting at least another kind of 
‘double life’ to Darwin: one advancing with ecological sciences, and one advancing with ecological 
thought in the humanities, particularly, as Lessl put it, in ways that ‘move in orbit around’ what has 
come to be called ‘self-conscious ecology.’   
Certainly it would come as no surprise to most that, as R.C. Stauffer noted, the roots of scientific 
ecology are often traced back to Darwin as one of its pioneering figures, often by considering how many 
of Darwin’s observations and proposed mechanisms still fit within the parameters of contemporary 
scientific ecology, or by describing key differences in the methods of classifying tens of thousands of 
new plant and animal species on global expeditions, or the means of identifying their ‘geography’ or 
biota, their co-adaptations or interdependencies with abiotic factors, or non- living chemical and 
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physical forces (2).170   Among works by ecological historians (including both historians and ecologists) 
such as McIntosh, Egerton, Worster, Nicholson, Nash probably the main distinction in studying Darwin 
as one of the “antecedents of ecology” in relation to other pioneering figures like Humbolt, Wallace, 
Warming, Huxley and Haeckel is the objective of either building a “retrospective ecology” that generally 
looks at Darwin as “someone doing something similar to what came later to be recognized as an aspect 
of ecological science,” or the objective of tracing how Darwin realigns older ideas from philosophy, 
science or religion that contribute to “self-conscious ecology” –the “distinctive concepts and questions” 
that make ecology a form of thought and praxis that extends beyond the parameters of science 
(McIntosh 22).   Both “retrospective ecology” and “self-conscious ecology” approaches have, as Robert 
McIntosh suggests in his seminal work The Background of Ecology, frequently revolved around semantic 
debates about a definition or disciplinary identity for ecology in the 18th and 19th century.   While the 
prior tends to consider how a Darwinian ‘revolution’ gave certain parameters to the “crystallization  of 
ecology” as a science that emerged from a more amorphous body of natural philosophy or theology, the 
latter tends to consider how Darwin contributed to what “is commonly described as a synthetic science” 
that advances new knowledge through methods of investigation that continually integrates, synthesizes, 
or (to give it its Burkean term) perceives the world through a fundamental process of composition of 
diverse facts from natural and social phenomena in order to gain new levels of insight  -- a process 
challenging disciplinary science as it raises clear political and ethical questions by putting humans in new 
“objectively determinable ecological relations with nature” while raising the stakes of our responsibility 
as the species with some consciousness of our influence or control over evolutionary processes 
(McIntosh 25-27). 171   
What we might call the ‘synthetic appeal’ to treat Darwin as a proto-ecologist grew in 
prevalence mostly after the many persuasive rebuttals of more “tired Social-Darwinist metaphors” 
emphasizing the individual in ‘competition’ or the so-called ‘struggle for existence’ (among which 
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perhaps Margulis and Sagan’s work still stands out as the model), rebuttals which have proven without 
any doubt that organisms are not self-contained, and that any notion of an independent individual is, 
scientifically speaking, a myth that ignores how the human is “embedded in ecological communities” 
comprising of varied symbiotic relationships of mutual ‘benefit,’ ‘cost,’ ‘cooperation’ and ‘competition’ 
between organisms (Margulis and Sagan 15-18).  This has led, on one hand, to a number of recent works 
by ecologists who admirably forward research programs that align readings of Darwin endorsing images 
of nature and society as essentially cooperative (such as Allee, Emerson, or Mittman), and on the other 
hand, to more and more work in the humanities borrowing symbiotic metaphors from Darwin in ways 
that only seem to overdetermine the case of our ‘entanglements,’ ‘meshwork,’ or ‘interconnectivity’ 
with other organisms and living systems -- especially given the slew of recent historical and philosophical 
taking versions of Actor-Network-Theory to study large socio-technological systems that account for 
‘natural,’ social and technological phenomena as ecological agents participating within ecological 
systems (Law, Latour, Callon, Serres, etc.).  Indeed, while this growing body of work provides us with 
important ways of doing ecological histories, offering rich descriptions of networked behaviors that 
avoid  or confront assorted dangers of "biologism" or "essentialism" and a wealth of ways for scholars to 
become more conscious of their descriptions of complex (and many relevant) technological, social and 
ecological factors in their work, these perspectives might benefit from considering Darwin as a proto-
ecological figure in a way that seems largely to contradict most ‘synthetic’ appeals.  While rich in their 
ecological descriptions, such perspectives are less adept from an ethical or rhetorical point of view, 
often making it difficult to give due relevance to human intelligence, situate responsible agency, or 
translate this to present forms of action, largely because the complex nodes of agency also strategically 
passes over “what is commonly taken as distinctive or even unique about humans” and/or insists on 
superseding or forcing out any or all nature/culture dualisms (Bennettt, ix).  This is the main reason why 
I believe those in the humanities interested in ecology might benefit from  particular reading of Darwin’s 
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‘rhetoric of artificial selection’ as originating a form of rhetorical agency that remains in some ways 
unexplained and which could be a potentially valuable history for ecological thought today. 
 As one might expect, widespread discussions of ‘artificial selection’ range from the 
uncontroversial to the highly contentious.  Conventional treatments of artificial selection will of course 
tend to emphasize it as an important concept, metaphor, or analogy in Darwin, and it has become a 
truism for many in both the sciences and humanities many to accept artificial selection as a crucial tool 
in Darwin’s process of rhetorical discovery of natural selection, and as providing a convenient metaphor 
or analogy in explaining natural selection to readers.  Darwin’s observations of how humans can greatly 
alter the behavior and form of plant or animal species (fan-tailed pigeons, English bull-dogs, Hereford 
cattle, etc.) certainly helped lead to his inference that nature might achieve even more dramatic 
changes over longer periods of time.172  And on the origin of natural selection as a theory, Darwin said: 
“All my notion[s] about how species change are derived from long-continued study of the works of 
agriculturalists and horticulturalists” (480).   By the same token it is commonly taught (as it was to me) 
that while natural selection relies on analogies and metaphors from artificial selection to readily explain 
a process of how evolutionary changes function as a kind ‘blind watchmaker’ that lack a telos or 
designer, we can (or should?) confirm that such metaphors can then simply be shed as we explain 
change on the basis of the three interrelated scientific processes: variation (the inheritable genetic 
differences among individual organisms), selection (the differential reproduction of those organisms) 
and retention (the differential representation of fittest genetic variants in the gene pool).  In such cases, 
shedding divine selection for natural selection also hinges on shedding artificial selection as another 
unwanted rhetorical corollary to Darwin’s real theory, or perhaps half-heartedly grants that artificial 
selection is something of a rhetorical inevitability in reading Darwin and something to be pinned down 
as potentially ripe for misinterpretation or misappropriation for political or philosophical arguments.   
On the contrary, there are a few less conventional arguments from philosophers picking up artificial 
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selection as a concept, such Gill Aitken who recently cut against the grain by treating artificial selection 
not only as a problematic category or vital corollary to Darwin’s theory, but as a third mechanism for 
evolutionary change in Darwin’s theory.173  Aitken argues artificial selection is a ‘similar but different’ 
evolutionary mechanism, one either distinctive to an aspect of human evolution, or an aspect of 
evolution able to move partially outside the realm of natural selection and into a relatively distinct forms 
of human evolution as something goal directed (which natural selection is not), generally engaged by 
the requirements of a single species (which natural selection is not), and capable of much more rapid 
and particularized changes to species (Aitken 57).174    
This chapter does not seek to cast a new proposition about artificial selection as a ‘mechanism’ 
of evolution, but in taking a more thorough rhetorical approach to thinking about certain risks Darwin 
took in using artificial selection as a crucial trope (metaphor, analogy, and concept), I diagnose how this 
trope repeatedly influences a genealogy of ecological thought, and like Aitken I infer another way it 
might open up to a more “conceptually progressive” reception history for ecological thought today (to 
borrow a term from Paul Sheldon Davies).  To make this case the upcoming section draws our attention 
first to the ways that ecological thought in the humanities orbits around artificial selection as a 
problematic metaphor that encourages an unwanted division between of Darwin’s (anthropocentric, 
individualistic, or economic) rhetoric and forms of ‘true ecological connectedness’ – a division that is 
defend against in some of the earliest definitions of ecology (i.e. Haeckel) and that becomes an exigence 
for resultant forms of ecological ethics bent on limiting Darwinian rhetoric with metaphors of symbiosis 
and cooperation (i.e. Leopold), or a division that fuels Darwin’s ‘persuasive logic’ in ways that polarizes a 
great deal of 19th century arcadian vs. anti-arcadian ecological themes.  The following section then 
examines a counter trend in rhetorical scholarship valuing this division by looking particularly at Burke, 
Campbell, and Davies as leading arguments into own reading of the rhetoric of artificial selection as 
initiating a suitable trope for ecological thought today.    
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Indeed, many discussions about the accuracy or appropriateness of parallels between natural 
selection and artificial selection have become something of an unwanted or dangerous cliché in histories 
of science largely because they have missed much of what rhetoricians have valued in this trope as 
marking a crucial ‘division’ or moment of incommensurability between science and rhetoric that raised 
certain challenges for Darwin which orbit around questions of agency, ethics and ‘the rhetoric of 
artificial selection.’  To demonstrate how this rhetoric artificial selection becomes an important trope for 
ecological rhetoric in particular, I shift from a discussion of Darwin to a comparative analysis that maps 
out an understudied debate over artificial selection between Darwin and Huxley as one of the first 
thinkers responding carefully to these questions.  This reading emphasizes a shared exigence for 
amplifying artificial selection as a symbolic category that compelled a kind of rhetorical inquiry between 
the two, an exigence for defining artificial selection in rhetorical terms as a technê, and an exigence for 
establishing certain ethical principles and rhetorical strategies that might guide practices of artificial 
selection --- principles that Huxley believes might steer artificial selection away from transcendent ideals 
and towards an emphasis on an ethics of ‘transactions’ or ‘debts’ and ‘redundancies’ calibrated between 
two ‘artificial’ realms: a social-rhetorical realm and a more rigorously scientific realm of artificial 
selection (agriculture, fisheries, etc.).  It is the latter realm that Huxley conceives of as a ‘centre of force’ 
in society, creating a dynamic that replicates something like the ‘cosmic processes’ in nature.     
Analyzing Huxley as a rhetorician allows us to examine how he moves from analysis of the 
rhetoric of artificial selection and critique of  its narrow or vulgar uses, to both speculating about a 
heightened role for this rhetoric in an evolutionary and ecological context (one that might moderate or 
enrich forms of materialism, idealism, or merely “cosmetic rhetorics”) and appropriating it for pragmatic 
political purposes (as we will see in an example from his address to the fisheries exhibition).  This 
speculative and practical appropriation becomes a means to convince his audience to think more 
broadly about the relationships (or ‘debts’) between science and the commercial industries most 
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directly sustaining society, as well as to an ethics calibrated by the pleasures or tastes of the public.  
Taking a broader view of what Huxley does then, we see him considering what ways evolutionary 
science might require a corresponding ecological rhetoric to create forms of socio-ecological 
sustainability.  Indeed, as I will argue in conclusion, this ‘rhetoric of artificial selection’ seems to mark 
several important trends, an early rendition of a turn from analytic philosophies to the varied theses of 
pragmatism, wherein rhetoric is increasingly regarded as an unavoidable bridge between sciences of 
nature and culture, and a move beyond mere recognition of the unavoidability of  nature/culture 
dichotomies or the need to ‘destroy’ or reclassify these, by strategically and affirmatively bridging how 
science revealed deeper truths of the workings of nature, with the rhetorical supplements of art, technê, 
images, representation, convention (etc) with a particular end: supporting both (ecological) 
consciousness and our (unavoidable) political and technological interventions into natural and social 
systems.  The case of artificial selection shows us this kind of rhetoric is not a matter of choice; it is by 
default that artificial selection becomes a rhetoric that does come into play.  We can see, however, both 
Darwin and Huxley also play with how it should be made persuasive and sufficient for exigencies we 
increasingly define as ecological and sustainable – exigencies that include meeting a range of human 
needs and desires – for not only sustenance, but for emotional well-being, and moral or ethical training.   
 
Darwin’s Ecology and the Rhetoric of Artificial Selection  
 
It is interesting to contemplate an entangled bank, clothed with many plants of many kinds, with birds 
singing on the bushes, with various insects flitting about, and with worms crawling through the damp 
earth, and to reflect that these elaborately constructed forms, so different from each other, and 
dependent on each other in so complex a manner, have all been produced by laws acting around us. 
On the Origin of Species, pg 489 
Slow though the process of selection may be, if feeble man can do much by his powers of artificial 
selection, I can see no limit to the amount of change, to the beauty and infinite complexity of the 
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coadaptations between all organic beings, one with another and with their physical conditions of life, 
which may be effected in the long course of time by nature's power of selection. 
On the Origin of Species, pg 109.   
Darwin’s value for ecology and ecological thought in the humanities has taken a number of 
trajectories, and Robert McIntosh’s The Background of Ecology skillfully surveys many of these in 
discussions about Darwin’s contributions to ecology sciences, from some of the earliest ecologists who 
described Darwin as “the great exponent of ecology before it had a name” (Spalding, 1903), to some of 
the earliest  historians who consider it “hyperbolic” to describe Darwin as “the true premier ecologist” 
(Ramaley, 1940) (10).  With the upsurge of more ‘theoretical ecology’ in the humanities since the 1960s, 
the varied discourses on ecological ethics, philosophy and critical theory, it is somewhat surprising that 
so of much Darwin’s appeal remains staked to an overriding deference for his ‘synthetic method’ 
generally centered on this in the idea of a kind of ‘true’ ecological “consciousness.” It may seem 
counterintuitive initially to suggest that this overarching appeal to ‘synthesis’ is problematic – especially 
as this is the primary appeal that lead first-rate ecological historians like Donald Worster to vet Darwin 
as “the single most important figure in the history of ecology over the past two or three centuries” and 
influential ecological thinkers like Roderick Nash to cite Darwin’s work as the ‘origin’ of environmental 
and animal rights discourses that remain influential today (128, 42).175   While I certainly don’t disagree 
that such works have rightly described the main contributions of Darwin for a vital trajectory of 
ecological thought and ethics, I would suggest that far too many ongoing discussions of ecology and 
ecological ethics in recent decades repeat an older set of rhetorical concerns in arguments that 
continually appeal to a ‘synthetic Darwin’ as the overriding contribution to ‘self-conscious ecology’ -- 
mainly since such readings typically emphasize ‘entanglements’ or interconnections with nature (which 
the first epigraph above captures as one of Darwin’s more persistently in-vogue quotes) as the 
overriding contribution to some form of evolving ‘consciousness,’ and usually by privileging some 
version of true ‘ecological connectedness’ that can support virtues like respect or care  at the expense of 
135 
 
any form of self-consciousness that accounts for any manner of ‘anthropocentric’ behavior or thought, 
the frequently self-centered nature of our language and rhetoric, or (to give it the opposite Burkean 
inflection) to confront the implications of this central ‘division’ between artificial and natural processes 
(or human culture and nature) in Darwin’s thought.  
The philosopher and ecologist Ricardo Rozzi offers up a case in point of a commonplace way of 
reading Darwin’s synthetic method through a dialectical reading of Darwin’s evolutionary concepts 
working their way into seminal texts on environmental ethics, arguing that Darwin provided the clearest 
examples of “complex links” between two open systems, the sociocultural and the natural environment, 
which promoted a basic dialectical relationship between how “ecologists formulate their scientific 
theories influenced by ethical values, and in turn, environmental ethicists value nature based on 
scientific theories.”176  Like many others valuing a ‘synthetic’ rhetoric in Darwin, Rozzi values the origin 
of a basic dialectic stipulating a logical “is/ought” problem grounding ecologists who approach nature 
with the aim of understanding what it is, while raising new questions for environmental ethicists “who 
approach nature asking how we should relate to it, or live in and with it.”  Grounding a Darwinian 
intervention in Hume’s basic terms is, however, also presented as a new ‘rough ground’ with a set of 
problems surfacing in Darwin’s rhetoric.  Rozzi sums it up thusly:     
 On the one hand, the Darwinian conception of a common evolutionary origin and ecological 
connectedness has promoted a respect for all forms of life. On the other hand, the metaphors 
of struggle for existence and natural selection appear as problematic because they foist onto 
nature the Hobbesian model of a liberal state, a Malthusian model of the economy, and the 
productive practice of artificial selection, all of which reaffirm modern individualism and the 
profit motive that are at the roots of our current environmental crisis. These metaphors were 
included in the original definitions of ecology and environmental ethics by Haeckel and Leopold 
respectively, and are still pervasive among both ecologists and ethicists.177   
It is worth examining further how Rozzi identifies these metaphors as integral to a particular ‘birth’ of 
ecological thought. Haeckel of course offered the fledgling term ecology (oekologie) in part as a 
136 
 
response to Darwin, stating: "the body of knowledge concerning the economy of nature […] in a word, 
ecology is the study of all those complex interrelations referred to by Darwin as the conditions of the 
struggle for existence."  While Leopold would much later define ecological ethics and ecological 
evolution as “two definitions of one thing,” and his influential “land ethic” counseled a wide range of 
ecological thinkers to take on narrow models of land usage (especially those he addressed as economic, 
utilitarian, and libertarian) with arguments for “a limitation on freedom of action in the struggle for 
existence” and a replacement of the evolution of current “politics and economies [that] are advanced 
symbioses” with “co-operative mechanisms with an ethical content” (248, 238).  
Rozzi’s argument is helpful for thinking about a basic relationships between Darwin and these 
historic moments in ecological discourses, but perhaps more so for reflecting on a long-term inclination 
in environmental ethics to elevate what is deemed ‘ecologically ethical’ in Darwin’s ideas by 
emphasizing this basic dichotomy in Darwin’s rhetoric, where some consciousness of true ‘ecological 
connectedness’ is singled out as reinforcing virtues like respect, admiration or awe, while they are pitted 
against a brand of rhetorical Darwinism that could promote lesser qualities marked by their political, 
artificial or economic status as they might sponsor dangerous ideas of ‘individualism’ or (we assume) 
turn the ‘productive practices of artificial selection’ towards dangers associated with capitalism or 
technoscience. This basic dichotomy and the potential use or abuse of Darwinian rhetoric is one that 
Rozzi addresses as a familiar tune in a “long line” of work in environmentalism and ecological ethics 
focusing repeatedly on Darwinian ideas that are “easy to abuse” because they “can favor patterns of 
over-consumption and exploitation of the natural environment by strengthening individualism and the 
idea of progress,” even though Rozzi thinks Darwin initially diminishes this "abuse" by “weakening 
anthropocentrism” with metaphors like the "entangled bank" and "the tree of life."   In this general 
ecological-ethical sequence largely opened up by Darwin, Rozzi singles out a prescriptive normative 
ethics, one emphasizing both a new moral “respect” for nature, as the path most effective in limiting 
137 
 
Darwinian rhetoric “strengthening individualism” or discovering ways to read Darwin as “weakening 
anthropocentrism.”  That Darwin can be read either way is, again, is obvious enough, and has garnered 
much attention especially as it takes shape within a dominant ideational swerve of a normative or limits 
based environmental ethics with this particular ‘birth.’    
In his more multifaceted reading of ecological history, Donald Worster’s Nature's Economy: A 
History of Ecological Ideas (1977), marks another important division and set of trajectories in ecological 
thought fueled by Darwin’s “persuasive logic” (128).   Worster reads ecological themes that develop 
from a rough ground in rhetorical Darwinism, mapping out similar dualisms to Rozzi while drawing upon 
rhetorical terms more explicitly to read a reception history he picks up mainly from where Clarence 
Glacken left off in Traces on the Rhodian Shore (1976) by examining the relationship between a “new 
ecological model” Darwin handed down in his evolutionary theories to science, and in a new form of 
“persuasive logic” that Darwin handed to an “expansive rhetoric” in subsequent ecological thought 
“prior to [ecology’s] recent ascent to oracular power in a popular environmental movement” (128).178   
What brings Worster to call Darwin the “the single most important figure in the history of ecology” is 
that Darwin seems to be the “chief architect” of a history of consistently oppositional ecological ideas, 
or at least of ideas consistently pulled in two opposing directions: those flirting with an ideal (but often 
also ‘dark’) vision of mastery, and those flirting with the darkest themes of Darwinism, “extinction, 
conflict, depravity, terror – these were far from the qualities of an arcadia” (124).  Worster summarizes 
several large-scale tensions in 19th and 20th century rhetorical Darwinism, mainly in what is often 
referred to as the themes of “Arcadian Ecology” (a collections of motivations led by a renewed sense of 
mastery he attributes to a revised Baconian rhetoric that aspired to replace the sense of “equilibrium 
between man and nature” with a “more aggressively artificial, humanized landscape: a new world in 
which science would give mankind absolute power over the land and its creatures”) and a rhetorical 
Darwinism he calls “Anti-Arcadian” or “imperial” (a collection of motivations guided by the darker 
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“lessons of the Galapagos” as lessons of “ecological turbulence” and human nature as driven by a 
creative force in nature that is ‘red in tooth and claw’ and frequently compared to a similar “human 
malevolence and conflict” which Darwin saw as the “inevitable effects of an invasion of people who not 
only were ignorant of the natural order but found the pursuit of conquest easier than the principle of 
cooperation”) (123-128).    Worster’s ambitious history is not quite as binary as I describe it here, as he 
attempts to account for how Darwin converted the early ecological writings of Linnaeus, Ray and others, 
and how this influenced a wide array of subsequent interests in ecological themes.179  However, what he 
captures in this basic tension reflects another consistent form of rhetorical Darwinism that is at least 
pulled in these divergent ‘Arcadian/Anti-Arcadian’ directions, which have advanced a great deal of 
content and ecological themes about human agency and evolution.  
In treating Darwinian rhetoric as grounding these trajectories for ecological thought, dialectical 
readings like Rozzi’s (while useful and accurate in some respects) seem to consistently misconstrue any 
meaningful interpretation of the rhetoric of artificial selection -- and most would agree that many 
similarly construed readings to narrowly concerned with Social-Dawinism or the anthropocentric or 
individualism slant from rhetorical Darwinism may even have become a dangerous cliché in the history 
of science and ecology.  Worster’s rhetorical reading, on the other hand, while impressive in its reach 
and its precise analysis, would also seem to benefit from a more thorough rhetorical analysis that might 
offer ways of moving beyond, or dissuade any ongoing appeal to Darwinian rhetoric from simply 
repeating this Arcadian tension – appeals that extend this particular ‘double life’ in ecological thought 
right up to the present.   
Consider briefly a main thread of Timothy Morton’s recent work that repeatedly appeals to 
Darwin as essential to rethinking ecological criticism today, starting with his influential Ecology Without 
Nature (2009), which recreates the case against naturalistic fallacies by arguing that we do without any 
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writing about “nature” that “ironically impedes a proper relationship with the earth and its life-forms,” 
especially three problematic and commonplace uses of nature: (1) as an empty placeholder an array of 
other concepts, (2) as a ‘normal’ force or law of nature used to measure other deviations, and (3) as a 
“Pandora’s box” for disparate fantasies (2, 15).   In The Ecological Thought (2010), which Morton calls his 
“prequel” to these arguments, he appeals to his readers to understand “ecological thought” as much 
more than just extending new descriptions of our countless interconnections with nature or a lifeworld, 
and to instead exemplify “the form of ecological thought” or “how you think” the ecological thought, 
which he says is “at least as important as its content” (4, emphasis his).  Principally, “the ecological 
thought” requires us to think by making connections between the natural and artificial, a claim which he 
recurrently backs up by claiming we should “just read Darwin” as providing the most persuasive 
example of a “denatured” nature, since Darwin’s writing is so consistently based on comparing the 
natural and artificial that his view is never strictly “natural,” or never sees nature as a closed-system, 
since his writing interconnects nature with many “unnatural, uncanny sequence of mutations and 
catastrophic events” (8).  While Morton is interested in Darwin as a figure helping us think about ecology 
‘without nature’ by helping us understand an evolving “form of ecological thought,” a main trajectory of 
his own work on this seems increasingly ill-formed, as his invocations of Darwin make especially clear.  
Darwin is invoked as both a great thinker of the Arcadian/Anti-Arcadian rhetoric well charted by Worster 
and others, and for thoughts on a ‘denatured’ nature through his well-known natural/artificial analogies.  
However, Morton’s analysis (especially in his most recent work Realist Magic) turns to Darwin’s use of 
dialetheias (contradiction or ‘double truths’) leads him only to claims he warned about earlier as 
insufficient – a repetition of almost interchangeable claims about humanity as an interconnected ‘mesh’ 
of organisms, or worse to the speculative realist zeal that then concludes that we need a democracy of 
objects, or that follows an odd circular logic back to claims like there “are no species and they have no 
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origin” since “lifeforms are made of other lifeforms, which in turn are made of other non-living entities” 
(Realist Magic, 29).  
While Morton’s later work at times seems to fall into the critical trap he identifies in his earlier 
work in Ecology Without Nature, he does however offer the most recent diagnosis of a key part of the 
problem I will now turn to address in this chapter.  He notes in “Ecomimesis: Nature Writing and the 
Nature of Writing” that ‘ecomimesis’ is a prevailing rhetorical device at work in a wide range of 
ecological texts in recent decades (particularly Nature writing) aiming to bring us closer to an authentic 
experience of nature by erasing the aesthetic or rhetorical conventions that supposedly ‘separate’ us 
from our connections with ‘nature’ (31).  He notes that “ecomimesis is an authenticating device” that 
seems to have largely effaced or greatly reduced what “Rhetoric used to have a whole panoply of terms 
for” allocating as persuasive appeals in writing or speech making the basic appeals of“geographia (the 
description of earth or land), topographia (place), chorographia (nation), chronographia (time), 
hydrographia (water), anemographia (wind), dendographia (trees)…” (33).  While Morton notes a 
concern that forms of identification or appeal are too often effaced by ‘ecomimesis’ in genres of nature 
writing and numerous other critical works invoking or rethinking nature as a category, in this chapter I 
make a similar contention about the more specific trend in these ongoing appeals to Darwin’s ‘synthesis’ 
in ecological thought that either tend to misconstrue, reduce or overshadow how the ‘rhetoric of 
artificial selection’ might serve as a  historical benchmark for a key form of ecological rhetoric taking its 
first (and perhaps clearest) shape in Darwin and its reception by T.H. Huxley who gave artificial selection 
some explicit rhetorical principles and context.  Indeed, as I will argue, this ‘rhetoric of artificial 
selection’ might contribute to some helpful ways of thinking about how ecological thought can move 
different trajectories than the dialectical reading noted, and without recourse to the Arcadian tensions, 
or the circular appeal to Darwin that Morton marks out here.   
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De-Composing Darwin: Rhetoric of Artificial Selection from Division, to Mystery, to “Imperfect 
Instrument”  
 
This comparative reading will require something of a pendulum swing from our field’s recent 
penchant in reading Darwin rhetorically, and the reasons for this need some initial explanation.  The 
attention to Darwin has gone through a major shift in perspective in recent decades from reading 
Darwin as a reclusive figure and “rhetorical indigent” relying on “the charity of the persuasively gifted” 
like T.H. Huxley and Joseph Dalton Hooker, to an array of eulogies on Darwin’s rhetorical prowess in his 
own right (Campbell 55).  Rhetoric and Communication scholars like Fahnestock, Miller, Halloran, Lessl 
and Campbell have shown how Darwin’s rhetorical skills were able to change the perception of his 19th 
century audience from theistic design in nature to scientific or naturalistic perspectives, doing so by 
analyzing both precise rhetorical features of his rhetoric (such as Fahnestock’s analysis of incrementum 
and gradatio), and investigating broader elements of a Darwinian ethos powerful enough to promote a 
new genre of “Historical Science” (as Miller and Halloran argued), a genre that diverges from 
“experimental-predictive” sciences like physics or chemistry largely because Darwinian rhetoric (as a set 
of concepts, methods, claims, and as an authoritative ethos) went so far as to make “conformity with 
the works of Darwin crucial” in a widely held genre of historical science that “offers explanations that 
are narrative and sufficient rather than predictive and necessary” (112).180   In rhetoric it had been 
common enough to accept that Darwin played a major role in creating a genre that can “problematize 
the very concept of science,” that this framed several longstanding objectives for the rhetoric of science 
to examine this genre of ‘historical science,’ and urged rhetoricians to move beyond the debate about 
what Darwin “means” and to examine instead how Darwin’s strategies and his ethos have evolved 
through subsequent intellectual communities (108).  The texts and rhetorical problems I work with in 
this chapter are firmly in this vein of ‘rhetorical Darwinism,’ and the attempt to remedy what seems to 
hinder Darwin’s potential for recent branches of ecological thought seems to dictate some initial 
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synthesis between several ways of reading Darwin rhetorically (particularly by Burke, Campbell,  and 
Davies), while noting the particular connections these readings of a rhetoric of artificial selection have 
with Darwin’s rhetorical contributions to ecology.  Through these readings we see a clearer exigency for 
my later reading of Darwin’s ‘rhetoric of artificial selection’ as it extends beyond his own rhetorical 
strategies to include his ‘bulldog,’ T.H. Huxley, who initially problematized and strove to systematize 
Darwin’s rhetoric of artificial selection as he lectured and wrote about science, culture, and ethics.   
A crucial starting point here is thinking more critically and rhetorically about Darwin’s method as 
promoting a form of ‘synthesis’ as the highest (or sometimes singular) value in ecological texts invoking 
or appealing to Darwin.  To do so we needn’t look much further than Burke’s unfavorable diagnosis of 
Darwin as the exemplar of the terministic screen of composition rather than division.   Burke remarked 
how Darwin “sees only a difference of degree between man and other animals… as continuous” – a 
perspective which Burke thought made “Darwin overstate his case” and “unduly slighted the evidence 
for discontinuity here” (Language as Symbolic Action, 50).   In Language as Symbolic Action he accused 
Darwin of saying “astonishingly little about man’s special aptitudes as a symbol- user” and that Darwin’s 
“terministic screen so stressed the principle of continuity here that he could view the principle of 
discontinuity only as a case of human self-flattery,” but that we only need evidence of our 
“characteristic sociopolitical disorders, to make it apparent that man, the typically symbol-using animal, 
is alas! Something special” (50).  Almost two decades earlier in A Grammar of Motives Burke cites 
Darwin’s stance on domestication as a crucial instance where “a great biologist’s Grammar” is guilty of 
overshadowing any stress on the study of “motivational functions covered by our term agent,” and in 
being guilty of “reducing all phenomena to terms of motion, biology is as unambiguously scenic as 
physics” (157).  He finds Darwin’s descriptive biology and its account of the human “organism” to be 
grammatically the equivalent to articulating a world without human agency or of describing an earth 
“agent-minus” (GM 157).  We should note that Burke singles out domestication and Darwin’s notion of 
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“variability” in particular, noting that this concept emerges with an “idealistic stress” on our 
‘interconnections’ with external conditions because Darwin’s notion of variability is too completely and 
“ultimately” tied to ‘conditions’ as the “locus of motives” (157).   Keep in mind that Darwin does make 
variability of distinctive species a key mechanism for natural selection principally by discussing and 
comparing the forces of artificial and natural selection together during his Beagle Voyage, his work on 
barnacles, and most thoroughly thought through in Origin in “Variation under Domestication.”181  For 
Burke, we can safely say that these repeated analogies between artificial and natural selection by 
Darwin seem to be a missed opportunity for thinking about a crucial ‘division’ or discontinuity that 
should emerges as another key concept, one that implicates a particular kind of “strife” taking place in 
this thinking, or is mixed up in this thinking that requires analogical reasoning as the “mediatory ground 
that makes communication possible” and that is moreover that crucial moment where we “put 
identification and division ambiguously together, so that you cannot know for certain just where one 
ends and the other begins, and you have the characteristic invitation to rhetoric” (RM 25).   
To say that this is one invitation to rhetoric in Darwin’s thought, or the beginning of type of 
rhetorical Darwinism that deserves our attention is to say that, from Burke’s perspective, Darwin’s 
emphasis on composition not only overshadows a fundamental division, but that this is associated 
specifically with Darwin’s artificial/selection analogy as something like a “semi-conscious identification” 
or a rhetorical concept, device or strategy that is "not wholly deliberate yet not unconscious” (115).   In 
Burke’s reading, what comes from Darwin’s use of the artificial selection analogy as a rhetorical device is 
indeed connected to a more enduring form of persuasion, one that Burke diagnoses as a type of 
“mystery” around the connections between natural/artificial selection in Darwin’s thought (RM 115).  
The concept of ‘mystery’ refers to what arises constantly in the interplay between different species, or 
different ‘beings’ in moments of hierarchical estrangement, such as between humans and animals or 
royalty and commoners.  Mystery is also that element of a symbol’s persuasiveness that is either 
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passively reflected by a class or culture, or actively deployed in maintaining some form of persuasion, or 
identification and cultural cohesion. Burke’s interpretations of Darwin take several directions, but one 
case made is that the interplay of analogies and metaphors used by Darwin to describe artificial and 
natural selection is a particular instance of mystery, that this instance holds some permanence in that 
there is always the possibility of mystification, and that “rival rhetoricians” would need to redraw this 
key “distinction” at “different places, [as] their persuasiveness varies with the resources each has at 
hand” (25).   What Burke seems to suggest is not only that we distinguish artificial selection as having an 
element of rhetorical ‘mystery’ for readers, but that there is some exigence for rhetoricians to examine 
or reengage this actively as an evolving rhetorical ‘instrument,’ to explore how this functions as a 
concept, strategy or a more formal device now that it had taken an initial form of rhetorical Darwinism.   
Of course, rhetorical scholars have indeed often been drawn on Darwin to discuss how symbolic 
and rhetorical expression, as ‘artificial’ practices, might indeed be theorized as a shared form of ‘natural’ 
adaptation among species, presenting interesting connections between rhetorical and evolutionary 
theories, or charting persuasive activities as a kind of wavering communication between species, or 
drawn to think rhetorically about sexual selection as based in persuasive biological or biocultural 
practices that allows us to consider the overlap between evolutionary and persuasive activities 
(Kennedy, Campbell, Doyle or Parrish for instance).182  Most rhetoricians, however, will recognize the 
root of a basic division in Darwin’s use of the artificial/natural selection analogy as a basic strategy (even 
if perhaps only a ‘semi-conscious’ one) that not only marks some similarities between forms of 
evolutionary change as processes of so-called ‘selection,’ but demarcates artificial selection as 
something ‘incommensurable’ in that it cannot be strictly scientifically identified with, or defined in 
terms that evade rhetoric.  Indeed Lessl, for instance, recently treats artificial selection as one piece of 
evidence for a distinctive birth of a form of rhetorical positivism or “ideological science” which he 
adjoins to Kuhnian categories of ‘revolutionary’ and ‘normal’ science (Lessl 209).  There are, however, 
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other ways of thinking about artificial selection’s place in Darwin’s theory and its rhetorical function with 
worth drawing our attention to.  John Angus Campbell and Paul Sheldon Davies offer two notable 
readings by rhetorical scholars singling out artificial selection as a means to understand other substantial 
aspects of Darwin’s rhetorical strategizing, and they help to flip our attention from artificial selection as 
the means to invent the theory of natural selection, to focus on the re-invention of artificial selection 
itself as distinctive rhetorical concept.  Both study this analogy/metaphor/concept as something 
connecting Darwin’s method of inquiry to certain rhetorical strategies, and as something connected to a 
pattern rhetorical response that Darwin seemed to anticipate might forward a kind of responsible (and 
perhaps ecological?) agency in his readers, especially in both the “habits of thought common to 
breeders” and the “inability of professionals to see beyond their own specialty” (Campbell, “Comic 
Frame,” 34).   
Campbell’s thirty years of work on Darwin has contributed more than anyone on Darwin’s 
rhetoric, and it offers one key framework for reading the rhetoric of artificial selection.   He has 
examined both large and small scale rhetorical strategies (from his ‘grammar of natural theology’ to the 
evidence of his textual choices), as well as Darwin’s natural and scholarly resources for rhetorical 
invention and discovery.   If we begin with a panoptic look at his work, we see that his scholarship began 
with his dissertation work and ensuing essay “Charles Darwin and the Crisis of Ecology” which took 
Darwin as a key figure in developing a an ecological rhetoric largely by interpreting Darwin’s attitude 
toward nature as a “moral and humane response to the competition and violence in nature” one that 
resists crude translations that have led to the “ruinous exploitation” of nature in social, scientific, and 
economic pursuits (444).  Here Campbell argued that Darwin saw nature “not simply as a technical 
system in which means were intricately adapted to ends, but he also viewed nature from an aesthetic 
and implicitly from even a moral perspective” (445).  Campbell not only challenged other claims that 
Darwin secularized nature for man, giving him dominion over nature to appropriate its products to its 
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own use, he argued that a rhetorical evaluation of Darwin’s “attitude towards nature … enables us to 
respect the historical integrity of these works, yet read them in light of our own [ecological] 
situation”(444-445). This early work by Campbell claims that The Origin “is not an extension or 
justification of a philosophy of competition, but instead a moral and humane response to the 
competition and violence in nature” because Darwin’s attitude was to “wonder” at nature in a way that 
draws rhetorical parallels to many natural theologians, and which allowed him to invest nature with a 
sophisticated sanctity while promoting scientific understanding (444).    
While I could hardly begin to do justice to Campbell’s whole body of work here, it seems clear 
that Campbell had a lingering struggle with reading Darwin’s value as based solely (if profoundly) these 
largely moral consequences from this kind of ‘synthesis.’  Claiming that he paid too much attention to 
Darwin’s minor rhetorical strategies, Campbell’s later work returns to consider the ways that rhetoric 
could be considered integral to Darwin’s larger philosophical and historical ideas -- and their influence 
on scientific theory and practice.  In doing so, he turns to Darwin’s use of the artificial selection/natural 
selection analogy as the groundwork for an enduring rhetorical exigence, one that almost surely stems 
from Burke’s critique, as Campbell reclaims this analogy in terms of a ‘tragic-comic’ deflection of 
meaning, or as a particular moment of incommensurability between science and rhetoric in their 
descriptions of human nature, human agency, and evolutionary change.  In his essay “The Comic Frame 
and the Rhetoric of Science” (1994) specifically, Campbell argues that the natural/artificial connection is 
not just a “benign deception” that serves as a helpful but basically false analogy for making nature or 
evolution more understandable to laymen, but instead thinks the analogy is a historically significant 
“tragic/comic deception” with a double purpose of making readers more aware of their status as a 
“variety” of species of animals (the tragic), and aware of their status as separate “incipient species” of a 
“more or less permanent variety” (the comic) (38).183   The prior awareness is ‘tragic’ (surprisingly 
perhaps today) mainly due to religious circumstances, and because making this case would spread 
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Darwin’s own deep sense of guilt; while the latter is (equally surprising perhaps) ‘comic’ mainly because 
its emphasis is moreover on man’s undervalued ability to create certain forms of change that seem 
unbounded by natural selection, which stems from an awareness of certain human abilities that are 
hoped to “secure the reader’s tacit recognition of its competence and responsibility to bring about 
unbounded morphological change” (37).   In this particular essay, when Campbell reads Darwin’s use of 
this “leading/misleading analogy” as a potentially raising a kind of tragic/comic awareness, he is mainly 
interested in articulating a less frequently discussed ‘comic frame’ as something both ‘framing’ his 
evolutionary theories rhetorically, and s a set of rhetorical strategies designed to extend one of two 
main forms of responsibility which would seem to bridge scientific knowledge and rhetoric in ways that 
are far from ‘benign.’    
Pointing to Darwin’s “responsibility” chapters in particular, Campbell singles out two main forms 
of responsibility which we might distinguish briefly in terms of how they are attributed to Darwin’s 
rhetoric, and how they would supposedly develop or diffuse through forms of rhetorical Darwinism.   
The first is already highly esteemed and regularly attributed to Darwin’s powerful causal analysis of 
unobservable past events, which historians and philosophers like Gould and Edward Carr have analyzed 
as it became more extensive or commonplace as forms of ‘historical rationality’ that Darwin brought as 
a “properly historical mode of reason to the aid of biology” and which marks “one of Darwin’s most 
signal contributions as a thinker” (35).  Campbell then attributes another less-discussed form of 
responsibility mainly to artificial selection as an analogy, metaphor and concept, which he thinks raises a 
specific set of exigencies for rhetoric because he sees Darwin not only leveraging the analogy as a form 
of rhetorical discovery or a means to help explain natural selection, but sees Darwin’s commentaries on 
artificial selection as an attempts to help his readers move beyond “numerous tacit commitments 
linking domestication and nature, directionless struggle, variation and selection” to become more 
conscious of their productive abilities as this “incipient species” to create forms of change that are not 
148 
 
completely bounded by natural selection.  Campbell mainly singles out varied topics where artificial 
selection can be treated as an analogy, oxymoron, metaphor or concept, and argues that Darwin treats 
domestication, breeding, and horticultural practices as diverse topics in need of a “specific rhetorical 
task common to them all” (41).   This common ‘rhetorical task’ is, however, only ever supported where 
Darwin leverages two fairly rudimentary strategies designed to increase ‘awareness’ of certain 
distinctive human abilities (37).  The two rhetorical strategies Campbell singles out are also notably 
‘thin,’ especially as they are diagnosed as the potential beginnings of a kind of “Darwinian reason” with 
a ‘logic’ and ‘rhetoric’ that might engender another comparable form or responsibility to this ‘historical 
rationality.’   Campbell singles out Darwin’s use of ‘abductive inferences’ and the rhetorical use of 
‘persuasive images’ (mainly industrial images and persistent references to a ‘manufactory’ of species 
through artificial selection) as the strategies that seem most directly tied to artificial selection and to an 
attendant form of responsibility, though his analysis is pretty limited and scope and in any apparent 
application for two reasons.  The he acknowledges as he is only able to tease out examples of abductive 
inferences, strategies which are notably ‘weak’ forms of reason.  The second reason may be due to how 
he (like Worster) contextualizes these rhetorical strategies by looking backward to a Baconian tradition 
to explain these strategies (31-41). 184   Campbell’s conclusion is, nonetheless, revealing as he urges us 
rhetoricians to look further into Darwin’s method as offering both causes of origins as well as clues 
about how knowledge advances rhetorically through a kind of “synthetic and speculative character” 
while specifically asking asks readers to pick up on Darwin’s “inferential openness” about artificial 
selection as a rhetorical tool or instrument (35).  He stipulates that this is designed not only for 
facilitating understandings or designed to help “tip the balance of probability” about the existence of 
natural selection, but also as a rhetorical strategy to persuade readers to take on what is at issue in a 
“divergence in character” that distinguishes one species based on their tragic/comic existence, where 
the comic is bound to a sense of a ‘limitless’ potential and an attendant responsibility that would deeply 
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conflict with what animal breeders and plant breeders had always known about artificial selection as 
having distinct limits in terms of what they could accomplish in altering a species (35-7).   While these 
‘clues’ may seem to be little more than another return to ‘mystery,’ and these fragments of strategy in 
Darwin’s thought are notably ‘thin’ in Darwin’s own writing, they would still seem also to present an 
opportunity for reading these particular rhetorical strategies as the groundwork for more distinctive line 
of work and form of ecological rhetoric, especially if we read these ‘strategies’ in terms of what Paul 
Sheldon Davies calls a kind of ‘conceptual progressivism.’    
In Subjects of the World: Darwin's Rhetoric and the Study of Agency in Nature (2009), Davies 
positions much of his study on the back of a claim that would, at first glance, seem wholly contrasted to 
Burke’s critique, stating: “the method of inquiry best suited for discovering the nature of human agency” 
and “the best methods for discovering the truth about ourselves are methods framed, at least in part by 
Darwin’s rhetorical insights” (19-21).   Davies’ work, however, is guided by several central questions 
about how to apply and extend Darwin’s rhetorical insights into human nature or into humanity’s place 
in nature -- especially by thinking about the role we grant rhetorical strategies in our readings of the key 
concepts that support Darwin’s theories.185   Like many studies in rhetoric in recent decades, Davies 
thinks Darwin’s skills as a rhetorician do not diminish his accomplishments as a scientist, but that his 
rhetorical insights are deeply intertwined with his scientific inquiry.186   Davies’ attention is not merely 
directed to how Darwin used forms of rhetorical invention to generate his theories, or to how he crafted 
a theory and public argument by “lavishing upon the implicit, affective reactions” that keep animals alive 
and “entrench habits of thought” in humans, which Darwin recognized “his theory was bound to 
provoke” (5).  Davies focuses instead on how we might read certain Darwinian concepts as initial 
openings, or ‘origins,’ of a form of rhetorical inquiry that have much to teach humanistic thought itself 
by focusing on the relationships between scientific concepts and certain forms of rhetorical agency.  This 
emphasis requires placing a heightened value on certain rhetorical strategies that humanists have too 
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often subverted through readings he calls ‘conceptually conservative’ or ‘conceptually imperialist.’  It is 
here, also, that he notes artificial selection as a special victim of such readings – those that aim to locate 
and venerate concepts concerning human agency within our most well-developed scientific theories.  
‘Conceptual conservatism’ is genealogical work identifying and venerating a concept of particular 
importance for humans (such as responsibility, freedom, or consciousness) without considering how this 
might be  ‘dubious by descent’ (meaning the concept has since become seriously disconnected from 
science) or ‘dubious by psychology’ (meaning the concept leads thinkers astray as they become 
disconnected from our predisposed psychological abilities to use concepts, or they are simply over-
extended or under extended).  “Conceptual imperialism” is a related problem tied to a defensiveness 
against the possibility that many concepts describing human agency (or the methods of inquiry that 
locate and valorize them) might need drastic alteration or elimination, but persist in work to “describe 
what the world must be like for it to fit under such concepts” (26).  His remedy, to put it simply, is to 
take on a method of “conceptual progressivism” grounded in genealogical projects that are aware of 
‘dubious’ or ‘imperialist’ concepts, and to instead track what concepts in tighter relationship with the 
rhetorical strategies that enabled them to have significant rhetorical effects – with the aim of testing 
whether or not these concepts might yet effectively promote a distinctive rhetorical agency at present 
or the near future.  While he never applies this method fully to artificial selection, it is a central example 
early in his work, one which emphasizes some need to clear the ground of those ‘naturalist’ readings 
that seem to perpetually appeal to Darwin’s insights as insisting we are part of the animal kingdom, 
which while true, has lead to inquiries that either seek “grand truths about human nature” or attempt to 
re-articulate something about the “conflicted” nature of humans as a species by either raising 
“irresolvable antimonies” or attempting to integrate our most incredible capacities to reason, reflect, or 
transcend ourselves to our status as “children of nature” (21).  For Davies such pursuits have tracked the 
wrong problems or repeatedly returned to conservatism or imperialism instead of working on the idea 
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of that Darwin’s concepts are inexorably tied to rhetorical strategies which provide a greater way of 
bridging scientific thought describing/representing nature and humanistic thoughts on agency (that are 
lost or at least hard to express in scientific description) – especially if we emphasize histories that 
engender forms of rhetorical agency from these initial strategies.   This exigence brings Davies again to 
example of artificial selection as a concept within Darwin’s theory that must be understood as a set of 
rhetorical strategies which enable understandings of a “fuller range of capacities” of subjects agency 
“outside the natural” (21).   In doing so, he lays down the beginning of a ‘conceptually progressive’ for 
the rhetoric of artificial selection that I take up in the next section.  The challenge, for Davies, is to take 
up the ‘cultivation’ of artificial selection as a conceptual category and set of strategies that evolve in 
public arguments or scholarship that either perpetuates or addresses bad habits of thought.  As I see it, 
this challenge begins with some of the particular rhetorical strategies Campbell and Burke identify, but it 
takes us rather directly to a comparative analysis between Darwin and Huxley and on the topic of 
rhetoric, artificial selection and our habits of ecological thought.  
 
Darwin’s Technê Question 
 
On p. 8 of Darwin's copy of J. Sebright's "Art of Improving the Breeds of Domestic Animals,"                               
Darwin noted (in pen), "does not take into account loss of desire."  He made similar observations on pp. 
10 and 14... 
-- John F. Cornell, “Analogy and Technology in Darwin’s Vision of Nature,” pg 316 
To discuss artificial selection in a conceptually progressive way asks us to look briefly at a 
pattern of inquiry into the concept by Darwin, and to consider how this inquiry correlates with certain 
rhetorical strategies and persuasive effects that (as previewed earlier) Darwin thought might impact 
“habits of thought common to breeders” and the “inability of professionals to see beyond their own 
specialty” (Campbell, “Comic Frame” 34).  We can follow John Cornell’s perspective initially, who worked 
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on the premise that the artificial/natural selection analogy is “one of the most significant analogies in 
the history of science,” and while he also treats the analogy as a type of rhetorical invention, he 
foregrounds instead how Darwin’s notebooks are replete with question about whether artificial 
selection is a kind of technê, questions which he suggests served as another kind of “powerful research 
tool” that focuses Darwin on the invention of ‘artificial selection’ as a concept itself, rather than merely 
as a tool of discovery for natural selection.   
To make this argument Cornell notes how Darwin distinguishes his conception of artificial 
selection from Linnaeus, Buffon, Lyell or Lamark, as “naturalists [who] showed little awareness of the 
role of art in the transformation of domestic organisms” (306).   Cornell emphasizes that “not even 
Buffon's allusion to human tyranny is meant to place animals in the category of artistic products,” while 
Darwin repeatedly questions  whether or not human were making new species or varieties, and how 
these questions were clearly joined at the hip with his more philosophical questions about a potential 
need for a “reinterpretation of the meaning of art and nature,” a renewed “vision of man and all other 
being in a limitless historical flux,” and about “the power of artificial selection … [being] as difficult to 
delimit as man’s changing relations to different organisms is difficult to ascertain” (306 -308).  While 
modern European intellectuals and scientists were well acquainted with thinking about the relations 
between art and nature, as well as the idea of looking at nature or organisms as machines, Cornell 
demonstrates that Darwin’s central analogy differs from a long-line of ‘machinic metaphors’ for nature 
(which of course it is to some extent), but is something he explored analogically and conceptually as a 
kind of technê -- whereby Darwin makes certain uses of a classical technê analogy or the classical 
propensity to ask: is X a technê, or does X work like a technê?  Reviving a classical Greek technê question 
is of course to consider how something comes to be defined through practices of craftsmanship, craft, 
or any art that relied on learning a skill, technique, method, or aptitude involved in producing an object 
or accomplishing a goal, and by definition technê often seamlessly (and therefore sometimes 
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scandalously) links making and doing, or method and action.  Its compass in classical Greece inquiry 
pointed to an array of activities and professions that stirred diverse figures to test and challenge 
technê’s potential reach in describing politics, economics, farming, medicine, rhetoric, navigation, 
warfare, etc.  To briefly size up Cornell’s argument, he starts and finishes by diagnosing a ‘technê 
analogy’ in Darwin’s notebooks, which he says offers clear evidence of questioning that generally 
follows classical interests in questioning whether a particular craft and some form of cultural action is a 
technê – questions leading Darwin through inquiry into how technê diverges from theoria (as something 
like ‘pure knowledge’) by being related with productive practices (that are teachable, more easily 
transferrable and connected to certain use values) and inquiring into how these forms of ‘productive 
knowledge’ might cause a problematic uncoupling from moral responsibility, virtue, and contemplations 
of truth.187   Darwin’s technê questions resurface classical attempts to think about that branch of 
knowledge situated  between Plato’s and Aristotle’s conceptions of theoria and emperia (experience), 
knowledge that operates in fixed ways and in distinctly more rhetorical ways because technê was not to 
be conceptualized “merely as routine experience,” but as guided practices of a crafts or vocations built 
from an ‘artifice’ with some known rules or seemingly fixed knowledge, as well cultural forms of 
strategic thinking or ‘cunning’ that are often harder to schematize (Jaeger, 130). More specifically then, 
the ways Darwin thinks about distinguishing artificial selection from comparable definitions by 
naturalists and philosophers is by re-posing classical “technê questions” that have a history of 
expanding, delimiting, and finding paradoxes in “technological thinking” – a kind of thinking that leads 
Darwin to several conclusions. 
First, this inquiry would lead Darwin to believe the "connection between artificial and natural 
selection [was] a genuine advantage” because it enabled many of his “bold” discussions of “the 
boundless possibilities of rigorous selection” and because it challenged Darwin to extend his ideas about 
moral responsibilities towards nature to deal with the way breeders increasing seem to talk of agency as 
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‘unlimited’ by natural or by moral laws (303-308).   Much of Cornell’s key evidence comes from Darwin’s 
defenses of the analogy in his correspondence with A. R. Wallace, who thought the natural/artificial 
analogies threatened the reliability of his theory (303).  Cornell notes how Darwin sought to “maintain 
the analogy even at some cost” as he consistently invoked artificial selection practices, particularly 
breeding, as the main example of something that is both an art and technology, and that comes to bear 
on his theory in ways that science could not easily translate (303-4).  Darwin was prone to argue: “It is 
easy to forget that breeding is a form of technology; it seems to be simply an art, and a traditional one, 
unrelated to machines and modern industry.  But breeding became increasingly rationalized in the 
England of the agricultural and industrial revolutions [by breeders claiming they were able to] ‘summon 
into life whatever form and mold’ they pleased” (304).    Cornell argues that Darwin’s thoughts on 
artificial selection and breeding consistently return to a concern with a “latent technological slant” of 
breeders, and leads him to believe that a definition of artificial selection must expand to take into 
account both this technological thinking and “the effects of human desire and design when they viewed 
the creatures living with man,” an effect he traces in interesting ways to the potential “loss of desire” in 
domesticated animals themselves (as noted in the above epigraph).  Darwin’s insistence in his 
notebooks that most other botanists and naturalists “did not see effects of human desire and design 
when they viewed the creatures living with man” is, as Cornell points out, a key to Darwin’s “conceptual 
creativity” mainly because this marks a feature of “the power of artificial selection … [which is] as 
difficult to delimit as man’s changing relations to different organisms is difficult to ascertain” (306, 308).  
The exigence for a new definition of artificial selection vis-à-vis other recent ideas on domestication 
should thus be taken up as a concern for ‘delimiting’ artificial selection by some means, which leads 
Cornell to cite a good many of Darwin’s comments while “under the influence of the breeding 
literature,” from Darwin paying attention to how breeders “wish to alter” whatever “could be effected,” 
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to any moment where Darwin seems to make his own “intellectual leap from the notion of 
anthropomorphic engineering deity to the possibility of … man’s mastery of natural things” (317).   
What’s most interesting in Cornell’s reading is the focus on Darwin’s thinking as a process of 
inquiry which takes Darwin on a deeper rhetorical “assessment of man’s place in nature [hinging on] a 
paradox in technological thinking” – one that seems conditioned to aim for a practical forms of mastery 
but is always delimited by biological and rhetorical conditions (305-317).  While Cornell sometimes 
merely calls this a “transition to a technological perspective” in Darwin’s own thought, his larger 
conclusions are that we read this as a process of rhetorical inquiry, such as when he says: “The question 
[for Darwin]: ‘Has nature any process analogous?’ must be taken not as analogical but as rhetorical” 
(322, emphasis his).  He goes on to say: “from the moment Darwin hits upon the analogy of the breeder 
and nature, his conception of evolution is advanced by rhetoric and imagination.  He pursues less an 
analogical argument than a conceptual realignment of the relation of breeding and nature” (327).  
Cornell in fact concludes that ‘artificial selection’ is  essentially “the first enunciation of his rhetorical 
strategy using analogical reasoning” directed at the breeder who “necessarily takes a particular, 
technological view” because their understanding nature requires some “technical mastery over it” 
through forms of “selective action” (324-5).   
Like Cornell, I think looking at how Darwin explores his conception of artificial selection as a 
technê allows us to consider some important rhetorical questions, some of which revive a number of 
well-trodden ‘technê questions’ that raise epistemological and ethical questions about how technê 
implies, carries forward, or hinders forces of rhetoric, how these are tied to the development of virtue 
or character (i.e. Gadamer, Roochnik, Angier), the command of memory (i.e. Derrida, Stiegler), or the 
formation of a polis (i.e. Arendt, Yunis).   In particular, however, I would suggest that Cornell helps open 
the door to pursue this particular reading of Darwin’s process of inquiry as it leads to more particular set 
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of rhetorical strategies, and to certain ‘fragments of strategy’ that T.H. Huxley critiqued, theorized and 
developed as Darwin’s rhetorical uses of ‘artificial selection.’   Putting Darwin and Huxley in conversation 
around a distinctive technê question can allow us to compare how they each articulate artificial 
selection as a type of productive knowledge they mark out in evolutionary and rhetorical terms.  An 
emphasis on technê can also delineate several distinctive ways Darwin deploys rhetorical strategies that 
Huxley more clearly picks up potentially productive processes bridging human and natural systems.  
While Darwin’s sometimes use of these strategies is sometimes fragmentary or an ‘unconscious 
identification’ with rhetoric, Huxley on one hand critiqued artificial selection analogy as potentially 
unscientific, and on the other hand treats this analogy as the crux of new questions about evolution and 
ethics, and the underlying importance of a kind of rhetorical intelligence we might associate with an 
evolving ideas about technê, and more broadly, ecology. 
 
Darwin and Huxley:  A Rhetoric of Artificial Selection 
 
“The garden was apt to turn into a hothouse.” 
T.H. Huxley’s “Evolution and Ethics,” pg 55 
Strictly observed, the ‘golden rule’ involves the negation of law by the refusal to put it in motion against 
law-breakers; and, as regards the external relations of a polity, it is the refusal to continue the struggle 
for existence.   It can be obeyed, even partially, only under the protection of a society which repudiates it.  
Without such shelter, the followers of the ‘golden rule’ may indulge in hopes of heaven, but they must 
reckon with the certainty the other people will be the masters of the earth. 
T.H. Huxley’s “Evolution and Ethics,” pg 32 
Emphasizing artificial selection, as we have discussed, covers a number of conventional lines of 
thought on how this analogy ‘rewrites’ certain links and oppositions between the ‘artificial’ and the 
‘natural.’  Foregrounding this as an important technê question for both Darwin and Huxley establishes 
quite another way of thinking about this rhetorical intervention – one that is integral to Huxley’s ethical 
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theory and altogether more strategic in relation to a technological, economic and political context for 
both thinkers.  The relatively brief comparative rhetorical analysis here demonstrates some of this by 
fleshing out several main aspects of an understudied debate between Darwin and Huxley over artificial 
selection, including commentaries by both figures on the repercussions of how artificial selection is 
guided rhetorically by certain ideals, and an appeal by Huxley to consider how this demands thinking of 
artificial selection as another kind of “imperfect instrument” that might serve as a “constant 
counteraction of the hostile influences of the state of nature,” and one that, like technê, connects 
certain social and technological systems to a set of transferrable or transactional rhetorical principles 
that might steer forms of productive knowledge associated with practices of artificial selection (35, 55). 
188  These principles take shape in Huxley’s response to Darwin’s rhetorical amplification of the concept 
of artificial selection (rather than his more consistent concern about delimiting its role in his theory), a 
response that leads Huxley to contest several contemporary ideals for artificial selection with a theory 
emphasizing his ethics of ‘transactions’ or ‘debts’ and ‘redundancies’ between two ‘artificial’ realms: a 
social-rhetorical realm and a more rigorously scientific realm of artificial selection (agriculture, fisheries, 
etc.).  It is the latter realm that Huxley conceives of as a ‘centre of force’ in society, creating a dynamic 
that replicates something like the ‘cosmic process’ in nature.   
Huxley’s vision of ethics is, of course, largely a response to certain contextual matters we should 
briefly be reminded of, particularly his response to ethical tenets and economic theories of this initial 
and politically diverse wave of social Darwinism, a response which allows us to pay attention to his key 
emphasis on this particular rhetorical shift that turns on artificial selection as an “imperfect instrument” 
for advancing an ethical and political system with the science he forcefully defended (Huxley EE, 35).189  
It should be remembered that Huxley’s reviews of The Origin of Species, his public lectures, and his 
writings, provide not only the best known defenses of natural selection as “the best explanation 
available of evolution” but a relatively consistent treatment of its “analog, artificial selection or 
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breeding” as “imperfect” in at least two key ways (Blinderman citing Huxley in “The Westminister 
Review”).190   The first concern is one he largely shared with Darwin about the role artificial selection 
played in shaping the questions, discoveries, or types of evidence that both Huxley and Darwin troubled 
over as they leveraged breeding literature, sharing concerns about how this either challenges, weakens 
or fragments the new-found boundaries of evolutionary biology.191   On the other hand, Huxley 
diagnosed a second ‘imperfection’ tied to artificial selection’s rhetorical function, mainly in terms of how 
Darwin turns its potential function (as either a tool of invention, or for its rhetorical/political effects) 
towards ‘old ideals,’ a concern which also led Huxley to speculate about how social realms being 
thought of in terms of ‘artificial selection’ might be reconceived as rhetorical instrument that functions 
as what he calls a “centre of force” in society – a term he reclaims from those taking strictly materialist 
views of ‘atomic force’ , or sophistic views of ‘man measure’ relativism on the other (131).  Indeed, as 
the analogies to artificial selection seem unavoidable, Huxley turns the rhetoric of artificial selection 
towards a kind of dialectic between a central region of inquiry for biology (noting the rise of the 
laboratory in particular) where he thought something like pure scientific knowledge could be known, 
and (in reflecting his need for an ‘ethics of the macrocosm’) into a rhetorical realm that might come to 
bear on politics and ethics in ways that would ground his ethical system without recourse to certain 
ideologies, shallow or “cosmetic” rhetorics, or to a strict materialism in science (EE 125).192   
Ironically, as also discussed in The Westminster Review, Huxley’s rhetorical assessments of 
artificial selection came in a type of research that “to Darwin’s dismay” directed Huxley both to “his old 
line” that artificial selection is limited by the impossibility of cross-breeding certain hybrid animals and 
by forms of sterility, and led Huxley to pursue what Darwin thought was a far too “demanding a type of 
evidence... in research indicating that speciation would not occur through the agency of artificial 
selection” (Lyons 163).  This research around artificial selection led to two main points of disagreement 
between the two, one hinging on Huxley’s continual insistence that Darwin over-emphasized  
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gradualism, which contrasts to Huxley’s belief in some probability of drastic sudden change or ‘saltation’ 
as a likely driver of evolution, and to a related point of disagreement over Huxley’s insistence that 
“speech alone” offers a strong possibility that humans evolved more dramatically and rapidly as 
“reasonable beings,” who are plausibly capable of unlimited intellectual progress (Blinderman).   While 
Darwin seemed to think Huxley was wasting his time pursuing these, this may have led to a number of 
Huxley’s better conclusions about why the emerging rhetoric of artificial selection was particularly 
problematic, and yet a something of an unavoidable rhetorical bridge between Victorian science, society 
and any ethical theories that might keep up or advance beyond the current rhetorical, ethical, and 
scientific climate.  What’s interesting today, moreover, is taking a more contemporary outlook on these 
conversations and extended debates, a perspective less interested in demarcating new boundaries 
between science and society, or science and rhetoric, than entertaining instead how these debates led 
to more definitive rhetorical theories, strategies and questions about how the “rhetoric of artificial 
selection” might function as what Huxley called an “imperfect instrument” as a social technology.    
As we foreground this perspective, it should also be remembered that Huxley’s lectures, such as 
his famous Romanes lecture “Evolution and Ethics” (1893) are commonly understood as offering a 
“humanistic statement” against the use of science, especially Darwin’s, “to justify a specific social ethic 
or policy” (Himelfarb 322).  Others, like Michael Helfand , have argued that his lectures and the political 
essays leading up to them mark their own combination of “scientific theory, class consciousness and 
rhetorical dexterity” designed to remedy the rhetorical problems Huxley saw in vulgar constructs of 
social Darwinism in the “excessive” responses by Spencer, Wallace, Henry George, and numerous other 
British politicians, scientists and social scientists who were defending a middle class with capitalist or 
socialist ideals during the economic depression in the latter quarter of the 19th century (160).  Most 
know Huxley calibrated many of his ideas about science, ethics and rhetoric in direct opposition to his 
friend Spencer’s analogies between evolution, economic theory and a brand of ethical relativism, as well 
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as to George and Wallace’s policies on land socialism, especially in the latter’s work with Mill in the Land 
Nationalization Society during the 1880s.193  It is helpful initially to remember that despite their 
similarities, Huxley’s thought differs from Wallace’s political and philosophical ideas, particularly those 
in the essay “Human Selection” which emphasizes socialism as a socio-political framework that helped 
ensure that “higher intelligence” or those with improving mental ability are selected (176).  Such claims 
caused a notable “shift in [Huxley’s] philosophical rhetoric” later in life, which led him to thematize 
artificial selection as it became either a problematic ideal in readings of Darwin (especially as it repeats 
either religious ideals or turns towards novel ideals of ‘social stability’) or as what it might be thought of 
as an “imperfect instrument” of rhetoric for other socio-political purposes (EE 35).   Indeed, it is Huxley’s 
“rhetorical dexterity” when taking up Darwin’s rhetoric of artificial selection where we see him 
articulate an analogical model for another kind of collective social arrangement with an ethics and 
rhetoric potentially ahead of its time, especially as Huxley focuses in on issues that have always been at 
the heart of social systems (breeding, farming, and horticultural practices) treating them as a social 
realm requiring a ‘common’ set of strategies for the enculturation of forms of responsible/ethical 
decision making, but only if this common is treated as “a ‘vital’ capital and energy that sustains life” 
(Helfand 160, 172).  As we can see in a somewhat closer reading, Huxley turns the rhetoric of artificial 
selection towards another kind of political-economic parable, one working against what he sees as both 
capitalist and socialist ideals, and instead working to make the realm of artificial selection a space 
where, on one hand, science can pursue a new ideal for comprehensive knowledge and control (or a 
more suitable realm of “drastic thoroughness” in scientific pursuit than those pitched by 
contemporaries), and on the other hand a rhetorical and social theory based in a notion of debt as 
potential a “centre of force” for a culture that seems to necessitate a certain kind of redundancy in the 
artificial selection of species, but a redundancy that might be calibrated socially, ethically, and (mainly 
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by several implications Huxley could hardly anticipate) towards levels of biodiversity suitable to sustain 
human life (which is arguably ecologically responsible today) (EE, 22, 131).   
The way artificial selection becomes the predicate for these arguments is relatively 
uncomplicated, as both Darwin and Huxley discuss artificial selection as something being guided 
rhetorically by ideals constructed by the species making supposedly intelligent interventions in 
processes of natural selection.  As Burke put it, Darwin obviously lay ‘idealistic stress’ on environmental 
conditions as the locus of human motives, but Darwin consistently makes room for a role of several 
more distinctly idealistic motives that play upon the purposes for artificial selection, most often by 
aligning it with the images from industrial and technological revolutions of his day.  Campbell singles out 
the imagery associated industrialism as a one basic persuasive strategy, such as Darwin’s request to 
allow him “to use the expression the manufactury of species,” which Campbell claims is an attempt to 
show that this “manufactured” process must be “intelligible to the common sense of technological 
reason” and is appeal to connect with those breeders who would be self-assured that they are “beyond 
the average” in their ability to influence evolution (Campbell 38, citing Origin pg 56).   Artificial selection 
is also symbolized by a more conspicuous image in Darwin’s “Sketch of 1842” essay, where he calls the 
breeder “a being infinitely more sagacious than man” (see “Sketch” pg 45) and in a later version of the 
essay compares the breeder to an imaginary Overseer of nature who sidestep temporal or geographic 
limits and “select chance variations for the benefit of all organisms” (Cornell 326).    Huxley seems to 
treat the extension of transcendent or God-like ideals as a particular problem and opportunity to 
elucidate what seemed to be the rhetorical stakes in the recourse to such ideals.  It’s especially 
interesting that, as Huxley would largely agree with Darwin in thinking that artificial selection is a 
boundary zone between science and art, and that any notion of ‘art’ had now become a too narrow 
concept to explicate artificial selection as an analogous process to natural selection, he seems to treat 
Darwin’s ‘breeder/overseer’ image as serious attempt to amplify rather than simply delimit artificial 
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selection as category. 194   In doing so he deeply challenges how this strategy plays out as it comes into 
contact with other culturally dominant ideals, while taking up the opportunity to refine the rhetoric of 
artificial selection as an “imperfect instrument” that might create a “constant counteraction of the 
hostile influences of the state of nature” that functions much more like technê involving both 
scientific/technological systems and a set of related rhetorical principles (55).   
Consider first how Huxley works at re-contextualizing the latter example of Darwin’s ‘ideal 
breeder’ by turning this into a potentially useful commonplace or topoi for argumentation as he initially 
contrasts this ideal to two dominant socio-cultural ideals: one stemming from religious metaphors of 
‘man the gardener,’ and one from colonialist metaphors of ‘man the administrator’ of extensive spans of 
wilderness and agriculture.  In these moments Huxley is not interested in disentangling Darwin’s rhetoric 
of artificial selection from a scientific theory;  he makes unequivocal arguments in lectures, including the 
enduring “Evolution and Ethics” and “Science and Morals” lectures, urging his audience to first explore 
how Darwin marks artificial selection as a process guided in part as “selection directed towards an 
Ideal,” and then challenging them to see artificial selection as a concept that falls partly outside what 
contemporary ideals are capable of doing as they shape human/nature relationships, raising not only his 
well-known agnostic arguments, but several familiar technê questions challenging how value based 
theories hold up to what artificial selection would mean as a distinctly rhetorical concept imbricated in 
an evolutionary context (“Prologomena to Evolution and Ethics” 19).   Many interested in Huxley’s 
rhetoric have commented on how he often addresses the topoi of the ideal vs. the actual, especially in 
his agnostic arguments, but never in the context of how his later lectures and essays apply this to 
artificial selection as, in general, guided by some version of the ideals of a gardener or administrator (or 
by analogies to them), by our imagining of “some administrative authority as far superior in power and 
intelligence” who would “proceed in the same fashion as that which the gardener dealt with his garden” 
by restricting the multiplications in the “cosmic process” of competition between myriad species, based 
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on standards of the useful or beautiful (17).195   In “Evolution and Ethics” he suggests that the more 
contemporary “process of colonization presents many analogies to the formation of a garden which are 
highly instructive” in order to show how varieties of ‘gardener ideal’ and ‘administrator ideal’ (of which 
he notes both capitalist and socialist iterations) imagine similar versions of mastery that cast narrow 
“limits within which this mastery of man over nature can be maintained” (14).    Although this may bring 
to mind a more recent postcolonial or environmentalist reaction to limiting a frontier mentality or vulgar 
forms of capitalist expansion, the ‘limits’ Huxley points to are the those on the “intelligence” in 
theorizing a “state of art” for intervening in nature, and those to ethical theories based for the most part 
on such recurring ideals (33).  He addresses these limits symbolically initially by foregrounding the 
metaphor of the “hothouse” vis-à-vis the “garden ideal,” as the latter reflects too simply the desire to 
“restrict” or replace nature’s “cosmic process, the course struggle for existence” with any ideal “state of 
art” (55).  Indeed, in the first sections of this essay Huxley consistently berates those following ideals of 
the administrator and gardener because he believes religious and colonial ideals have failed to admit 
that “garden was apt to turn into a hothouse,” a competing metaphor he thinks offers the right “mixture 
of two worlds” the artificial and natural, the transitory and permanent, and an admixture of ideals of 
mastery “latent in man” in conjunction with the inevitable return of more ‘imperfect instruments’ of 
rhetoric (55, 108).  This competing metaphor of a ‘hothouse’ enables Huxley to set his aim plainly on 
nuancing the ideals of mastery “latent in man” while also maintaining, on one hand, that he can “see no 
limit to the extent to which intelligence and will, guided by sound principles of investigation, and 
organized in common effort, may modify the conditions of existence, for a period longer than now 
covered by history.  And much may be done to change the nature of man himself” (85).   On the other 
hand, Huxley uses the metaphor to forward a basic claim that ideals for either a “garden” or “the most 
orderly polity” are tainted by a ‘positivist’ quality naïve to the ways they would necessarily lead to a 
rekindling of the cosmic process by selection that leads to further “stimulation of the senses, the 
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pampering of the emotions, endlessly multiplied the sources of pleasure… and capacity for suffering” 
(55).  In other words, the ‘hothouse’ metaphor allows him to balance a “mixture of two worlds,” an ideal 
for ‘unlimited’ pursuit of intelligence and sound investigation through science, with more distinctly 
rhetorical considerations leading into the beginnings of the ethical formula he casts in response to these 
enduring ideals. 
What’s most interesting today perhaps is how this hothouse metaphor enables him to discuss 
this “mixture of two worlds” with some of his greatest rhetorical dexterity by tying the metaphor to an 
ethics of “the macrocosm” that hinges on several rhetorical principles (83).  Huxley’s knowledge of 
ethics and the changing ideals in Western and Eastern philosophy is evident throughout his body of 
work, but captured succinctly in these particular arguments against ideals, which he extends to reproach 
those with strict materialist ideals in sciences, as well as those “modern idealists” who veer too far into 
‘immaterial’ philosophies and new forms of “subjective idealism” (70).  In doing so he both meets and 
breaks some our expectations to form a typical sort of middle ground argument, particularly as he 
explores some of his ideas about rekindling Gautama or Heraclitus as the only figures focusing on ethical 
problems of “the macrocosm” before the “forsaking” of this ethics by the Greek concentration on 
ethical problems “of the microcosm” (70).  This emphasis on the macrocosm reinforces some of Huxley’s 
basic (if now somewhat warn-out conclusions) that ethics must be based fundamentally in humanity’s 
struggle to distinguish a ‘state of art’ in politics, education, and professionalized science from the 
struggle for existence, states of ‘art’ that would be fundamentally separated from nature, but in 
“conflictual harmony” with nature’s cosmic process – a dynamic casting a set of tensions that he thinks 
would make humans more capable of improving the whole of nature for human ends.  As Huxley says: 
“That which lies before the human race is a constant struggle to maintain and improve, in opposition to 
the State of Nature, the State of Art of an organized polity; in which, and by which, man may develop a 
worthy civilization, capable of maintaining and constantly improving itself (EE 45).”  Emphasizing this 
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seemingly anthropocentric foundation for an ethics based in conflicts with nature stems largely from his 
distrust of “those endowed with the largest share of energy, of industry, or intellectual capacity, of 
tenacity of purpose… of wealth and influence,” those who Huxley thinks have also overshadowed any 
genuine “ethical process” with transcendent ideals, vulgar parallels between humans and the animal 
kingdom, or poorly formed beliefs about social progress as “direct selection, after the fashion of the 
horticulturalist and the breeder” (36).  He is indeed adamant in “making obvious to everyone” that the 
most influential social actors affecting an ethical course of humanity “bear no real resemblance to that 
which adapts living beings to current conditions in the state of nature; nor any to the artificial selection 
of the horticulturalist” (36-42).  His ethics, however, is based in more than critique and general distrust 
of the ability of contemporary leaders to frame adequate metaphors that advance social engineering, 
and indeed it is either that is his ethics is simply unable to abandon these analogies to artificial selection 
or perhaps that he consciously appropriates them.   
While he clearly wants no “pigeon-fancier’s polity,” he reiterates his interest in the breeder and 
horticulturalist as the broadest social category where there is another kind of “constant counteraction” 
of an “antithetic” and “antagonistic” relationship with nature – one that he extrapolates is “manifest 
everywhere between the artificial and the natural” and one that interests him in terms of the particular 
“artificial personality” (as he quotes Adam Smith) of the breeder or farmer which this creates, and which 
seems to present “the bonds of a singular character” within socio-political systems (13-24).  Indeed, if 
we track Huxley’s ‘rhetorical dexterity’ along one of its main paths, he first reweaves problematic 
analogies to nature or to ideals of ‘selection’ in order to shed light on certain limitations of  antiquated 
ideals, he then flips the main function of the analogy so that it seems to not only be an important 
‘parallel’ between social and natural evolution, but something that should do persuasive work that 
makes ‘obvious’ that distinction between human artifice and nature’s cosmic process requires a novel 
ethical framework.   His conclusions to “Evolution and Ethics” urge his audience to “return, once more, 
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to the parallel of horticulture” but to think beyond a restricted metaphor to “the gardening of men” or 
of “selection,” and to think instead both as a moral philosopher and scientist -- as a moral philosopher 
about how these metaphors expand “the creation of conditions more favorable than those of the state 
of nature; to the end of facilitating the free expansion of the innate faculties of the citizen,” and as a 
scientist thinking about how “the method of observation, experiment and ratiocination… practice in 
other kinds of scientific work” that might influence these metaphors (43).  Indeed, Huxley’s pursuit of an 
‘ethics of the macrocosm’ appropriates the rhetoric of artificial selection mainly as he repeatedly insists 
that breeding, like all productive arts, is a process “constantly trying to break down and destroy” 
nature’s cosmic process, and noting that breeders or horticulturalists are perhaps some of the clearest 
examples of human work in “constant counteractions” with a “cosmic process,”  to the point where 
“man retains his identity through the whole substance of his body constantly shifting to the river 
constantly changing” (89).  Beyond Huxley’s attempts to use the artificial selection analogy to rekindle a 
notably obscure ethics of Heraclitus or Gautama, he offers several more concrete principles that stem 
from this rhetoric of artificial selection – particularly as they are connected with principles of debt and 
redundancy.   His recourse to these two related principles is evident in his speculation about how an 
“imperfect instrument” might “suffice to subdue masterfulness” without recourse to “purely ethical 
ends,” speculation which takes Huxley to consider how a more “drastically” rigorous scientific approach 
to artificial selection might also function as social or rhetorical technê suitable for intensifying or 
delimiting the ‘cosmic processes’ in social orders.196   
To put it more plainly, Huxley’s conceptions of ‘debt’ and ‘redundancy’ are interesting ways of 
thinking about how he creates ethical principles that bridge the social-rhetorical aspect of his ethics with 
his evolving ideal for a more thoroughly scientific pursuit of knowledge – principles which remain largely 
tied his appropriation of the rhetoric of artificial selection.  His notion of ‘debt’ surfaces mainly as he 
forwards some merits of Darwin’s analogical reasoning, responding to them as something like tacit or 
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underutilized rhetorical strategies.  Of course, he singles out Darwin’s comparisons between humans 
and animals as effectively drawing out scientific propositions without ever using such comparisons 
about competitive, co-operative or even ‘capricious’ animal or human ‘tendencies’ to draw reductive or 
overdetermined conclusions about human society (EE 27).197   Huxley, however, also suggests that a 
persuasive function of such analogies is not only that they should improve understandings of human 
nature or human society as analogous to forms of animal conduct, cunning, cognition, or social 
organization, but that these analogies should make “obvious” that the whole “artificial world within the 
cosmos”  is easily distinguishable by “the quality of [human] intellects” and/or “the intensity of [human] 
passions,” especially  “the insatiable hunger for enjoyment – of all mankind” (27).  We know that Huxley 
consistently emphasized that the production of  culture “was what distinguished man from the lower 
animals,” but as he notes in the “Prolemogena,” the analogies making nature/culture relationships 
obvious should lead others (as they do Huxley) through a kind of rhetorical inquiry into the limits of their 
current moral or political ideals seeking to bring cosmic processes of competition, co-operation, or 
capricious behaviors to some ideal “end,” and to weigh the merits any recent rhetorical acts that 
‘selectively’ pitch analogies to natural or artificial selection as structuring principles for human society 
(White 120). Better metaphors or analogies would, at the very least, encourage exploring a fuller range 
of any human intellectual or material labor as a product “borrowed from her [nature] and arranged in 
combinations which are not favoured by the general cosmic process” (12).   In fact this emphasis on an 
act of ‘borrowing’ seems to be his key stipulation as an attendant analogy for selection, as it stresses 
that Darwinian analogies create either intensifications or delimitations of observable forms of conduct, 
cunning, cognition, or social organization in nature, and stipulates specifically that those forwarding the 
“ideals of society” or those forwarding newer forms of rhetorical Darwinism were limiting the richness 
of scientific perspectives on evolution by being naïve to the range of “debts” that their rhetorical 
constructs create, or as he occasionally puts it, naïve to just how they rhetorically pit “the macrocosm 
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against the microcosm” (83).  Indeed, for Huxley the potential strength in the popularization of 
metaphors and analogies to natural or artificial ‘selection’ in particular seems to be that it expands the 
framework of terms for thinking about what distinguishes human arts (in any intellectual or material 
form) by the quality of the exchanges or transactions they make with nature, allowing us to consider 
what material and ethical ‘debts’ develop.  This is not an idea that gets fully formed as ethical system, 
but it takes shape as set of ethical tenets for treating all human artifice as intensifications of forms of 
animal conduct, cunning, cognition, or social organization borrowed from a ‘cosmic process,’ and it leads 
to his stipulations that both social and material constructs are best constructed rhetorically if they make 
“man mindful of his debt to those who have laboriously constructed it” (82).   
Consider several of Huxley’s central examples, starting with Huxley’s general illustration of how 
to extend the limited rhetoric of popular analogies between humans/animals, natural/artificial selection, 
or the cosmic process and a social or ethical process, which too often foreground one aspect of the 
cosmic process by either intensifying or delimiting ‘competition’ or ‘efficiency’ or ‘co-operation’ as 
singular or primary drivers of social evolution.  In “Evolution and Ethics” and “Science and Morals” he 
argues that science will continue to teach us how society has multiple ways of limiting or intensifying a 
wider range of ‘natural’ behaviors.  His central example is the relative exclusion ‘pleasurable imitation’ 
by contemporary nature/culture analogies, which he marks as a crucial behavior going relatively 
‘unchecked.’  As Huxley states, if there has come to be a “vast and fundamental difference between bee 
society and human society,” it perhaps most largely because: 
Man is the most consummate mimics… compelled to imitate for the pure pleasure of it.  And 
there is no such other emotional chameleon.  By a purely reflex operation of the mind, we take 
the hue of passion of those who are about us… It is not by any ‘conscious’ putting one’s self in 
the place’ of a joyful or suffering person that the state of mind we call sympathy usually arises 
(26 - 28).  
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For Huxley, the ‘pleasurable imitation’ of human ‘mimics’ is an analogy like those to competitive, 
capricious, or co-operative behaviors in nature, mainly in that it evolves in a cosmic process that is prior 
to our consciousness and most often “in spite of one’s will” or “contrary to one’s sense of what is right,” 
and is intensified or delimited in a “harmonious contrast” to nature by cultural processes (28).  As an 
intelligent commentator on Hume and Smith, it is not surprising that Huxley distinguishes the 
sympathies, particularly enjoyment as the main example of one that casts a certain debt culture owes to 
nature, stipulating that our intensified ‘mimicry’ has become “one of the essential conditions of success 
in the war with the state of nature outside; and is yet the sure agent of the destruction of society if 
allowed free play within” (27).   This affective, ideological, or rhetorical terrain for ‘sympathy’ and 
‘enjoyment’ is of course a philosophical staple discussed in many more nuanced scholarly registers 
today, but what’s unique about Huxley’s discussion of an ‘ethics of pleasurable imitation’ is in how he 
asks his readers to think about how the doxa of a social realm might be partially “governed” (a term he 
references as a ‘governor of a steam engine,’ which is now more familiar metaphor in rhetoric and 
cybernetics for communication and control) by the realm of artificial selection as the domain that might 
ground or curb the “excesses” of  sympathies that lead to every polity but that can become “ruinous to 
it” (115, 31).  Huxley thinks ethical ‘checks’ must be based in social and rhetorical systems that calibrate 
human ‘selfishness’ between excess and ennui, while creating systems that make “each man who enters 
into the enjoyment of the advantages of a polity … mindful of his debt” in ways that might check 
excesses like “fanatical individualism” (82-3).  Some of his political lectures consider how these general 
ideas might be applied, such as the curious example of Huxley’s inaugural address to the London 
Fisheries Exhibition (1883), captured in his Scientific Memoirs, where he brings this rhetoric of artificial 
selection and its attendant ethical and rhetorical principles to the problem of overfishing.  
We know Huxley valued a kind of separation of a new ‘purer- science’ from industry, revering 
the possibilities in the shift from a “museum based natural history to a laboratory-based biology’ as the 
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potential for something like a “pure-sphere, free from social influences… in which nature was mediated 
only by impersonal and perfectly neutral instruments” (White 56).  He had a rather ‘matter of fact’ 
perspective that any ‘purity’ in the lab would be mediated by something like the “gentlemanly 
reclusiveness of Darwin in his pursuit of truth,” which still manifested a number of Victorian values, but 
he nonetheless valued the separation of science especially from commercial and industrial programs 
(such as “the training of engineers to exploit colonial resources”) as an opportunity to rethink the 
relationships between an improved science, culture, and industries (61).198  In the fisheries example, 
Huxley is clearly motivated to voice several possibilities for bringing a more powerful culture of science 
to a Victorian concern with a kind of Malthusian collapse of fish stocks, and in doing so he cycles back 
again to artificial selection as an analogy and potential ‘center of force,’ arguing that fisheries seem 
likely to forever be only partially protected or controlled by even the most rigorous science and careful 
laws.  He starts the speech with a fairly rich description of the problem, one that is reminiscent of 
present discussions of ‘multiple agencies’ in an ecosystem, while again foregrounding an unrivalled role 
of human “intelligence” as “constantly tending to break it down and destroy” such natural systems (EE 
12-13).   
In this case, although man is only one of many agents which are continually effecting the 
destruction of salmon in all stages of its existence–although he shares the work with otters and 
multitudes of other animals, and even with parasitic plants–yet his intelligence enables him, 
whenever he pleases, to do more damage than all the rest put together; in fact, to extirpate all 
the salmon in the river and to prevent the access of any others (Scientific Memoirs V, 86-87) 
Huxley goes on to discusses the “plain enough” idea that better scientific knowledge about the 
redundancies fish stocks is likely to increasingly offer new ways  for “dealing with this kind of exhaustible 
fishery” by creating the grounds for dealing with man as “the chief enemy...by force of law.”  But to deal 
with the less obvious, Huxley goes on to leverage the analogy to artificial selection again, saying: “If the 
stock of a river is to be kept up, it must be treated upon just the same principles as the stock of a sheep 
farm.”  Here Huxley draws in the analogy between laws for fish conservation and the “sheep farmer” to 
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first note the limitations of the analogy, the limited agencies of the fisherman or the farmer on these 
grounds.  When Huxley goes on to say: “All I desire to show is that in principle, the measures adopted by 
the conservators, if they are to be efficient, must be identical with those of the sheep farmer,” he 
proceeds to ask his listeners to think beyond the (again) “obvious” idea that conservation would 
completely efficient by means of legislations grounded in science, and to think further about a what is 
required to “complete the analogy.”   Here Huxley states:  
And the analogy is complete, for when the conservator has done all he can, droughts, parasites, 
and other natural agents which are beyond human control, may nullify his efforts. In the case of 
the salmon, as in that of the sheep, careful and intelligent protection may promote the 
prosperity of the stock to any conceivable extent; but it cannot ensure that prosperity, nor 
prevent immense fluctuations in the yield from year to year. 
Emphasizing the limitations of conservations or “mere” protection, he questions whether all fisheries 
are exhaustible (something he doubts, but is open to), and notes that he can’t imagine how laws of 
conservation could be thoroughly enough enforced, before asking his listeners to consider how “every 
legislative restriction means the creation of a new offence” by robbing people of their means of survival 
and of pleasure.  For Huxley, conservation laws established in relation to knowledge of the redundancies 
of species of fish will also necessitate the creation of new means of production, new fisheries in this 
case, to be conceived of as evolving relative to the pleasures or tastes of the public.  What would 
complete the analogy in this case, it seems, would be to manage to ensure that his audience is not 
limited to evolving within a limited rhetoric of artificial selection, but open to the possibility that the 
‘control’ of species through processes of ‘artificial selection’ that would sustain a human population 
would require a better combination of science, law, and forms of public persuasion – all of which might 
calibrate artificial selection as something like a ‘center of force’ that endures without succumbing to the 
excesses of human intellect or human behavior that constantly tries to break down such natural 
processes. 
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Conclusion 
Criticism of metaphoric world, or vision, become one clear and important –                                                   
perhaps the clearest and most important—instance of a general human project of improving                   
life by criticizing it.                             
 -- Wayne Booth, “Metaphor as Rhetoric” 
Rhetoricians, philosophers and many scientists (Ted Brown, Stephen Jay Gould, Brendan Larson, 
to name a notable few) have commented on the historical relationships between science and important 
metaphors, analogies and concepts that have advanced important lines of inquiry, provided crucial 
means of description, communicated new ideas, or helped to bind new discourse communities within 
new cultural contexts.  We know that the term metaphor itself is notoriously hard to define (there are 
arguments [Ricoeur], Dictionaries [Elsye and Weisse], and Annotated Compendiums [Shibles] on the 
subject); we know that certain metaphors ‘die’ and others seem to ‘live on’ as “root metaphors” (such 
as Stephen Pepper’s argument that all philosophies hinge on metaphors to formism, mechanism, 
organicism, or contextualism); we know also that today’s work in science studies, the rhetoric of science, 
or ‘post-normal science,’ accepts that the way we speak about nature, ecology, conservation or 
sustainability reflects the values and priorities of culture, and that there is always a certain confluence 
between value-laden language and the sciences that inform us of ecological exigencies (while also asking 
those rhetorically inclined to account for the world beyond language). What Darwin and Huxley ask us is 
not simply to accept artificial selection a ‘rival metaphor’ for describing a relationship between science 
and society, an argument that would run against Darwin’s vital theory, much of Huxley’s fairly 
traditionalist leanings and his specific arguments on the natural/artificial selection analogy.  Nor, 
however, does this argument ask us to simply critique this metaphor and analogy, or to extend a critique 
to similar metaphors in ways that he could have easily retraced to similar criticisms of pastoral 
literature, to Virgil’s political uses of similar metaphors, or to Thrasymachus in The Republic who offers 
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the metaphor shepherd and sheep to attempt to refute Plato’s notion of justice (Booth 66).  Huxley does 
indeed, as we have discussed, analyze and critique the rhetoric of artificial selection, but he also 
manipulates it in such a way that it becomes more than an epistemic metaphor to describe evolutionary 
theories, and instead foregrounds particular role for rhetoric that might function as an alternative to 
vulgar forms of materialism, idealism, or merely “cosmetic” rhetorics.   If we take a broader conception 
of what he does, is it not that he asks us to consider in what ways will evolutionary science require a 
corresponding ecological rhetoric to create forms of socio-ecological sustainability? 
 Analyzing Darwin (rhetorically) and Huxley (largely as a rhetorician) allows us to not only 
examine early critiques of the rhetoric of artificial selection, or how this was ripe for appropriation in an 
evolutionary context, but to consider this as a shift that imbricates these domains of scientific, rhetorical 
and ethical study as something that might have ended their distinctions, largely by distinguishing their 
relationship as a superior human art suitable for promoting something like ecological sustainability 
today.  The rhetoric of ‘artificial selection’ today would focus on commonplace concerns with the 
advance of monocultures, preserving traditional and cultural practices for managing the land that are 
rapidly being lost, or forwarding progressive bioregional or technological and experimental farming 
practices.  In such cases, what rhetoric advances this work might hinge on extending Huxley’s principles 
of debt and redundancy to better scientific knowledge of biodiversity, ‘extinction debt,’ integrity, 
resilience etc., as well as to present socio-political concepts like ecosystem engineering, and ethical 
ideas like ecophilia.  In these veins of ecological thought we should be mindful of the origin of this 
Darwinian and Huxleyan rhetoric as the end of an era that disconnects what we value as our ‘synthesis’ 
with nature, from the values of these ‘synthetic’ arts forwarding a rhetorical-ethical horizon for the 
human sustained by the practices of artificial selection. 
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 Chapter Five) Conclusion: Towards a Responsible Ecological Rhetoric 
Planetary thought can have no other logic: it wills itself, it presents itself as politics, strategy. 
Deleuze, Desert Islands and Other Texts, 158 
As Bateson told us long ago, an ecological “struggle for survival” has been taking place in the 
domain of ideas and “the task of every ecological analyst now is to promote ecologically ‘good’ ideas in 
the hope that these will prevail, through a process of natural selection” (Sutton and Pindar, 11).199   In 
light of this struggle, this dissertation’s analysis of familiar figures from the history of rhetoric might be 
considered a fairly conventional contribution to rhetorical studies, a field that has witnessed many 
historical ‘recoveries’ that unpack rhetorical figures, concepts, strategies and texts for the present.  
Amid other recent ecological histories contributing to our sense of the rhetorical tradition (Dobrin and 
Weisser, Miller, Ophuls, Lane, etc.), we have made a good start at reclaiming ecological knowledge as 
part of the rhetorical tradition, and there is certainly an enduring exigency for working with other 
Western thinkers who make ‘unusual suspects’ for ecological rhetoric (Protagoras, Lucretius, Nietzsche, 
Bataille, etc.), Aboriginal traditions, or Eastern philosophers and religious thinkers who have made 
reverence for nature so persuasive in the Buddhist, Jain, and Hindu religions and in cultural centers.  
While such work will likely bring more to our present understandings of what ecological rhetoric can be, 
without some added sense of what this project brings to the present, the historical and genealogical 
approach of this dissertation might be either conceived as a serious limitation of the study, or might 
urge other dissertation work that pursues ‘interesting histories’ without addressing today’s pressing 
ecological exigencies through such historical work.   
This project reveals almost nothing of my initial research exploring contemporary forms of 
rhetorical agency or interventions for ecological exigencies now.  The project does little to address the 
folly of numerous arguments forwarding rhetorics of ecological revolution or reflecting on a ‘slow 
175 
 
reckoning’ or ‘paradigm shift in ecological consciousness,’ and little to specifically contribute to the 
motivations or forms of communication working hard to accelerate community or socio-political work 
with great ecological potential.  I do very little here to consider the countless forms of exploitation, 
preservation, or ‘wise use’ of ecological ‘resources’ in the West at present.  I do nothing at all to address 
how these align with waning forms of disciplinary power, how they are revealed in a metamorphosis to 
the dominant political technologies of control society, or they might shift to ‘eco-nomies’ with a new 
emphasis on ‘sustainability’ that currently seem dedicated to re-privatizing and unleashing multifarious 
desires, floating capital and values.   An influential intervention in ecological rhetoric today seems to 
need to trace up-to-the-minute theories and strategies that that can circulate among the most complex 
and efficient forms of social control transversely linked across a great number of sites in everyday life, 
while paying particular attention to control of instant communication –making a genealogy of ecological 
rhetoric familiar with the genealogy of power in contemporary American economic and cultural life, 
what Jeff Nealon calls "the operating system" for "a new modality of cultural 'resistance' to capital" (26).   
On the other hand, the project’s investigation into a longer history of rhetoric might make 
modest contributions as we “move beyond the foundational and totalizing question of ‘What is 
rhetoric?’ to a more inclusive and proactive question: ‘What can a rhetoric be?’” (Haskins 208)  The 
potential contributions here can be fleshed out in three main registers.  First, this study of several 
authoritative figures from this long history of rhetoric bridges rhetorical and ecological theories in ways 
that might help extend this alliance as it has developed in recent decades.  Particularly, we can briefly 
discuss here the main ways this dissertation helps us move beyond the more dated alliances between 
critical theory, ecological thought and rhetoric detailed in the first chapter, and discuss how these 
historical studies emphasize rhetorical theories that align with (and potentially help forward) more 
recent work interested in leveraging actor-network theory, cybernetics, ecocriticism, political ecology, or 
certain concepts from science studies.  Second, the dissertation offers several specific accounts of 
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technê as a core concept for a progressive ecological rhetoric, accounts which add to our field’s interest 
in this concept’s performances in different historical and cultural circumstances (i.e. Papillion, Jarratt, 
Atwill, McComiskey, Haskins, Pender, Hawk, etc.).   Moreover, as Pender argues that “technê’s features 
have become a kind of invisible foundation for the field,” this project ties in an ecological definition of 
technê in the first chapter that began by negating the opposition of ‘instrumental’ vs. ‘non instrumental’ 
modalities of this concept, and proceeded to replace this with a genealogical narrative of recent 
ecological valuations of technê as a core concept for ecocriticism, for argumentation in environmental 
rhetoric, for philosophical tenets in ecosophy, and for theorizing ecological economics.  We can then 
review the subsequent turns to technê in each chapter as marking ways that technê has long been 
crucial to a distinctive unity of ecological knowledge and action, which might help us round out our 
theories of ecological rhetoric at present (31).  Thirdly, the study offers an emphasis on the inclusion of 
rhetorical strategies as integral to advancing forms of ecologically responsible praxis, or to put it more 
boldly, the dissertation emphasizes that integrating rhetorical strategies into a conception of ecological 
rhetoric is integral to thinking about the responsibilities of ecological rhetoric today.  
To start, we should remember that there is currently significant emphasis on the rhetorical 
theories that support analytic and deliberative in work in environmental rhetoric, which in recent 
decades has made prominent contributions to better argumentation, improved inter-disciplinary 
research, more persuasive policies and successful advocacy in networks of science, politics, policy and 
activism.  The successes of such work analyzing communication practices, successes, and failures have 
come in applying a number of rhetorical approaches that have demonstrated their potential impact on 
policy, in explaining how scientists turn to metaphors (how these lead to, or hinder, social 
understandings and productive policies consistent with sustainability), or in applying better 
argumentation to carry out tactical interventions at different levels of politics.  While (as argued in more 
detail in the first chapter) it is clear that much of the work in environmental rhetoric has generally 
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followed ecological thought and critical theory in ways that lead our field to embrace our conventional 
commitments to rhetorical analyses and improving deliberations in innovative ways, the theories drawn 
largely from second wave environmental thought and critical theorists from the Frankfurt school, Laclau 
and Mouffe, and Actor Network Theory, has made it somewhat more difficult to forward rhetorical 
theories that contribute theoretical work that might advance this configuration in other ways, and this 
has triggered some notable critiques that this emphasis on analysis and deliberation is somewhat 
reactionary, too slow to respond, or “crisis driven” (Mathur 151 -152).   This criticism is mainly pointed 
at the vein of work in environmental rhetoric that has attempted to shore up and sustain forms of 
deliberation -- a main emphasis in scholarship running from Killingsworth and Palmer’s significant work 
Ecospeak (1992) to the strategies of a so-called “deliberative turn” more recently noted by Karin 
Backstrand in Environmental Politics and Deliberative Rationality (2010).200   This criticism might be 
somewhat severe, but it suggests that part of the challenge for rhetorical studies might be to think more 
broadly about the relationship between rhetoric and ecological theories as a means to critically rethink 
broader but familiar tensions between concepts like deliberative rationality and instrumental rationality.   
To put it another way, the challenge may be to think about how ecological rhetoric is itself a ‘logic’ 
worthy of foregrounding in its own right, and that this logic involves certain theories, technê and 
strategies that might precede praxis, and which asks us to configure ways to think about how 
innovations in ecological rhetoric must sometimes precede deliberation.  If too much of what we value 
as environmental rhetoric remains moored to the theories that initially spurred this subfield, the result 
may be that much in the recent history of environmental rhetoric could fall under the same well known 
critique of Habermas who, while remaining persuasive in many ways, tended to position technology and 
instrumental rationality as a form of nonsocial rationality, a stance that this much less plausible after 
decades of research into science and technology studies, as well as the recent history of 3rd wave 
environmentalist thinkers emphasizing (often contentiously) more aggressive and conscientious 
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technological and economic solutions to ecological problems.  Consider a brief comparison between a 
benchmark example for Habermas (and an important starting point for Killingsworth and Palmer) and a 
more contemporary example.  Habermas started Towards a Rational Society with news about a new 
university town built to train ten thousand Israeli students as “personnel who will be necessary for 
future industry in the desert,” stating his concerns about instrumental rationality in a university that 
serves as an instrument for “transmitting technically exploitable knowledge” that meets industrial needs 
and “fulfills the system of social labor” (1).  Compare this to a new mission for the University of British 
Columbia, an urban campus with a Center for Interactive Research on Sustainability with a “command 
center” and a “living laboratory” dedicated to “commit, integrate, demonstrate, and inspire” 
sustainability by reshaping Vancouver’s urban spaces into a network of buildings on and off from 
campus that aren’t just carbon neutral, or designed to mimic nature, but designed to actively remediate 
environmental problems by creating food, drawing carbon from the atmosphere, drawing energy from 
waste, as well as promoting new policies, and engaging community partnerships through forms of 
deliberation.    While rhetoric’s contributions to such promising changes are clearly tied to helping 
forward better deliberations about ecological decision making, to those rhetorical exigencies Aristotle 
canonized as a concern for the contingencies of human control of the future with an “end” of promoting 
the good and avoiding the harmful, we seem to risk losing valuable aspects of our rhetorical theories by 
making deliberation the initial or overriding framework for our critical interventions into environmental 
problems.    
Of course, in addition to leveraging rhetorical theories that support deliberation, we have seen 
some emphasis on how rhetoric helps break down particular binaries between nature and culture, how 
certain figurations or “rhetorical fields” (as Whiteside put it) of persuasive forces, characters, tropes, or 
strategies consider that “the identities of ‘nature’ and ‘humanity’ get constituted together reciprocally” 
– as they are consistently “reinforced by a rhetorical field in which ‘human’ and ‘natural’ issues are kept 
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constantly intertwined” (46).  Indeed, the relationships configured between rhetorical theory, critical 
theory and ecological thought have most often worked in the direction of, as Andrew Biro recently put 
it, working to pull the best from the critical theory’s “commitment ... to developing a dialectical account 
of human biology and to basing projects of social transformation on a firmer understanding of what 
really motivates human behavior, without succumbing to biological determinism and essentialism” 
(emphasis his, 17).  As argued in this dissertation, recent works in critical theory, or that area within it 
sometimes called  ‘theoretical ecology,’ has helped us work out the latter concern with forms of 
‘biological determinism,’ especially the slew of recent historical and philosophical work taking versions 
of Actor-Network-Theory to study large socio-technological systems that account for ‘natural,’ social and 
technological phenomena as ecological agents participating within ecological systems (Law, Latour, 
Callon, Serres, etc.).  However, while this still growing body of work provides us with important ways of 
doing ecological histories that avoid the dangers of "biologism" or "essentialism" and offer numerous 
ways for scholars to become more conscious of their descriptions of technological, social and ecological 
networks in their work, these perspectives often make it difficult to give due relevance to what rhetoric 
is best at mapping about human intelligence as what guides our vulnerabilities to persuasion or enables 
our ability to be motivated, and to situate these as forms of responsible agency, or translate this to 
present forms of action -- often because on describing complex nodes of agency also strategically passes 
over “what is commonly taken as distinctive or even unique about humans” and/or insists on 
superseding or forcing out any or all nature/culture dualisms (Bennett, ix).  As it is presently written, the 
project does contribute histories with several rhetorical theories that might give their allegiance to 
those recent critical theories bent on thinking ecologically in ways that do not see ‘nature’ as distinct 
from culture and human agency, mainly by teasing out several rhetorical theories and performances 
that add to interest in ‘ecologics’ (as Hanjo Berrenssem recently put it) that promote human agency 
within ecological parameters, or, as Deleuze and Guattari put it, that offer ways of thinking of the 
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natural and the human not as confronting opposites, but as “one and the same essential reality, the 
producer-product” (Herzogenrath 1-5).  However, in addition to this, as much in critical theory seems 
increasingly to work within this kind ecological framework, the genealogical work in this study might 
help forward several key ideas and axioms about ecological rhetoric today as a particularly useful way of 
theorizing a distinctive kind of ecological thought that emphasizes rhetoric as a productive art that must 
create a distinctive form of ecological ethics.   
To start with the more modest contribution, these rhetorical histories offer a contribution to 
what Guattari called “the creation of” diverse “thinking environments” that can support an increasingly 
“generalized ecology,” ways of thinking that work on the interplay of, at least, three ecological registers 
-- the environment, social relations, and human subjectivity -- needed to broadly support sustainable 
knowledge production and praxis (Three Ecologies 35).  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Guattari 
argued that a generalized ecology had barely begun to exist, and he foresaw the possibility for its 
emergence in response to the narrow association of ecology with “the image of a small nature-loving 
minority or with qualified specialists” (35).  Each chapter in this dissertation offers a line of thought 
where versions of ecological rhetoric surface as a means to theorize and give structure to what Castell’s 
called a recurring ecologist’s challenge that “criticizes the domination of life by science” while using 
“science to oppose science on behalf of life” in order to “present a superior knowledge” (181). The 
brands of “superior knowledge” discussed here work with rhetorical concepts and strategies to 
advances science beyond merely epistemic concerns, and they resurface in the canonical definitions of 
wisdom by Heraclitus, Bacon and Huxley, which are each distinctive definitions bridging rhetorical and 
ecological theories, and largely depend upon including rhetorical techniques and strategies for making 
this wisdom impact everyday life. 
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In some regards then, this project’s interest in historic versions of ecological rhetoric is also 
comparable to other recent critical interests in histories of ecological thought that have been aptly 
summed up by William Connolly in Neuropolitics (2002) as interest in a tradition of immanent 
naturalists: “a minor tradition of the reflection upon nature, memory, thinking, the layering of culture, 
and an ethics of cultivation advanced at various times by theorists such as Lucretius, Spinoza, Friedrich 
Nietzsche, Henri Bergson, William James, Sigmund Freud, Stuart Hampshire, Gilles Deleuze, Isabelle 
Stengers, and Ilya Prigogine” (5).   Connolly proposes that “immanent naturalists resist both a command 
model of morality set in a juridical rendering of the transcendental field, and a teleological image of 
ethics set in a divine order of things ... [to] support an ethic in which visceral attachment to life and the 
world provides the preliminary soil from which commitment to more generous identifications, 
responsibilities, and connections might be cultivated” (104).   The perspectives on the figures I work with 
in this study share this hallmark of progressive ecological work in recent decades, which should be clear 
in my attempt to find a precedence in thinkers who shift from describing these ‘generous 
identifications,’ to offering means of cultivating identifications and responsibilities rhetorically.  This is a 
shift that motivates this study’s emphasis on rhetorical theories, its modalities of technê, and the 
construction of rhetorical strategies as marking key registers for ecological thought.  It might be added, 
then, that the general ethos of the figures studied here not only support Guattari’s basic idea that a 
more generalized ecology would require a radical dissensus of ecological thought, but that the emphasis 
on rhetoric, and technê in particular, helps align or bring together ways of thinking that Guattari though 
should be ‘transversally’ linked as forms of social action.  Guattari thought a generalized ecology would 
need support from a multiplicity of intellectual efforts that not only re-negotiate human and non-human 
relationships by evading dualisms like nature vs. culture, technology vs. biology, or natural vs. artificial 
(dualisms which were all too clearly breaking down in the 20th century) but that offer revised logics (or 
rhetorics) that forward multiple ways of relating and creating ecological assemblages (in any 
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combination of rhetorical, social, technological, ecological systems) that channel past gains in a 
‘ecological struggle of ideas’ towards future ones.  This history of ecological rhetoric may reveal some 
‘past gains’ in ecological thought that we can build on, but perhaps only if we distinguish the productive 
and ethical nature of its genealogy of technê  as a distinctive “unity of knowledge and action” that might 
help us to move beyond the more ecologically descriptive work in recent decades.   
This idea emphasizing a genealogy of technê as a key modality for a productive knowledge that 
is integral to ecological rhetoric is also one that Guattari helped to advance, particularly as he picked up 
the enduring appeals of Bateson’s first wave cybernetics, which argued persuasively for not only 
describing/understanding the mind as immanent information moving through larger ecological systems, 
but stipulating that this “difference which makes a difference” both resolves certain 
mind/body/environment dualisms, and potentially cultivates a personal shift (his own) from a 
philosophical repose or scientific descriptions to an “ethical” mentality as his cybernetic perception of 
ubiquitous informatic relationships became a motivational factor to change the ways that this 
mind/body/environment nexus is evidently evolving in “suicidal” ways (see "Form, Substance, and 
Difference," 454 -460).   In taking a great deal of ecological theory from Bateson and Varela, Guattari 
asked us plainly to move ecological science towards a more affirmative kind of ecological praxis in an 
"ethico-aesthetic paradigm" that included personal, social and environmental changes, where scientific 
knowledge is not the groundwork for normative ecological values (which he already saw as a kind of 
dead end) but is something that must enter a larger ecology of ideas that produce new personal and 
social values, new communication networks, new socio-political formations and new technologies as 
autopoetic processes (Heroux 182).   This intention is, as Erick Heroux put it in a recent essay, much of 
what guides the ambitious “gambit” of Guattari’s analytical and theoretical pursuit to find “the way 
around our current impasse, a world where we already have far more ecological knowledge than we do 
ecological practices, which are often blocked at the level of national politics and suppressed whenever 
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they conflict with the profitable interests of corporations... [turned into] piecemeal reforms... and  
ineffective technical reforms” (184).   As Guattari compelled critical theory to advance a meshwork of 
new micro-political practices that could cultivate new subjectivities, collectives, assemblages (etc.) that 
are diversified but ‘transversally’ linked across three social, psychic, and natural realms by a mentality, 
he also noted that this might be beneficially grounded in kind of productive knowledge – which (as we 
saw in the first chapter) urged his reclaiming of technê as a key concept among his theory and 
conceptual creations.  This might define a central responsibility for ecological rhetoric to build on this 
concept that has come to carry meaning for a number of key changes in culture, and to articulate a role 
for rhetoric’s interventions into these ‘micro-political’ levels of the emergent collective, the subject, the 
pre-subjective, the motivational, etc.     
It is worth noting, therefore, that the relationship between ecological knowledge and practices 
has significantly changed since Guattari’s appeal to appropriate technê, as the scientific catalogues of 
new ecological tipping points are not only growing (even while many were ignored, or “hit overdrive”), 
but as the past decade also spurred a massive growth in social and political organizations taking on 
ecological problems.  Indeed in the humanities and social sciences we have already had fairly reliable 
attention to describing the development of something more like a generalized ecology after Guattari, 
with numerous efforts to portray a new “typology of the movement” (Castells), a range of 
environmentalist identities (Killingsworth and Palmer), or the massive growth of environmental 
organizations that have taken shape over the past two decades (such as Hawken’s or WiserEarth’s 
mapping of an ‘unorganized’ network of over a hundred thousand new organizations).  This expansion of 
ecological practices certainly solicits analytic work to detail new forms of environmentalism based on 
social and cultural units with differing goals, adversaries, discourses communities, political and social 
ideologies, and different forms of identification with nature, science, technology, politics, the economy, 
and culture.  It also, however, seems to ask us to take up a responsibility to theorize and persuasively 
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articulate how this expansion and diversification of ecological practice is also to be ‘transversally linked’ 
(to again think with Guattari) in effective ways.  What links such diverse practices at the moment is of 
course the world picture that emerges from the facts granted by ecological sciences, or the commonality 
of certain principles espoused by ecological ethics, or an ‘international standard’ for technical 
environmental communication, or an orientation towards creating and meeting sustainability indexes, 
or (and increasingly) the processes of ‘environmental mainstreaming’ supported by the U.N., the World 
Bank and numerous multi-national corporations implementing sustainable development policies and 
environmental economics.201    As ecological rhetoric now rests on these and other common technê, our 
intervention as a field at present might represent or help rearticulate how such technê guide a (much 
easier to conceptualize) version of Guattari’s ‘generalized ecology’ as ecological organizations continue 
to expand, diversify and ‘mainstream,’ aiming to make the best of their potentials under the pressure of 
ecological tipping points that must be dealt with in the first-half of the 21st century.  Our theoretical, 
interdisciplinary, and pedagogical responsibilities of rhetoric must also work within this apparatus to 
promptly advance new forms of productive knowledge precisely because of the possibilities this 
presents.  In other words, it is time for ecological rhetoric to take into account what technê precedes 
praxis, and to configure ways to think about how innovations in ecological rhetoric will often precede 
deliberations.  This will be in the vein of many thinkers that have looked at the evolving relationships 
between technê and other classical concepts like phronesis, arête, episteme or praxis to chart 
“alternatives” to technological thinking or to resist the “lure of technique” (as Joseph Dunne put it in his 
great piece of synthesis), but the challenge now might be to reconfigure that “particular mode of 
rationality called technical reason” as a technê for ecological rhetoric that best constrains and sustains 
the so-called ‘higher forms’ of praxis that so many have sought after in 20th century thought (Newman, 
Collingwood, Arendt, Gadamer, Rorty, Heidegger, Habermas, Schon, Dunne, Bernstein, etc.) (Dunne 9).  
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The studies in each of the preceding chapters offer some insight into what this looks like in rhetorical 
terms. 
Without too much recourse to the previous chapters, we might delineate the role of technê in 
terms of the conclusions drawn in each chapter, the first of which was the most predictable one: that 
environmental discourses continued fetishizing Heidegger and his discussion of technê long after 
Guattari accused him of entrusting the way we think through technê to a philosophical ‘unmasking of 
the truth’ and nailing “technê to an ontological plinth” that “compromises its character of processual 
opening” (34).  My second conclusion comes in foregrounding a more recent circulation of technê in 
ecological discourses (environmentalist, economic, literary, and philosophic) which captures a more 
specific reconfiguration of ecological thought that has coalesced around technê in recent decades.  This 
presents us a more distinctive modality where this concept functions as theorizing productive forms of 
ecological rhetoric, rather than operating in a so-called ‘non-instrumental’ mode which seems to stray 
too far from any viable understanding of this concept from the history of rhetoric.  Accordingly, my first 
contribution is an argument that, if technê has often been an “invisible foundation” for the field, these 
four areas of ecological thought provide another foundation by recycling traditional understandings of 
technê (as they offer technê as a core concept for ecocriticism, for argumentation in environmental 
rhetoric, for philosophical tenets in ecosophy, and for theorizing ecological economics).   These returns 
to technê take on rhetorical and instrumental qualities that line up to some extent with Atwill’s 
treatment of technê in Rhetoric Reclaimed, where she staked out an ancient rhetorical tradition 
beginning with Sophistic and Isocratic paradigms connected by their notion of technê as a model of 
knowledge that took shape in theorizing and teaching how to “seize an advantage in social and political 
situations” (44).  This promoted a version of rhetoric as “productive knowledge” with the power to 
embed man in a social, political and natural environment (which, according to Atwill, is contrary to ideas 
of the soul and much in a humanist tradition) as well as to open up spaces for the expression of 
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alternative models of subjectivity, knowledge, value and humanity (44).  This first chapter argues that 
recent ecological discourses return to technê in parallel ways as they articulate ecological subjectivity, 
knowledge, and value – returns that seem like a key modality for understanding an evolution of 
ecological rhetoric today. 
 My reading of Heraclitus perhaps marks the earliest opening for thinking about how ecological 
themes are imbricated with a kind of productive rhetorical knowledge in his critique of how logos 
became separated from technê in several ways, and in his insistence that ‘nature was confused’ by 
treating it as something to be understood as Logos without seeing how also somehow ‘becomes’ varied 
technê as it is channeled by human artifice.  I lay emphasis on how a rhetorical  analysis of Heraclitus 
enables us to sidestep problems with reading Heraclitus as representing the metaphysical concept 
Logos, and instead to allows us to read his conception of a “logos from the Logos” as a more dynamic 
set of rhetorical innovations and strategies drawn from principles Heraclitus found in his singular pursuit 
of Logos, core principles such as flux, the unity of opposites, and strife as justice, which are integral to 
his discussion of persuasion as type of common wisdom and a social force.  Thus, I don’t attempt to 
conclusively answer the elusive historical question “what was Logos?” once and for all in this chapter, I 
make a case for reading this particular logos as a distinctive rhetorical strategy and persuasive method 
that gave form and content to his wisdom as a teachable rhetorical technê.  The second concept I 
emphasize in this chapter, first second nature, preserves his vital word play while minimally defining 
Heraclitus’ singular strategy and its goal – a unique persuasive strategy to be embodied in his figuration 
of the wise man, with an end goal of making logos a broader ‘sense,’ ability, or ‘attunement’ held in 
common.   In other words, first second nature emphasizes that the value of this sage seems to be tied to 
a vital challenge to make something strategically persuasive from pre-Socratic ideas of first nature by 
affirming a way of thinking he thought should become so “obvious” that it be considered nothing less 
than second nature.      
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If Heraclitus sought to make something like ecological rhetoric ‘common’ or obvious, in some 
ways Bacon sees rhetorical invention play a similar role as a technê that crafts new knowledge by 
providing techniques for moving the imagination from the affectations or anticipations to a deeper form 
of reason and an attendant form of social persuasion– one that hinges on a re-conceived notion of 
‘mastery’ as a whole strategy for scientific-rhetoric.  In today’s intellectual climate, Bacon’s authority 
seems worth re-engaging as another ecologist’s challenge, one striving to inaugurate the challenges of 
rhetorical mastery at the cusp of the 17th century that granted a new responsibility to take on 
instrumental, pragmatic, rhetorical and reflective thought.  Bacon’s refrains about rejecting a known 
teleological natural order to which man's arts and actions were alleged to conform, about the truth 
values of empirical methods and experiments, and the progress of mechanization and mathematization 
of nature, all come to play in the context of this authoritative idea:  that this period in history required 
man to drive for a fuller ‘mastery’ not only turned ‘inward’ towards ‘mastering the self,’ but in an 
outward turn to controlling ‘nature’ through a scientific and rhetorical process.  While Bacon has been 
blamed (usually along with Descartes) in philosophy, critical theory, and environmental discourses for 
spearheading a scientific revolution which promoted a patriarchal and mechanistic view of nature 
(Heidegger, Marcuse, Popper, Merchant, Harding, and Keller among others), his engagement with 
technê questions add an important ‘defense’ of Bacon as a “servant of nature” (such as those by Vico, 
Coleridge, Whitehead, Sobel, and Mathews).  As Bacon engages with a number of technê’s fundamental 
principles through his concerns with “the dangers of the innovator” (in philosophic, scientific and 
political terms), technê is a means by which Bacon theorizes the “subtle devices” of persuasion that 
were being learned as he and contemporaries thought about how rhetorical arts mingled with science 
and mechanics (Reese, Wolfe).   Jessica Wolfe looks to Bacon’s “subtle devices” to articulate how Bacon 
turns mechanistic principles (being explored by a number of Renaissance humanists) to deal with moral 
and epistemological challenges posed by instrumentality – an interest Bacon shared with other 
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Renaissance thinkers (3).  I argue that, for Bacon, these subtle devices are in line with rhetorical 
understandings of technê, and that this re-establishes technê as something responsive to now familiar 
“ecological” concerns, emphasizing that for Bacon these rhetorical principles might permit us to 
participate in the ‘whole’ of nature, “to be a part of creation and movement on equal footing” where 
external limitations are overcome to attain progress to the extent that “rational knowledge about 
natural machinery takes over from the inefficient meandering of evolution” (Davidson 69). Bacon’s 
conceptualization of rhetoric and technê mediates science and his ethical concerns about power and the 
possibly destructive forces of science, and help round out his ‘whole strategy’ as an ecological rhetoric.  I 
conclude by asking:  Can we imagine a recent history of ecological thought drawn to strategic aspects of 
Bacon’s ecological rhetoric and its handling of mastery?  Would this not have curbed the excessive focus 
on critiquing technoscience, ‘mechanization’ or ‘instrumentality,’ the many returns to some version of 
organicism, or the absolutist attempts at overcoming, re-writing or reuniting the antithesis between 
nature and man?   Would not the attempts of many deep ecologists to radically restructure society with 
ideas of ‘ecocentrism,’ ‘inherent worth,’ ‘holism,’ ‘preservation,’ and ‘limits’ have taken on qualities of 
pragmatism, agency, and reflective instrumentalism aimed at progressive forms of rhetorical, scientific 
and technological intervention?   Would Bacon not only help us think about the spirit of science in an 
age of production, but the spirit of science in our age of consumption? 
Lastly, amplifying artificial selection as a symbolic category that compelled a kind of rhetorical 
inquiry between Darwin and Huxley reveals an exigence for defining artificial selection in rhetorical 
terms as a technê, and an exigence for establishing certain ethical principles and rhetorical strategies 
that might guide practices of artificial selection.  Huxley argued these principles might be leveraged to 
steer artificial selection away from transcendent ideals and towards an emphasis on an ethics of 
‘transactions’ or ‘debts’ and ‘redundancies’ calibrated between two ‘artificial’ realms: a social-rhetorical 
realm and a more rigorously scientific realm of artificial selection (agriculture, fisheries, etc.).  It is the 
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latter realm that Huxley conceives of as a ‘centre of force’ in society, creating a dynamic that replicates 
something like the ‘cosmic processes’ in nature.    Analyzing Huxley particularly as a rhetorician allows us 
to examine how he moves from analysis of the rhetoric of artificial selection and critique of its narrow or 
vulgar uses, to a technê question that speculates about a heightened role for this rhetoric in an 
evolutionary and ecological context (one that might moderate or enrich forms of materialism, idealism, 
or merely “cosmetic rhetorics”), and finally to appropriating it for pragmatic political purposes (as we 
saw in an example from his address to the fisheries exhibition).  Indeed this ‘rhetoric of artificial 
selection’ seems to mark several important trends.  One is an early rendition of a turn from analytic 
philosophies to the varied theses of pragmatism, wherein rhetoric is increasingly regarded as an 
unavoidable bridge between sciences of nature and culture.  Another, and more distinctive in this study, 
is a move beyond mere recognition of the unavoidability of nature/culture dichotomies or the need to 
‘destroy’ or reclassify these, to creating axioms for strategically bridging scientific truths with rhetorical 
supplements of art, technê, images, representation, convention (etc) with a particular end: supporting 
both (ecological) consciousness and our (unavoidable) political and technological interventions into 
natural and social systems.  The case of artificial selection shows us this kind of rhetoric is not a matter 
of choice; it is by default that artificial selection becomes a rhetoric that comes into play.  We can see, 
however, both Darwin and Huxley also play with how it should be made persuasive and sufficient for 
exigencies we increasingly define as ecological and sustainable – exigencies that include meeting a range 
of human needs and desires – for not only sustenance, but for emotional well-being, and moral or 
ethical training.  Huxley, especially, asks us to think more broadly about the relationships (or ‘debts’) 
between science and the commercial industries most directly sustaining society, as well as to consider 
an ethics calibrated by the pleasures or tastes of the public.  Taking a broader view of what Huxley does 
then, we see him considering what ways evolutionary science might require a corresponding ecological 
rhetoric to create forms of socio-ecological sustainability.   
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Among the implications we draw from this genealogy of ecological rhetoric in closing this 
dissertation, we might highlight that this emphasis on rhetorical theory, technê and attendant rhetorical 
strategies (as discursive practices, performances and techniques) might help to frame or extend how our 
field conceptualizes its responsibilities to advance ecological thought or practice through rhetorical 
scholarship, teaching, or public work today.   The work of recovering histories of ecological rhetoric has 
been partly in response to the possibility that much of the work in (environmental) rhetoric, technical 
communication, ecocomposition and service learning might rally around its extraordinarily long history 
to forward more progressive rhetorical theories, technê and rhetorical strategies that bolster both 
ancient and innovative forms of ecological responsibility.202    Most generally, this might mean a slight 
(but not insignificant) shift in emphasis from analytic work responsive to facilitating other forms of 
ecological thought or actions we deem as responsible, to taking some risks by emphasizing that the 
ideas and actions we produce as ecological rhetoric may indeed best describe forms of ecological 
responsibility that are some of our best hopes for sustainability.  The history of ecological rhetoric drawn 
out in this dissertation emphasizes that we owe some debts to our own histories of rhetoric, and that 
present work might continue to hinge on forwarding rhetorical theory, technê, and rhetorical strategies 
that cultivates new and enduring forms of ecological responsibility as a critical contribution to what 
Dieter Birnbacher called “the many faces” of responsibility as a “social phenomenon” in an ecological 
age (9).203  He notes that much of the classical discussion of responsibility is essentially of a form of 
retrospective “ex post responsibility ... a kind of responsibility that one incurs by being held ‘answerable’ 
for some act of one’s own, done by commission or by omission in the past, either as someone acting in a 
socially defined role or simply as an accountable person,” while the question of an ecological 
responsibility has shifted essentially to our relationship to the future and to questions about what 
defines sustainable actions (9).  Work like Hans Jonas’ The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of 
Ethics for a Technological Age (1985) helped mark this shift in a search for  a responsibility as “ex ante” – 
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or a form of responsibility ascribed to individuals or collectives for the production of affairs that can 
have greater (and less immediate) impact on the future (10).  While Jonas’ work is now often thought of 
as conservative, it was innovative in its consideration of aspects of this forward-looking form of 
responsibility, ascribing it to the collective nature of risk in a context that is technologically complex and 
ecologically interdependent.  Ricoeur, in Oneself As Another (1992), responded to and critiqued Jonas’ 
extension of the scope and power of responsibility with concern that, when the whole of nature is 
submitted to our care, responsibility becomes so vast as to be beyond our ability to grasp it as 
something that fully applies to us (Ricoeur 170).  Because of the long temporal gaps between many 
harmful acts and their effects, Ricoeur proposes responsibility as something exteriorized as a horizon of 
meaning and interiorized through a socialization of risks, while positing the likelihood of a resolution 
between exteriority and interiority where the two notions overlap and reinforce each other 
(Dauenhauer 153).   Discussions of the recursivity between risk and responsibility run in many directions 
(notably Beck, Giddens and other risk theorists, but it also expands to limits well charted by Levinas who 
charts responsibility as a ‘principle,’ or by Jonas who sees it as the entire terrain of becoming), directions 
which Ricoeur accredits to the “polysemy of the verb ‘to respond’: not just in the sense of ‘to answer 
for...’ but also as ‘to respond to...’” (“The Concept of Responsibility” 12).    This dissertation may not 
offer an ‘answer for’ our ecological problems today, which will require processes of mitigation, 
adaptation and geoengineering responsive to known planetary boundaries sustaining life, hard-hitting 
political-economic reform and legislation from the West to align sustainable economic growth, global 
interventions into the political-ecology of war, nested efforts at re-engineering the planet’s cities, 
diversified experiments in sustainable agriculture, revolutions in energy production and use, and an 
extended form of conservation that makes preservation of biodiversity a logical after effect of these and 
other efforts at indexing sustainability.  This dissertation may, however, help to mark ecological rhetoric 
as something enduring from our tradition which we might ‘respond to’ as a deeper exigence, one asking 
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rhetoricians to produce an ecological responsibility through the progressive rhetorical theories, technê, 
or strategies that address the motives or mentalities that make sustainable actions seem impossible, 
unbearably difficult, or inadequate.   In other words, it offers some steps towards an ‘ecology of mind’ 
where the possibilities in ecological rhetoric would be eclipsed by common sense and observable the 
world over.  
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APPENDIX A: ENDNOTES 
1 In Treading Softly: Paths to Ecological Order (2010) 
2 In regards to energy, see Jay Hanson’s famous article in Energy in 1999 giving his calculations about energy 
growth and physical limits.  The most interesting update in this story is that peak oil, while still heavily debated, 
convinced the US Joint Forces Command to issue the Joint Operating Environment statement that by 2012 surplus 
oil would begin to disappear, and to make a push for renewable energy as a security measure. See Michael Mann's 
account in The Hockey Stick and the Climate Wars: Dispatches From the Front Lines, and the documents attained 
by Peter Gleick, a climate scientist and author, and posted to the DeSmog blog in February 2012 to expose the 
inner workings of the Heartland Institute.  In addition to this comment on geoengineering publications, note also 
and that the IPCC would now be holding expert meetings on how to proceed with such tactics for manipulating 
global climate systems 
3 citing Bazerman, pg 15 
4 which he explained in his 1977 interview “The Confession of the Flesh” 
5 Siegfried Jäger, “Theoretical and methodological aspects of a critical discourse and dispositive analysis.” Appears 
in a revised version in Reiner Keller / Andreas Hirseland, Werner Schneider, Willy Viehöver (eds.): Handbook of 
Social Sciences discourse analysis, Opladen (Leske + Budrich),  2000. 
6See Journal of Advanced Composition, Volume 13, Number 1, Winter 1993. UNT Digital Library. 
 http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc28608/.  
7 See Rhetorical Power, 3-4. 
8 For a recent discussion see: Noah R. Roderick, in “Analogize This! The Politics of Scale and the Problem of 
Substance in Complexity-Based Composition” (2012), which recently made insightful and cautionary comments 
about the how the interests in ‘ecology’ in composition and rhetoric gave galvanized around complexity, and a 
proposal that any engagement with ecology or complexity should be understood as a different kind of relationship 
or “interface” between our field and the sciences. 
9 She stipulates that this is, of course, one narrow or selective history "constructed from the perspective provided 
by a single concept” – and that it is almost as difficult to extract a history of techne in the field as it is to pin down 
the history of rhetoric (7).  And while Pender’s five definitions are rather useful, and insightful in respect of the 
recent history of techne in rhetoric and composition, they also reflect number of problems in regards to the fourth 
and fifth definitions (and Pender shows her reluctance in several fronts: in framing these definitions as 
representing “shifts on the axiological axis” (31), as two versions of techne shaped largely by the concept’s 
connections with 20th century concerns that techne has both opened up to and helped to frame, and in pointing to 
Hawk as an avatar for the 5th definition). For several reasons it seems problematic that, after situating Atwill as the 
major spokesperson for the third definition, one of inventing new social possibilities, Pender offers two modes that 
can seem to some to close these possibilities down.  In the 4th definition, Pender suggests the meaning (or we 
might prefer modality) of techne “as a means of producing resources” developed through a wide range of 
scholarship “looking at techne in a position of extreme [or dangerous] instrumentality,” where techne framed 
understandings of ‘instrumental reason’ and modern production practices as capable of turning the world into 
mere “resources” for human exploitation, and where she says, techne is examined in the “extreme” manner of 
being “capable of  sending the world into a void”(32).  She argues that the fifth meaning stems from those looking 
at a kind of ‘counter-history’ of techne (as she cites Byron Hawk as her avatar), not only as a conceptual tool for 
examining all that is ‘instrumental’ and “capable of sending the world into the void” but as “also capable of the 
opposite – summoning the world from the void” – the category which she calls techne’s “non-instrumental mode” 
(31, 33).   
10 as James Bauman defined ethos in our Encyclopedia of Rhetoric, 263 
11 The title of their second chapter 
12 See in particular the chapter “Varieties of Environmentalism: a Genealogy” 
13See their appendix A for a diagram and short explanation. 
14 A fairly recent and compelling example of such work is Elizabeth Malone’s 2004 project Rhetorical Analysis of 
Arguments Made in the Climate Change Debate that worked with Jeanne Fahnestock (who was a committee 
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member on her dissertation project) and members of the IPCC at the United Nations to explore “argument 
families” and “social network links” between scientists, economists and policy makers.  Malone’s work combined 
Fahnestock’s insight into argumentation and rhetorical structures in science with work from sociologists and 
cultural theorists such as Lyotard, Habermas, Giddens and Beck who have used various ‘rhetorical’ methods such 
as risk analysis, logical analysis and discourse analysis.  Using these methods, she unearths and explains similarities 
and differences in scientific and narrative knowledge formation to diverse stake holders in this critical debate.  
Brendon Larson’s Metaphors for Sustainability: Redefining Our Relationship with Nature (2011) is equally effective, 
while coming at the problem from the opposite direction: as an ecologist seeking out the contributions of a 
number of rhetorical scholars, philosophers and social theorists. A professor of Environment and Resource Studies 
at the University of Waterloo, Larson approached a number or rhetorical scholars to familiarize himself with 
rhetorical theories and concepts (citing Fleck, Latour and Woolgar, Shapin and Schaffer, Gross, Bazerman, 
Killingsworth and Palmer, Fahnestock, and Worster) to explain how scientists turn to metaphors, how these lead 
to, or hinder, social understandings and productive policies consistent with sustainability.   
15 See Lundgren’s Risk Communication and http://asq.org/quality-progress/2005/08/standards-
outlook/environmental-communication-standard-on-the-horizon.html 
16 Early discussions of 3rd  wave environmental discourses were intermittently termed ‘3rd  way’ in association with 
sociologist Anthony Giddens, or as political “triangulation” strategies associated with certain Clinton era programs.  
In the 3rd wave we see an approach stemming from prominent and heavily debated attempts to re-articulate 
environmentalism’s core vision and strategies over the past several decades in efforts to broaden its influence 
through centrist compromises to both right and left approaches to governance and growth, while stressing more 
mainstream mechanisms for change, including technological innovation, economic controls, and continued 
attempts at global treaties (Giddens 5). 
17 The now historic "1st Wave" wave of American works on environmentalism will typically recount the advocacy of 
John Muir and Teddy Roosevelt's style of Conservationism, the early 20th century debates between Gifford Pinchot 
(founder of the National Forest Service) and John Muir (founder of the Sierra Club), or the impact of Aldo Leopold’s 
landmark work A Sand County Almanac published much later in 1949 (Malone 34).  First wave discourses are 
epitomized today by the “Wise Use” movement or the more radical “Earth First!” activists -- groups that have been 
topics of study in communications and rhetoric in works by Thiele, Payne, Shabecoff, Oravec, and Meister.  
However, as a form of strategic advocacy, these perspectives are increasingly critiqued as ineffective or 
essentialist, and have become much less prevalent as popular texts or within most political forums for public 
policy.   
18 Carson is an archetype of the second wave approach.  She was what Deleuze and Guattari would call a nomad 
scientist rather than a royal scientist, a biologist turned conservationist and nature writer, a scientist who swept in 
to destabilize a settled order. She studied English, Biology, Zoology and Genetics, and left a legacy primarily as an 
ecological thinker, both in her challenging of dominant conceptions and practices of science, and in her affect on 
the environmental movement and ecological philosophies like deep ecology.   In her chapter “Nature Fights Back” 
she closed Silent Spring by stating “the ‘control of nature’ is a phrase conceived in arrogance, born of the 
Neanderthal age of biology and philosophy when it was supposed that nature exists for the convenience of man” 
(297).  Her final words were a critique of the concepts and practices of applied entomology as coming from a 
“Stone Age of science” a “primitive science” armed with “modern and terrible weapons” turned not only against 
insects but the earth (297).  Almost fifty years after Silent Spring, Carson’s forethought about nature ‘fighting back’ 
resonates with increasing intensity in the assorted fields doing ‘science studies’ and in the network of 
organizations and practical endeavors that make up the environmental ‘movement’ that Carson helped to 
transform.  By the same token, her sentiment that the ‘control’ of nature ushered in a primitive and arrogant 
science has helped to motivate many critical attempts to re-theorize and reorient technoscientific control, often in 
light of the growth of ‘ecological thought’ that has taken root in wide range of fields 
19 Aldo Leopold (1887 –1948), the famous ecologist, forester, and environmentalist, is best known for A Sand 
County Almanac (1949) and his impact on the field of environmental ethics over the past 50 years.  
20 The recent work Sustainability Indicators: Measuring the Immeasurable by Simon Bell and Stephen Morse (2012) 
seems to pinpoint the central paradox today for concept of sustainability today:  defining something as sustainable 
works best when dealing with limited, well defined situations (i.e. small-scale  ecosystems or local economies) and 
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when methods and interpretations are extremely rigorous and slow, but the “concept of sustainability takes us 
away from limited, well-defined situations” by necessitating some understanding or representation of complex 
global systems, and holds a requirement today for fast “emphasis on immediate implementation” that doesn’t 
allow rigorous testing of indicators.  Defining anything as sustainable today, as the authors argue, “takes place in 
tandem with a wish to implement sustainability Now!” (73).    
21 Renatto Barilli echoes this view in his definition of rhetoric as “technê  in the fullest sense: the activity it 
performs is not only cognitive but also transformative and practical as well. It does not limit itself to conveying 
neutral, sterilized facts (that would be docere), but its aim is to carry away the audience; to produce an effect on 
them; to mold them; to leave them different as a result of its impact" (x).   
22 She stipulates that this is, of course, one narrow or selective history "constructed from the perspective provided 
by a single concept” – and that it is almost as difficult to extract a history of techne in the field as it is to pin down 
the history of rhetoric (7).  And while Pender’s five definitions are rather useful, and insightful in respect of the 
recent history of techne in rhetoric and composition, they also reflect number of problems in regards to the fourth 
and fifth definitions (and Pender shows her reluctance in several fronts: in framing these definitions as 
representing “shifts on the axiological axis” (31), as two versions of techne shaped largely by the concept’s 
connections with 20th century concerns that techne has both opened up to and helped to frame, and in pointing to 
Hawk as an avatar for the 5th definition). For several reasons it seems problematic that, after situating Atwill as the 
major spokesperson for the third definition, one of inventing new social possibilities, Pender offers two modes that 
can seem to some to close these possibilities down.  In the 4th definition, Pender suggests the meaning (or we 
might prefer modality) of techne “as a means of producing resources” developed through a wide range of 
scholarship “looking at techne in a position of extreme [or dangerous] instrumentality,” where techne framed 
understandings of ‘instrumental reason’ and modern production practices as capable of turning the world into 
mere “resources” for human exploitation, and where she says, techne is examined in the “extreme” manner of 
being “capable of  sending the world into a void”(32).  She argues that the fifth meaning stems from those looking 
at a kind of ‘counter-history’ of techne (as she cites Byron Hawk as her avatar), not only as a conceptual tool for 
examining all that is ‘instrumental’ and “capable of sending the world into the void” but as “also capable of the 
opposite – summoning the world from the void” – the category which she calls techne’s “non-instrumental mode” 
(31, 33).   
23 While Heidegger’s concerns with techne remain of interest to a number of recent works by Rutsky, Mitcham, 
Feenberg, Hawk and Miller, these account of technê should largely be confined to a second wave of environmental 
thinking – most often filtering their ideas through Heidegger and Aristotle’s renderings of technê as a concept to 
be thought through in stark contrast to modern technicity and its treatment of nature as ‘standing reserve’. Such 
arguments draw on technê in ways that (by the late 1980s) already represented the vintage interpretation of 
Heidegger that Badiou saw over-determining philosophy, and that Guattari indicted specifically as nailing technê  
to an “ontological plinth” by entrusting ancient technê  in a philosophical fashion – and in opposition to modern 
technology – with the mission of ‘unmasking the truth’ about making, art, and poeisis, something which Guattari 
thought compromised technê ’s character of “processual opening” (Chaosmosis 34).    
24 Andrew Kirk (Counterculture Green, 2007) and Fred Turner (From Counterculture to Cyberculture, 2006) have 
evaluated and praised the literate practices and creative processes of invention in the catalogues and early 
instantiations of open source cultures like “The WELL” for the evolution of useful “platforms,” “publics,” and 
“commons,” that shape processes of invention through the sharing environmental project ideas, instructions on 
‘tool-use,’ plans to provide access to tools through freecycling goods and services that support environmental 
projects.  
25 “Planet Craft” is a slogan he coins in his work Whole Earth Discipline: An Ecopragmatist Manifesto (2009).  
26 Marglin defines episteme as theoretical knowledge, self-evident principles, disembodied and decontextualized, 
universal knowledge, and “that which easily becomes the logic of calculation and maximization” (145).   
27 which they believe requires a “comparative approach to different socio-cultural contexts, in the framework of a 
knowledge theory of culture, describing different ways of mixing episteme and technê ; dis-embodied 
universalisms and practical body-centered intuitive competencies” 
28 This book won the John G. Cawelti Award for the best book in American Cultural Studies in 2001.  However, 
Buell’s assessment of ecocriticism was severely critiqued by several ecocritics, especially Dana Phillips in The Truth 
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of Ecology (2003), who argued that Buell reinforced several naive assumptions of early ecocriticism that tended to 
privilege nature writing and to assume it was relatively easy for writers to directly venture out into nature and 
bring it back in writing through individual and often idiosyncratic experiences (something Robert Finch called the 
natural pattern of nature writing, or the excursion).  Both Dana Philips and Robert Wess, a Burke scholar and 
ecocritic, accused early eco-criticism for indulgences in what Burke sometimes calls a “naïve verbal realism” about 
nature that refuses to realize the full extent of the role played by human constructions in shaping nature, or to 
acknowledge “symbolicity in notions of reality” (Wess, quoting Language as Symbolic Action, 5).   
29 Ten years after Ecospeak, Killingsworth argued that the study of environmental rhetoric had progressed in two 
essential directions:  one that deals with ecology and environmentalism as topics or exigencies for the forms of 
analysis mentioned above, and another approach that he says is more “holistic,” tending toward “forms of eco-
criticism” that contribute new ways of practicing rhetoric that uses ecology or ecological thought to model 
rhetorical theory and conventions29 (Coppola 226).   
30 Buell notes that ecocritics have been urged for decades to recognize that “the physical environment humans 
inhabit is not a holistic spiritual or biotic economy but a network or networks within which, on the one hand 
humans are biotically imbricated (like it or not), and within which, on the other hand, first nature has been greatly 
modified (like it or not) by technê” (45).   
31 see 1973’s “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement” p. 7 of Selected Works.   
32 This quote continues “The details of an ecosophy would show many variations due to significant differences 
concerning not only the ‘facts’ of pollution, resources, population, etc. but also value priorities.” 
33 Stating that: “A time will come in which immense programs will be needed to regulate the balance among 
ozone, carbon dioxide, and oxygen in the atmosphere.  Environmental ecology could [therefore] be easily 
requalified as machinic ecology since, both for the cosmos and for human praxis, machines are everything, and I 
would even add war machines.  Since time immemorial ‘nature’ has been at war with life!  But the acceleration of 
techno-scientific ‘progress,’ when conjugated with the enormous demographic growth of the moment, implies 
that an escape forward needs to be engaged immediately if the mechanosphere is to be controlled. (Three 
Ecologies, 66)” 
34 William Ophuls’ Plato’s Revenge (2011) and Melissa Lane’s Eco-Republic (2012) cast an argument that largely 
runs counter to Val Plumwood’s well known Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (1993) which tagged Plato’s 
famous dualisms to a logic of colonisation and hierarchy that pit spirit over matter, reason over nature, soul over 
body, etc.   
35 Roochnik’s study of Plato is one of many works charting the most consequential separation and stabilization of 
technê from other crucial concepts (most notably logos, episteme, and dunamis) during the formal emergence of 
rhetoric and philosophy. While passages from the Republic, Gorgias, Euthydemus, Hipias Minor and Protagoras 
demonstrate Socrates’ arguments that that each type of knowledge has its own dunamis or potency/potential, 
where the words dunamis, wisdom, knowledge and expertise are often used interchangeably, it is rarely seen as 
problematic to argue that Plato’s separation of philosophy and rhetoric subverted a number older ideas about 
technê largely by distinguishing them as ‘deceptive’ or ‘artificial,’  that this endured as a means to undermine 
rhetoric’s status as epistemic (or as producing ‘true’ knowledge), or that this separation has strengthened claims 
that technê and rhetoric need to be not only supplemented by, but subverted to other ‘nontechnical’ forms of 
knowledge.  As Bernard Stiegler stated in the first lines of Technics and Time, Vol I (1998), philosophy’s separation 
of technê  from episteme granted an inheritance of conflict “in which the philosopher’s episteme is pitched against 
the sophistic technê, whereby all technical knowledge is devalued” (1).  While such claims may be deliberately 
provocative, Stiegler’s announcement of this ‘inheritance of conflict’ resonates through rhetorical scholarship in 
several characteristic ways: in the field’s numerous treatments of the Classical questions of whether rhetoric is an 
art –a primary question that has animated a wide range of discussions on both rhetorical historiography and 
contemporary rhetorical theory in works by Poulakos, Bizzell, Lauer, Jarratt, McComiskey, Kerford, Marback and 
others, and in the related work ‘recovering’ Sophistic and pre-Socratic accounts of technê  to, as Ekaterina Haskins 
says, “move beyond the foundational and totalizing question of ‘What is rhetoric?’ to more inclusive and proactive 
question ‘What can a rhetoric be?’” – a question that has led to richer and more diverse accounts of technê  in 
Sophistic theories and performances grounded in different historical and cultural circumstances (i.e. Papillion, 
Jarratt, Atwill, McComiskey, Pender, Haskins) (Haskins, Professing Rhetoric, 208).  Of course, this ‘conflict’ is also 
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shaped by a much wider range of 20th century thinkers that have drawn on technê to examine or distinguish 
evolving features of technical or ‘instrumental’ knowledge formation from other forms of knowledge, most often 
knowledge associated with praxis or phronesis, and to pose new ‘technê  questions’ about wide range technical 
activities affecting political, social and intellectual life  (Dewey, Heidegger, Gadamer, Bernstein, Zimmerman, Ihde, 
Papillon, Roochnick, Mitcham, Winner, Steigler, Rotman).   
36 A selection of landmark studies and articles addressing history of rhetoric include: Berlin, James A, Susan Jarratt, 
John Schilb, and Victor J. Vitanza. "Historiography and the Histories of Rhetorics I: Revisionary 
Histories." PRE/TEXT 8 (1987): 9-152. Berlin, James A, Susan Jarratt, John Schilb, and Victor J. Vitanza. 
"Historiography and the Histories of Rhetorics II: Revisionary Histories and Ethics." PRE/TEXT 11 (1990): 169-287.  
Burke, Kenneth. Attitudes Toward History. 3rd ed. Berkeley: U of CA P, 1984. Connors, Robert. "Writing the History 
of Our Discipline."  An Introduction to Composition Studies. Ed. Erika Lindemann and Gary Tate. NY: Oxford UP, 49-
71. "Rhetorical History as a Component of Composition Studies." Rhetoric Review 7 (1989): 230-40. Jarratt, Susan.
"The First Sophists and the Uses of History." Rhetoric Review 6 (1987): 67-78.  Rereading the Sophists: Classical 
Rhetoric Refigured. Carbondale: SIUP, 1991. LaCapra, Dominick. "Rhetoric and History." In History and 
Criticism. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1985. 15-44.  Learning From the Histories of Rhetoric. Ed. Theresa Enos. Carbondale: 
SIUP, 1993.  Momigliano, Arnaldo. "The Rhetoric of History and the History of Rhetoric: On Hayden White's 
Tropes." In Comparative Criticism: A Yearbook. Ed. E. S. Shaffer. 3 (1981): 259-68. Poulakos, Takis. 
"Historiiographies of the Tradition of Rhetoric: A Brief History of Classical Funeral Orations." Western Journal of 
Speech Communication 54 (1990): 172-88. Schiappa, Edward. "The Historiography of Rhetoric: Conflicts and Their 
Implications." The Writing Instructor 8 (1988): 15-22. Streuver, Nancy. "The Study of Language and the Study of 
History." Journal of Interdisciplinary History 4 (1974): 401-15. Writing Histories of Rhetoric. Ed. Victor J. Vitanza. 
Carbondale: SIUP, 1994.(Includes Sharon Crowley, Hans Kellner, Kathleen Ethel Welch, William A. Covino, Takis 
Poulakos, John Poulakos, Janet M. Atwill, James A. Berlin, John Schilb, Lynn Worsham, Jane Sutton, Victor J. 
Vitanza.)  The diversity of topics in the history of Rhetoric today has sustained organizations including the 
American Society for the History of Rhetoric and The International Society for the History of Rhetoric.   
37 In this section, North draws a great deal from Connors’ "Historical Inquiry in Composition Studies." The Writing 
Instructor 4 (1984): 157-67. 
38 In Kennedy’s Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition (1980), Kennedy offers the technical as 
focused on handbooks, and ‘how-to’ manuals, the Sophistic as the study of the training and rhetorical 
performances of speakers of civic virtue, and the philosophic as encompassing the relationships between 
rhetorical knowledge and other forms of knowledge 
39 An approach he derives from W.B. Gallie’s philosophy. 
40 Granting that the pedagogical strand of the rhetorical tradition has some “genuine continuity,” Gross is directly 
responding to “the methods of Bizzell and Herzberg” in The Rhetorical Tradition.  See also, Richard Leo Enos in 
“Rhetorical Archaeology: Established Resources, Methodological Tools, and Basic Research Methods” where he 
argues for an archaeological analogy. 
41 In contrast to many descriptive studies of scientific knowledge formation that seek out how implicit and explicit 
‘narratives’ and ‘texts’ act as “supplements” to the material technologies developed by figures in the history of 
science, and Doyle cites Schaffer and Shapin’s study of the development of Boyle’s air pump as his example,  Doyle 
makes the case that the narratives and visuals used are not merely supplements, but “part of the network of 
power and thinking that made Boyle’s project possible” (3).  Doyle suggests that the prior view often “ignores the 
disjunctions and collaborations among technologies, rhetorical and otherwise, and thus ends up positing a 
historical agent in command of her techne” (3).   Doyle also emphasizes that rhetorics might be seen as working 
more like a contagion in scientific practices rather than as communication or representation alone.   
42 Here Doyle follows Deleuze and Guattari closely in their claim that that philosophy must be thought of in 
relation to the creation of concepts -- a relationship which grants “a history as well as a turbulent geography” that 
runs back to the “origin of phil-osophy” (What is Philosophy?, 8).   
43  They make a number of useful and fairly conventional claims about philosophy’s use of concepts, including (1) 
“concepts are not waiting for us readymade like heavenly bodies;” (2) a concept is never created in simple or 
solitary acts of “forming, inventing, or fabricating concepts, because concepts are not necessarily forms, 
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discoveries, or products;” (3) concepts hold their creators signatures (i.e. Descartes’ cogito, Leibniz’s monad, 
Bergson’s duration); (4) “although concepts are dated, signed and baptized, they have their own way of not dying 
while remaining subject to constraints of renewal, replacement, and mutation;” and (5) that we “must no longer 
accept concepts as gifts, nor merely purify and polish them, but first make and create them, present them and 
make them convincing” (Deleuze 5-8). 
44 Noting here the key repetition of this term in the fragments. 
45 Rhetoric has been particularly attentive to the recurring trope of ‘second nature’ from Aristotle’s association of 
rhetoric as part of the warring spirit that is “like second nature” to man (in The Politics 1.3.8, and the Rhetoric, 
1152a 30-32), to George Campbell’s belief that a rhetorician’s work involves negotiating the fundamental 
relationship between human nature and evidence (The Philosophy of Rhetoric vol 1), to Burke’s contention that 
man is the ‘symbol using animal’.    
46  Vickers often uses the Nietzschean term “ressentiment” to discuss the attitudes towards Bacon’s authoritative 
influence.  In emphasizing the centrality of persuasion, Vickers goes on to say:  “in effect, [Bacon’s] whole life’s 
work was dedicated to persuasion and he shows himself to be very aware of the importance of persuasive writing, 
interpreting a proverb of Solomon in The Advancement of Learning as ‘signifying the profoundness of wisdom will 
help a man to a name of admiration, but that it is eloquence that prevaileth in an active life’ (3.409)” (Francis 
Bacon and Renaissance Prose, 3).   
47 This also extends some contemporary views in Rhetoric that have tended to limit the present value of Bacon’s 
thought by constricting our sense of how radically Bacon recovered and reversed Ramus’ resistance to past ideas 
about persuasion and inventio by putting these in the service of knowing through dialectics, and his redefinition of 
rhetoric as the remaining canons, which he put back in the service of Aristotelian pedagogy – all of moves which 
distanced ‘truth’, virtue or character from the service of rhetoric.  Here I draw on “The Logic and Rhetoric of Peter 
Ramus” by Pierre Albert Duhamel, and Walter Ong’s exhaustive treatment in Ramus, Method and the Decay of 
Dialogue. It is also important that Bacon seems to have shared several of Ramus’ concerns about rhetoric, and 
delimited rhetoric in similar ways. 
48 Keeping in mind that ecology and the ‘ecologist’ are the subjects of a kind of performative naming or rhetorical 
figuration by contemporary critical and social theorists and historians [also added to intro],  the ‘ecologist’ can be 
considered a much older figure than a twentieth century persona. Daniel Graham’s entry on Heraclitus 
(Hērákleitos ho Ephésios; c. 535 – c. 475 BCE) in the Stanford Encyclopedia offers a quick impression of the 
differing interests in Heraclitus in recent times, as Graham points to studies on “a material monist or a process 
philosopher; a scientific cosmologist, a metaphysician, or a mainly religious thinker; an empiricist, a rationalist, or a 
mystic; a conventional thinker or a revolutionary; a developer of logic or one who denied the law of non-
contradiction; the first genuine philosopher or an anti-intellectual obscurantist.”  
49 See for instance: Pan’s Travail: Environmental Problems of the Ancient Greeks and Romans by J Donald Hughes 
(1994), The Ecology of the Ancient Greek World (1991) by Robert Sallares, or “Theophrastus as Ecologist” by J. 
Donald Hughes, Environmental Review: ER, Vol. 9, No. 4, Special Issue: Roots of Ecological Thought( Winter, 1985), 
pp. 296-306.  In all three Theophrastus is given special place as the ‘first ecologist’. Other examples of those 
looking for ecological ideas among the Greeks include Latour in Politics of Nature, William Ophuls in Plato’s 
Revenge, Richard Doyle’s recent reading of the Phaedrus in Darwin’s Pharmacy, Rebecca Stot’s work on Darwin’s 
debts to the ancients in Darwin’s Ghosts, Melissa Lane’s 2012 work Eco-Republic, Donald Worster’s Nature's 
Economy: A History of Ecological Ideas (1977), which tries to account for what the science of ecology looked like 
“prior to its recent ascent to oracular power” in a popular environmental movement (IX).  Worster picked up 
where Clarence Glacken left off in Traces on the Rhodian Shore: Nature and Culture In Western Thought from 
Ancient Times to the End of the 18th Century (1976), devoted particular attention to the history of the science of 
ecology, and to the environmental works of White, Linnaeus, Humboldt, Darwin, Emerson, Thoreau, Muir, Pinchot, 
and Leopold (Malone 29). 
50 William Ophuls’ Plato’s Revenge (2011) and Melissa Lane’s Eco-Republic (2012) cast an argument that largely 
runs counter to Val Plumwood’s well known Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (1993) which tagged Plato’s 
famous dualisms to a logic of colonisation and hierarchy that pit spirit over matter, reason over nature, soul over 
body, etc.  The latter reference refers of course to Bernard Alan Miller’s Rhetoric’s Earthly Realms: Heidegger, 
Sophistry, and the Gorgian Kairos (2011) 
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51 Keyser, P. and Georgia L. Irby-Massie (eds.), 2007, The Routledge Biographical Encyclopedia of Ancient Natural 
Science, Oxford: Routledge. 
52 Castells points to 19th century figures like Malthus, Darwin, and others, as well as the American Audubon Society.  
He makes the following comparisons about ecological thought and environmental action:  By environmentalism I 
refer to all forms of collective behavior that, in their discourse and in their practice, aim at correcting destructive 
forms of relationship between human action and its natural environment, in opposition to the prevailing structural 
and institutional logic. By ecology, in my sociological approach, I understand a set of beliefs, theories, and projects 
that consider humankind as a component of a broader ecosystem and wish to maintain the system’s balance in a 
dynamic, evolutionary perspective.  In my view, environmentalism is ecology in practice, and ecology 
is environmentalism in theory (171). 
53 There is a point of difference between Heidegger and Nietzsche on his ‘uniqueness’ in Greek thought that is now 
a mainstay of classicist scholarship on pre-Socratic thought (from Greek scholars such as Diels, Rienhardt, Frankel, 
Snell, Gignon, Kirk, Marcovich, Robinson, and Kahn).  There are various perspectives on the distinctiveness of his 
related ‘doctrines’ (and disputes about whether these are doctrines) of the unity of opposites, of logos, flux, and 
the common, but there is some general agreement that Heraclitus is a pioneer of a unique brand of pre-Socratic 
wisdom (ix) 
54 On Nature is of course the noted (and suspected) names of several works important works of ancient Greek 
philosophy, most notably by Anaximander, Epicurus, Parmenides, Heraclitus, and Gorgias. 
55 See Detienne’s arguments in The Origins of Greek Thought, pg 49-56  
56 By and large, there are three types of rhetorical interpretations that scaffold readings of Heraclitus in recent 
decades.  The first is the enduring propensity among classicists to study On Nature as a kind of commonplace book 
offering fragments of his aphoristic wisdom that enabled many arguments on interrelated themes of social and 
natural change, politics, and ethics.   The second approach stems from philosophers, deep ecologists and 
philologists making the case that analyzing Heraclitus’ rhetorical tropes and grammatical innovations is a crucial 
path to understanding his method and its relationship to the production of meaning.  These approaches see his 
method as hinging on an antagonistic response to other forms of understanding nature, an insistence on paradox 
and other paragrammatical forms, an inauguration of dialectical inquiry as integral to his model of truth, and a 
slant on technê as fundamental to his inquiry into nature’s Logos.  A third approach stems from scholarship in 
Rhetoric proper, and typically uses Heraclitus’ fragments of principles and doctrines to trace a genealogy of vital 
Sophistic concepts like logos and kairos (Schiappa, Poster, Helm, Miller, Jarratt).   
57 Rhetoric has been particularly attentive to the recurring trope of ‘second nature’ from Aristotle’s association of 
rhetoric as part of the warring spirit that is “like second nature” to man (in The Politics 1.3.8, and the Rhetoric, 
1152a 30-32), to George Campbell’s belief that a rhetorician’s work involves negotiating the fundamental 
relationship between human nature and evidence (The Philosophy of Rhetoric vol 1), to Burke’s contention that 
man is the ‘symbol using animal’.    
58 F. M. Conford uses the term the ‘Greek Miracle’ to mark the emergence of Greek science and of “rationality” as 
mythos and a mythological world view gave way to logos as a desire to formulate “an intelligible representation or 
account (logos) of the world, rather than the laws of the sequence of causes and effects in time—a logos to take 
the place of mythoi” (144). See also the work of Kōnstantinos P. Rhodokan on the idea of the ‘Greek Miracle.” 
59 For example, Heraclitus’ tenet that the same thing could both ‘be and not be at the same time,’ which prompted 
Aristotle’s arguments in the Metaphysics for a first philosophy or ontology with primary substances and first 
principles (and the firmest first principle of non-contradiction).  Among numerous examples, we see: It is by 
disease that health is pleasant; by evil that good is pleasant; by hunger, satiety; by weariness, rest." "To God all 
things are beautiful, good, and right; men, on the other hand, deem some things right and others wrong." "Doctors 
cut, burn, and torture the sick, and then demand of them an undeserved fee for such services." "The way up and 
the way down are one and the same." "It is one and the same thing to be living or dead, awake or asleep, young or 
old. The former aspect in each case becomes the latter, and the latter again the former, by sudden unexpected 
reversal." "The name of the bow is life, but its work is death." 
60 and our most stinging critiques  of  false positivism or negative dialectics that obsessed Adorno 
61 From Miller’s reading of Hegel in Encyclopedia on “The Philosophy of Nature.”   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
200 
62 beginning in earnest with Plato’s preference for determining the necessary qualities of physical objects and 
transhistorical concepts, 
63 Granger, Guthrie, and Kahn make similar arguments, but here I cite:  Hartnack, Justus; Lars Aagaard-Mogensen, 
Translator (1998). An Introduction to Hegel's Logic. Hackett Publishing. pp. 16–17.  Hartnack quotes 
Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy Volume I. 
64 This argument begins in the co-authored chapter “Ecosophy T: from intuition to system” in the 1989 work 
Ecology, Community, and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy 
65Devall and Sessions summarized an eight tier platform that Rothenberg and Naess were working to expand (70). 
1. The well-being and flourishing of human and nonhuman life on Earth have value in themselves
(synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent value). These values are independent of the usefulness of the 
nonhuman world for human purposes. 
2. Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these values and are also values in
themselves. 
3. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital human needs.
4. The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantial decrease of the human
population. The flourishing of nonhuman life requires such a decrease.
5. Present human interference with the nonhuman world is excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening.
6. Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect basic economic, technological, and ideological
structures. The resulting state of affairs will be deeply different from the present.
7. The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating life quality (dwelling in situations of inherent value)
rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of
the difference between big and great.
8. Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to try to implement
the necessary changes.
66 See: Krabbe, Erik C W (2010). "Arne Næss (1912-2009).” Argumentation 24 (4): 529. doi:10.1007/s10503-010-
9188-.  See Rothenberg’s book Hand’s End: Technology and the Limits of Nature 
67 For Rothenberg, logos and techne seem to serve an explanatory function in Heraclitus’ fragments, presenting 
novel and challenging ideas about the inseparability of natural, social, and subjective change.  He argues that 
Heraclitus thought this kind of explanation was a challenge that eluded language at the time, but became apparent 
only when thinking about action, processes of making, or simple technologies, arguing that Heraclitus insists 
“human language is itself strained and stretched when it is made to tackle such vast and vaporous concepts as the 
logos” and “to bring this abstract omnipresence within our reach, he analogizes from the realm of familiar tools 
which do not scare us... he needs images from the world of techne” (3).   The famous bow and lyre fragment reads:  
“They do not understand: how that which separates unites with itself. It is a harmony of oppositions, as in the case 
of the bow and of the lyre”(P45, Patrick: http://www.classicpersuasion.org/pw/heraclitus/herpate.htm) 
68 Kahn’s translation, fragment 77, pg 65 
69 ... as he ultimately sets Heraclitus aside as something like a prehistoric ecological thinker to pursue a study of 
subsequent thinkers promoting “deep technology” he hoped would support “deeper ecology” by proving that 
different thinkers have made it possible to “look at nature as a machine [although] the meaning of the machinery 
changes consistently though history [...and] that certain technologies seem to express a yearning towards nature 
itself through its ‘latent language’” 
70 or Simplicious’ commentary in the first book of Aristotle’s Physics, which is the oldest text on pre-Socratic 
teachings 
71 Gadamer uses the phrases “continual” and “persistent challenge” to mark a distinct trend from those ‘wasps 
discerning their favourite flavor’ in Heraclitus, a trend that was instead for Gadamer an example of “effective 
history” (Wirkungsgeschichte), a reception history that captures how Heraclitus “exists” both in the primary voices 
situated in their hermeneutical contexts, and in receptions that have stirred some to catalogue or clarify his 
principle tenets, and others to affirm some “unparalleled clarity” in Heraclitus’ voice for the intellectual and 
cultural concerns of their own day.  Perhaps the main reason Heraclitus has been so provocative is because he has 
been regularly thought of as the ‘obscure’ figure among the Pre-Socratics (or as Diogenes Laertius asserted, ‘the 
riddler,’ ainiktes).   By the time of Cicero, Heraclitus was routinely cast as “the Dark of Epheseus” because his view 
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on nature and his brand of wisdom had simply become “too obscure”(De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, Chapter 2, 
Section 15.).  .  The obscurity of Heraclitus was determined as he was defined against virtually every other 
advancing school of thought (Sophistic, Milesian, Pythagorean, Atomist, and Pluralist), against positions in 
philosophy, science and religion.  The Catholic Church also made an ideological separation in a sacred conception 
of logos that was distinguished from a Heraclitean logos deemed as pagan.   Besides these commanding heights 
that determine much of the ‘obscurity’ of his thought, Heraclitus’ own difficult style is notorious, and has 
contributed significantly to both the allure and the challenge of retrieving Heraclitus.   
72 Classicists like Charles Kahn have been drawn to Heraclitus as part of an rival historical trend revaluing Heraclitus 
then tends to look for types of “intellectual unity” in receptions of Heraclitus that extend beyond the “fullest 
accounts” of Heraclitus’ doctrine that come through Plato or Aristotle (via Theophrastus) (Kahn 6-7).   Kahn reads 
Heraclitus “dialogically” through a “chain of statements, interlocking ideas, imagery and verbal echoes” that is 
“greater than his archaic poem, since its final intent was more explicitly didactic, and its central theme a direct 
affirmation of unity: hen panta einai, ‘all things are one’” (Kahn 6).  Thinkers as diverse historically and 
philosophically as Bacon, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida and Deleuze, have all shared an interest in 
securing Heraclitus as evidence of a lucid thinker in his own right, a thinker who, as the classicist Charles Kahn 
simply put it, reflected “upon the order of nature and man’s place within it, upon the problems of language, 
meaning and communication [in ways which] still seem profound” (Kahn ix).   
73 Heraclitus and Derrida: Presocratic Deconstruction (2005) 
74 his study of the emergence of philosophical discourse is Presocratic Reflexivity: The Construction of Philosophical 
Discourse C. 600-450 Bc, Volume 3.  While granting logos as special place in his work (while maintaining its status 
as a philosophical and rhetorical aporia), he looks to understand Heraclitus’ method through five main rhetorical 
innovations: an adversarial code that served as a polemical device, an alethic code that insists on a version of the 
truth and plays with verbal devices to mark truth and inquiry together, a logos code which (for Sandywell) insists 
on ‘listening’ to physis, a paragramatic code of “ambivalent symbols, antithesis, and paradoxes,” and the 
dialectical code “concerned with the elaboration of dialectical oppositions” (256-7).   Sandywell insists that it the 
interplay of elements of this rhetoric “should effect a change ... his listeners commensurate with the vision it 
recounts,” remembering that for Heraclitus the “invisible harmonie/harmonia is better than the visible” (Fr. 54) 
(Sandywell 257).  The main insight Sandywell offers in an analysis of five ‘rhetorical codes’ is perhaps more 
gainfully read as an overview and arrangement of Heraclitean ‘tropes’ rather than codes, as  the emphasis this 
places on change or direction for future thinkers makes more sense.   
75 ‘tropes’ might be more appropriate given the emphasis this places on change or direction for future thinkers 
76 For one etymology see Watkins, Calvert (2000). "Appendix I: Indo-European Roots: leg-.” The American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language: Fourth Edition. 
77 Though Brann’s book is very fast and loose with claims by comparison to Kahn’s more thorough and well-
documented study I started with here. 
78 It should be noted that Brann’s book is fast and loose with logos by comparison to Kahn’s more thorough and 
well-documented study, which I draw on more frequently here. 
79 On Nature is of course the noted (and suspected) names of several works important works of ancient Greek 
philosophy, most notably by Anaximander, Epicurus, Parmenides and Heraclitus. 
80 In one sense, this is a simple assertion of general agreement among classicists and philologists that his fragments 
have a literal starting point, but it also challenges those who have interpreted Heraclitus’ wisdom construed solely 
as aphorisms or as riddles to be interpreted in almost any way, by grounding a case that such interpretations don’t 
fully appreciate how, as Kahn said, Heraclitus “has many strings to his bow; he does not always speak in riddles or 
aphorisms. Among the quotations are four or five long passages of several connected sentences, and perhaps most 
significantly, fragment 1 is a carefully wrought poem, which suggests the beginning of a well planned book” (Kahn 
7).    
81 He seems to use terms like ‘fighting’ regularly in terms of how he establishes his own method and for something 
inherent to the method he preaches.  For instance, 100 states that “The people should fight for their law as if 
defending the city's wall” while he makes the claim “It is harder to fight pleasure than to fight emotion,” as quoted  
by Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics, Book III. 
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82  To say that Heraclitus ‘tames’ emerging modes of rationality is to maintain some reliable tensions about what 
we know about Heraclitus’ own re-appropriation of logos as a concept.  On one hand Heraclitus adamantly 
rejected “polumathiê or information-gathering on the grounds that it ‘does not teach understanding,” treating 
“the epic poets as fools and calling Pythagoras a fraud” (Barnes 40).  On the other hand he took the mathematical 
theorems of Pythagoras as having “pursued ‘scientific’ investigation further than other men” and he seemed to 
draw on his mathematical articulation of the one and the dyad82 as establishing the possibility of his own notion of 
logos as an initial (and always misunderstood) “account” of physis, and as “the beginning of strife” (Burnet 31-2).    
82  Nietzsche stressed that Heraclitus’ logos could only be illuminated in by thinking of it in relation to two 
“connected negations” or “refusals”:  one mainly in response to Anaximander, which rejected any complete 
separation of physical and metaphysical realms and refused to completely separate ideas about what is from their 
effects on social realms, and a second mainly in response to Parmenides, which fundamentally refused to accept 
being as the crucial category for knowledge. David Roochnik in Retrieving the Ancients paints the broadest stroke 
of Heraclitus’ appeals for many of these thinkers, saying: “With a single, insanely bold stroke, Heraclitus of 
Ephesus…resolved the crisis of Milesian philosophy: he eliminated Being” (Roochnik 32).   For Roochnik, Heraclitus 
solves the incessant problem of the interaction of being/becoming in Milesian philosophy, that is gripped with the 
problem of how a fundamental property (of Being) interacts with all derivations of this (all things Becoming) by 
doing away with Being absolutely, leaving all reality in an unremitting state of flux.  Nietzsche stressed that 
Heraclitus’ logos could only be illuminated in by thinking of it in relation to two “connected negations” or 
“refusals”:  one mainly in response to Anaximander, which rejected any complete separation of physical and 
metaphysical realms and refused to completely separate ideas about what is from their effects on social realms, 
and a second mainly in response to Parmenides, which fundamentally refused to accept being as the crucial 
category for knowledge. David Roochnik in Retrieving the Ancients paints the broadest stroke of Heraclitus’ 
appeals for many of these thinkers, saying: “With a single, insanely bold stroke, Heraclitus of Ephesus…resolved 
the crisis of Milesian philosophy: he eliminated Being” (Roochnik 32).   For Roochnik, Heraclitus solves the 
incessant problem of the interaction of being/becoming in Milesian philosophy, that is gripped with the problem of 
how a fundamental property (of Being) interacts with all derivations of this (all things Becoming) by doing away 
with Being absolutely, leaving all reality in an unremitting state of flux. 
83 Best known from Plato’s Thaetetus (152e) (although there are those who see no historical relationship between 
the two figures), the contrast to Parmenides’ focus on a stable being and unchangeable substances as the ‘nature 
of things,’ is often contrasted also to Aristotle’s similar ontology and categorical approach to a vast range of topics.  
In response to the more abstracted and deterministic philosophies of Anaximander and Parmenides, the emphasis 
on flux and fire was not a lawlessness or nihilistic for Nietzsche, but an affirmation that understanding of ‘nature’ 
could work with another set of constraints and contingencies tied to social and subjective change (Nietzsche PTAG 
51). 
84 This is a perspective that lines up with the work of Gerard Naddaf’s work on The Greek Concept of Nature. 
85 As Herbert Granger argued in “Heraclitus’ Quarrel with Polymathy and Historie,” (the “inquiry” of the histore 
marking a shift in Greek scholarship that took prosaic histories to new standards) 
86  By and large, these paradoxes opened up two possible courses for understandings initially, a basic division 
which Luhmann again described aptly as the “Greek invention of paradox at the beginning of serious second-order 
observing” which established “two different even contradictory uses, the one logical, the other rhetorical. The 
logical tradition tries to suppress the paradox... the rhetorical tradition ...introduced paradoxical statements to 
enlarge frames of received opinions ... to prepare the ground for innovation and/or the acceptance of suggested 
decisions (“Paradoxy” 38).   Heraclitus’ tenet that ‘the same thing could both be and not be at the same time86’ 
became one of the first sign-posts for both traditions, and charts a well-travelled path leading to the Metaphysics 
and Aristotle’s arguments for a first philosophy with primary substances and first principles, including of course the 
firmest first principle of non-contradiction.  While Heraclitus clearly influenced great debates about what it meant 
for the human ability to “correctly” speak about nature, his paradoxes were just as clearly meant to distinguish and 
encourage his own Brannd of innovative thinking from the pursuits of knowledge he sought to tame, and to 
establish some acceptance of contradictions that might help avert his audience from these serious crises of 
thinking, while setting a course to advance towards his own wisdom and notions of truth.  R.M. Sainsbury would 
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diagnose in his study of paradoxes as simply establishing a need to address certain contradictions as true and 
acceptable.  See Paradoxes, 2nd edition p 135-144 
87 From The Fragments of the Work of Heraclitus of Ephesus on Nature, translated from the Greek text  by G.T.W. 
Patrick, Baltimore: N. Murray, 1889. This was originally Patrick's doctoral thesis at Johns Hopkins University, 1888. 
A note states that this 1889 edition was reprinted from the American Journal of Psychology, 1888. 
88 Here John Burnet points to DK fragments 18 and 45: (18) Of all whose discourses I have heard, there is not one 
who attains to understanding that wisdom is apart from all. R.P. 32 b. (19) Wisdom is one thing. It is to know the 
thought by which all things are steered through all things. R.P. 40. 
89 see: Martin Heidegger and Eugen Fink, Heraclitus Seminar 1966/67, Charles H. Seibert, trans. (University, 
Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1979), pp. 74-76. 
90 See Detienne’s The Masters of Truth in Ancient Greece 
91 “What intelligence or understanding do they [the people] have?” asks Heraclitus. “They follow popular bards and 
treat the crowd as their instructor, not realizing that the many are base, while the few are noble” (B104). 
92 ‘An unapparent connection (harmonia) is stronger than an apparent one’ (B54). 
93 At least “technological” in the ancient sense of Rothenberg was after in his claim about Heraclitus’ techne 
94 which is often interpreted as form of elitism and distrust of the multitude, most often by focusing on his political 
comments that “one good man is worth ten thousand ordinary” in terms of political leadership (B49) 
95 For instance he reproaches his a group of citizens for banishing a distinguished leader: 
“The adult citizens of Ephesus should hang themselves, every one, and leave the city to children, since they have 
banished Hermodorus, a man pre-eminent among them, saying, Let no one stand out among us; or let him stand 
out elsewhere among others” (B121) 
96 Barnes’ translation.  See Haxton’s translation also: “Since mindfulness, of all things, is the ground of being, to 
speak one’s true mind, and to keep things known in common, serves all being, just as laws made clear uphold the 
city, yet with greater strength.  Of all pronouncements of the law the one source is the Word whereby we choose 
what helps true mindfulness prevail” (Haxton pg 59, fr 91). 
97 This is not only evident in the antagonism to science or histore discussed above, but in Heraclitus’ insistence that 
a value of written knowledge as public “intelligence” must effectively combine both speaking and action. The 
aphorisms of On Nature were of course written to be remembered and repeated, but he also urges his readers to 
be wary of emerging forms of written knowledge as problematic for the wisdom he promotes (missing source?).    
98 Keep in mind that Heraclitus thought there could be a type of justice associated with strife and ‘war’ as the 
common condition of humanity, one that can and should be perceived across natural, social and personal 
processes or  forms (keeping in mind that the Greek concept form comes from much earlier than the attested 
theory of forms or ideas that Plato abstracted largely in response to Heraclitus, and that ‘form’ is etymologically 
rooted in a number of terms having to do with vision, sight or appearance.  See:  Watt, Stephen (1997). 
"Introduction: The Theory of Forms (Books 5-7).” Plato: Republic. London: Wordsworth Editions. pp. xiv–xvi 
99 In Place, Commonality, Judgment: Continental Philosophy and the Ancient Greeks,  Andrew Benjamin makes a 
comparable claim as he traced back continental philosophy to Heraclitus’ original concern with place and 
commonality, which is cast in terms as designating “as much an original condition as they do a network of activity” 
(29).  While he oddly prefers the term “relational ontology” to mark Heraclitus’ emphasis thinking through 
networks of exchanges, place and commonality, Benjamin’s interest in Heraclitus as a point of entry into a history 
of continental philosophy is similar to my own in the sense that he sees Heraclitus initiating the task of 
differentiating the human relationally from the task of distinguishing the human as a “non-relational singularity” 
(31).  I also share Benjamin’s conclusion that “thinking” after Heraclitus becomes a task that takes up questions in 
complex forms of relations, from thinking of life in relation to death:  “What awaits men (anthropous) at death 
they do not know or even imagine (dokeoisi)” (DK 27), to thinking about what is present at the time only in relation 
to what is possible or “imagined” in the future (31).   
100 Given the fragmentary accounts of Heraclitus’ central poem that remain, to claim that Heraclitus’ thought is 
“systematic,” Kahn argues that: the intellectual unity of Heraclitus’s composition was in a sense greater than that 
of any archaic poem, since its final intent was more explicitly didactic, and its central theme a direct affirmation of 
unity: hen panta einai, ‘all things are one.’  The content of this perfectly general formula seems to have been filled 
in by a chain of statements linked together not by logical argument but by interlocking ideas, imagery and verbal 
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echoes.  Theophrastus found the result ‘incomplete and inconsistent,’ but he was looking for a prosaic exposition of 
physical theories (6).    
101 David Metzer, in The Lost Cause of Rhetoric101, calls these “pardigmatic” of genealogical approaches attempting 
to (re)define rhetoric or rethink the history of rhetoric.  While admiring a number of ‘reclaimed’ rhetorical 
traditions (like Susan Jarratt’s Rereading the Sophists), he cautions against the vaguely “utopian” genealogies that 
“chase after the possibilities of what rhetoric can be, by questioning what it once was,” specifically citing this as 
the kind of exploration that runs all the way back to the earliest “paradigm” that starts with the emergence of 
‘known rhetoric’ vis-à-vis “Heraclitean rhetoric” that is “unknown” (xi, 87).     
102 See Schiappa pg 92, and Poster pg 2. A recent thread that runs from Schiappa’s Protagoras and Logos (2003), to 
Carol Poster’s “The Task of the Bow” (2006), to Jason Helms’ response “The Task of the Name” (2008)102 makes 
several arguments for renewed attention to Heraclitus in rhetoric.  Helms and Poster initially hitch their wagon to 
Schiappa’s interest in Heraclitus’ influence on Protagoras, where he makes a case for thinking about Heraclitus an 
early ‘rhetorical’ theorist.  Schiappa used Heraclitus as a key figure to “triangulate” some of the harder to pin down 
concepts or meanings in Protagoras’s texts, making comparisons by “using the pre-Protagorean sources of Homer 
and Heraclitus on one side and the post-Protagorean writings of Plato and Aristotle on the other” (34).  When 
Schiappa studies Heraclitus’ bearing on Protagoras, he mostly suggests some straightforward influence and 
resemblances: the adoption of a writing style marked by the rhythm of “self-contained sayings ‘designed for 
memorization’” (much like the treatment of On Nature as a commonplace book mentioned above), a style marked 
be “linguistic density” (choice of words with multiple meanings), and “resonance” (writing in fragments or 
aphorisms that carry significance that can only be fully appreciated when taken in terms of how it ‘resonates with 
others), as well as significant differences, such as “generally railing against the poets (as in Heraclitus) to critically 
analyzing and evaluating their work (as in Protagoras)” (34, 57).  Schiappa draws these connections largely by 
taking Heraclitus’s work as a commonplace book that shaped the first Sophists’ privileging of logos over a mythic-
poetic tradition, which for Schiappa argues marks the Sophists as transitional figures which were still heavily 
influenced by this pre-Socratic tradition (58).  Schiappa argues that the neglect of Heraclitus by most contemporary 
rhetoricians has been due anachronistic assumptions about disciplinarity on “predisciplinary” ancient thought , 
especially about definitions of “philosophy,” “sophistic,” and “rhetoric” which were much more fluid than rigidly 
demarcated in antiquity (Poster 1).   
103 p. 241, The Philosophical Works of Francis Bacon, Edited with an Introduction by John M. Robertson.  This is
from the preface to the Magna Instauratio or Great Instauration 
104 notably his 1620 work Magna Instauratio or “grand edifice” which was never finished 
105 Margery Purvers citing Instauration Magna, Distrubution Operis: Works, vol. IV, in The Royal Society: concept 
and creation. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1967. Print. 
106 Montaigne was one of the first to comment specifically on Bacon as initiating a “ruse” of mastery as a type of 
master trope, principle or a general theory of science he brought to bear on all Brannches of knowledge, 
philosophy and natural history.  While often complimentary of each other, Montaigne mentions this “ruse” as a 
synecdoche for several points of differing opinion on the character and value of human experiences of nature, on 
inductive reasoning, on naturalism, and on the role of humanist and metaphysical interpretations of Aristotle, who 
Montaigne thought already formulated this “ancient ruse” in such a way that was “not amisse, to bend nature as a 
wand, to a contrary extreame, whereby to set it right” (Essay XXVI, Montaigne III, X).   See pages 32-3 of Montaigne 
Et Francois Bacon, by Pierre Villey.  I draw these distinctions in the literature review below.  
107 See The Mechanization of Natural Philosophy edited by Sophie Roux, Daniel Garber, pages 12 -13 for a typical 
argument for Bacon in the tradition of mechanical philosophy 
108 The ‘blackmail’ of Bacon is an idea given most heft by Adorno and Horkheimer, who argued that “since Bacon” 
technoscience could manage without such categories as “substance and quality, activity and suffering, being and 
existence” as appropriate to the times, since, after Bacon “from now on matter was to be controlled without the 
illusion of immanent powers or hidden properties” (3).  For Foucault’s argument see: “What is Enlightenment?”   
109  Vickers and Soble present similar defenses, but Nieves Matthews outlined these debates in the most 
painstaking detail, pointing to a history of character assassination by Lord Macaulay, to James Spedding’s defense, 
she traces a remarkable biography of his character, defending all accusations that he was a “blinkered careerist” 
(409).  For a useful overview of how long these ‘vicissitudes’ seem to affect receptions of Bacon in recent decades, 
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see also the review “Bacon and the Menace of English Lit” in March 27, 1969, by Frances A. Yates in the New York 
Times review of books. 
110 See Richards, Robert J. The Romantic Conception of Life: Science and Philosophy. University of Chicago Press. 
p. 544.  
111 And Matthews does indeed note that defenses of Bacon have also valued the role and responsibility he grants 
to rhetoric (noting Vickers especially).  See pages 418 -424 of Francis Bacon: The History of Character 
Assassination.  
112  Vickers often uses the Nietzschean term “ressentiment” to discuss the attitudes towards Bacon’s authoritative 
influence.  In emphasizing the centrality of persuasion, Vickers goes on to say:  “in effect, [Bacon’s] whole life’s 
work was dedicated to persuasion and he shows himself to be very aware of the importance of persuasive writing, 
interpreting a proverb of Solomon in The Advancement of Learning as ‘signifying the profoundness of wisdom will 
help a man to a name of admiration, but that it is eloquence that prevaileth in an active life’ (3.409)” (Francis 
Bacon and Renaissance Prose, 3).   
113 Jardine, Vickers, Zappen, Briggs, Olmsted, Wallace, Howell, Cunningham, Miller and others have studied Bacon’s 
famous method as a complex mix of a ‘new natural philosophy’ and an innovative rhetoric definitively advancing 
theories and events in the history of science and rhetoric from the early modern to the late Renaissance period.  
However, as Vickers argued, the serviceable studies of Francis Bacon’s contributions to rhetoric pale in comparison 
to the important place occupied by rhetoric in Bacon's career , stating: “there are three book-length studies 
frequently cited: Karl R. Wallace's pioneering study, Francis Bacon on Communication and Rhetoric, Lisa Jardine's 
revised Cambridge dissertation, Francis Bacon: Discovery and the Art of Discourse, and the overall history by W. S. 
Howell, Jr., Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700. There are also some shorter essays, of varying value.' But it 
is not being unkind to say that none of these offers a satisfactory account of either Bacon's theory or practice of 
rhetoric. In some cases major emphases in Bacon's theory have simply not been registered, or were 
misunderstood. In others, the writers' evaluation of Bacon was adversely affected by their general conception of 
rhetoric, and the place it held in European intellectual life”(200, Cambridge Comp.).  In recent decades however we 
have seen numerous connections between Bacon and philosophies of technology (i.e. the collection edited in 2008 
by Zittel, Engel, Nanni and Karafyllis) which make numerous other new contributions to Bacon scholarship and to 
histories of rhetoric interested in his theories of invention.  
114 A figure of speech in which an absent or imaginary person is represented as speaking. 
115 This also extends some contemporary views in Rhetoric that have tended to limit the present value of Bacon’s 
thought by constricting our sense of how radically Bacon recovered and reversed Ramus’ resistance to past ideas 
about persuasion and inventio by putting these in the service of knowing through dialectics, and his redefinition of 
rhetoric as the remaining canons, which he put back in the service of Aristotelian pedagogy – all of moves which 
distanced ‘truth,’ virtue or character from the service of rhetoric.  Here I draw on “The Logic and Rhetoric of Peter 
Ramus” by Pierre Albert Duhamel, and Walter Ong’s exhaustive treatment in Ramus, Method and the Decay of 
Dialogue. It is also important that  Bacon seems to have shared several of Ramus’ concerns about rhetoric, and 
delimited rhetoric in similar ways... 
116 The first line of critique, probably the most well-known in recent decades, took on Bacon for “infusing vicious 
sexual metaphors into modern science at its very beginning” which became “instrumental in its ascent” (Soble on 
Harding, 453).  This of course proved a worthy entry point into feminist concerns about science, but also motivated 
a more unfortunate turn that gained “added support from environmentalists seeking the origin of our current 
ecological crisis” (Vickers on Merchant, 118).   
117 (Solomon and Martin 14-15). 
118 Here is cites Bacon’s Novum, 3, 29, 39, 118, 29 (respectively).  The ellipsis here remove the following 
parenthetical: “(this crude and questionable figuring being the result of, and sanctioned by, Soper’s rhetoric).”  
Desroche’s defense is against Merchant, Harding, and Soper’s readings of Bacon 
119 Both Vickers and Keroetge wrote early defenses and selected aphorisms from Novum Organum that are 
frequently repeated:   
(I)  Man, being the servant and interpreter of Nature, can do and understand so much only as he has observed in 
fact or in thought of the course of nature…  
(III)….Nature to be commanded must be obeyed  
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(IV) Towards the effecting of works, all that man can do is to put together or put asunder natural bodies.  The rest is 
done by nature working within (4:47).    
Following Vickers, Kroetge uses Sedding and Ellis’ The Works of Francis Bacon, 14 vols.  
120 For Desroche this tension runs throughout Bacon’s philosophy:  “What is given with one (rhetorical) hand is 
taken back by the other: if Bacon figures the interrogation of nature as a race to be won, it can only be won by 
being lost; as a thing to be chased, it can only be caught by waiting patiently for it” (17).   As he continues: 
“Perhaps most important here, however, is the degree to which the second statement does not simply counter the 
first, but also functions entirely otherwise to it—to juxtapose the figure of a race, and the victory it implies, with 
the figure of the harvest, where the stakes have changed entirely, is to render deeply ambivalent the very rhetoric 
of victory, violence, etc., that scholars almost exclusively dwell upon when discussing Bacon’s conception of the 
relation between nature and science.”  Desroches then asks us to consider the following example: “one of the 
most fraught of rhetorical moments concerning nature in Bacon’s text, from Aphorism 117: ‘For I do not run off 
like a child after golden apples, but stake all on the victory of art over nature in the race. Nor do I make haste to 
mow down the moss or the corn in blade, but wait for the harvest in its due season.’ 
121 replacing the ‘old nature’ organically unfolding its potential (xiii).  
122 Briggs contributes an integral part of the equation in Bacon’s rhetoric of mastery, and he takes a few steps away 
from “Vickers, Richter, and Harrison [who] stress mainly the power of his imaginative prose” by establishing a 
central role for rhetoric in defining scientific discovery as a particular form of religious revelation requiring a 
strenuous reading of nature, which he thinks is not unlike the rhetorical act of reading into Bacon’s mountain of 
text.   
123 “Francis Bacon and the Mobility of Science,” 
124 (to use James Zappen’s term).   
125 See Bacon's Essays: and Wisdom of the Ancients, p 410 and the essay “Icarus and Scylla and Charybdis, or The 
Middle Way” 
126 As Bacon said in Book One of the The Advancement “For no perfect discovery can be made upon a flat or a 
level; neither is it possible to discover the more remote and deeper parts of any science if you stand but upon the 
level of the same science, and ascend not to a higher science” (V.5).   
127 (again here he’s following James Stephens) 
128 -- such as the promotion of a technocratic ethos (that Vico rejected) or the ways that Bacon’s “art of inquiry into 
nature” seemed to insist that “one must resort to force to obtain the answer desired, that nature must be 'put to 
the rack,’ which Leibniz (or Cassirer much later) tried to temper with more formal logic (Pesic, 82).  Hobbes, to 
state just one more weighty example, drew brilliantly from his work with Bacon in many respects, but as Marx put 
it, Hobbes may have most effectively severed Bacon’s unique combination of “rational methods” and “keen 
interest in impulse, vital force or … pain of matter” by turning this into something “one-sided” by parsing out 
Baconian politics, and systematizing this Brannd of science and materialism so “sensuousness loses its bloom and 
is turned into the abstract sensuousness of geometry.”  Peter Pesic’s “Wrestling with Proteus: Francis Bacon and 
the ‘Torture’ of Nature” (1999) points to Leibnitz as the first to accuse Bacon of inaugurating metaphors of 
torturing nature (1696) by “putting it on the rack” with these new forms of discovery and invention that opened 
the door to experimental science.  Pesic levels a defense against this claim first by contending that at least “one 
prong of Bacon’s rhetorical program was a polemic against science,” and then arguing that Bacon’s quest for truth 
“envisions a struggle that tests the nobility of both the seeker and of nature,” a fundamental struggle that Leibnitz 
neglects because he undervalued how Bacon “sought to present his vision of a new science [as part of] a complex 
rhetorical problem” (82-83).    Marx comments are from “England and Materialist Philosophy”  Labour Monthly, 
August 1923, pp. 105-113, “Further Selection from the Literary Remains of Karl Marx,” translated and annotated by 
Max Beer; Original German: Aus dem literarischen nachlass von Marx und Engels, Vol. II, pp. 225-240;Transcribed: 
by Ted Crawford.    For Marx, Hobbes’ revision of Bacon is the historical point where “materialism is rationalised, 
and it develops also the ruthless logicality of reason.”  Similarly, Engels would argue later in his Dialectics of Nature 
that many of the British followers of Bacon had drawn the furthest extremes from his thought, saying that while 
the German philosophies of nature had tried to force the objective world into the framework of its subjective 
thought, these followers of Bacon had  succumbed to “the opposite trend, which, relying on mere experience, 
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treats thought with sovereign disdain and really has gone to the furthest extreme in emptiness of thought” 
(“Natural Science and the Spirit World”).  
129 For a rich discussion on this relationship, one shedding new light on a number of recent assessments of Hobbes 
in political and cultural theory, see Hobbes and the Making of Modern Political Thought by Gordon Hull (especially , 
9-15 for this reference). 
130Paolo Rossi’s, “Ants, Spiders and Epistemolotists” in Terminologia e Fortuna (1984),  Martin Hollis “Ant’s, Spiders 
and Bees: A Third Way” (1994), and Muntersbjorn’s “Francis Bacon’s Philosophy of Science: Machina Intellectus 
and Forma Indita (2003) 
131 This is most recently translated and discussed by Madelaine Muntersborn, using Bacon, Francis ([1620] 
1994), Novum Organum, Peter Urbach and John Gibson (trans. and eds.). Chicago: Open Court. 
132 See The Order of Things 
133 Bacon's Plan of the Work runs as follows (Bacon IV [1901], 22): 
The Divisions of the Sciences. 
The New Organon; or Directions concerning the Interpretation of Nature. 
The Phenomena of the Universe; or a Natural and Experimental History for the foundation of Philosophy. 
The Ladder of Intellect. 
The Forerunners; or Anticipations of the New Philosophy. 
The New Philosophy; or Active Science. 
From:  Klein, Jürgen, "Francis Bacon,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/francis-bacon/>. 
134 ars inveniendi adolescit cum inventis, which is of course sometimes translated as “I regard that the mind, not 
only in its own faculties, but in its connection with things, must needs hold that the art of discovery may advance 
as discoveries advance.” See in particular the multiple authored “The Most Significant Passage on Rhetoric in the 
Works of Francis Bacon” (1996) where Cogan, O’Rourke, Zappen, Sloane, Abbot and Dube lay similar claims. 
135 See page 30-1 of Invention in Rhetoric and Composition, and Gross and Walzer’s Rereading Aristotle’s Rhetoric. 
Lauer is using Douglas Ehninger’s term for 18th century rhetorics to describe Bacon’s approach as ‘managerial.  This 
is however not a tendency unique Lauer and Miller’s examples, as this follows one tendency to restrict Bacon’s 
idea of rhetoric to managing decorum and developing eloquence aptly accommodated to an audience, while 
contrasted this role to the function of “the arts of science, technics and poetics” which concern novelty or 
invention (131).    Perez Zagorin’s work on Bacon is exemplary in how it both amplifies and reduces invention 
within several paragraphs arguing that “he gave the concept of invention a much wider scope by explaining that it 
referred to two quite different meanings... either the invention of arts and sciences or that of speech and 
arguments,” but that the “sum total of Bacon’s general reflections on the nature and purpose of rhetoric... was 
quite restricted... as it were, a technical, not a philosophical discipline, whose job was to affect the imagination... 
as an aid to reason in keeping the passions in order” (181).   Lisa Jardine, in Francis Bacon: Discovery and the Art of 
Discourse, very helpfully discusses Bacon’s contributions to 16th century dialectic teaching, but also greatly reduces 
rhetoric’s role to ornamentation or eloquence. Miller in fact contrasts Bacon to McKeon’s richer view of invention 
“as the part of rhetoric that could be used to provide some system and guidance to the present-day fascination 
with creativity and innovation” – even though, when McKeon touches on Bacon, he sees Bacon’s body of work as 
largely a response to problem of invention as “poorly developed,” and along with Leibniz and Vico, as restoring and 
extended the five canons, making “them ways of advancing science, reforming philosophy, conceiving and studying 
culture, and framing universal history” (Selected Writings, vol 2. p 46-47).   Such divergent views on Bacon’s sense 
invention have, as Richard Young pointed out, persisted in studies of Bacon, running through many of the more 
serviceable studies of Francis Bacon’s contributions to rhetoric. For Young’s comments see pg 352 of Encyclopedia 
of Rhetoric and Composition: Communication from Ancient Times, edited by Theresa Enos.  It was Vickers who 
claimed in the mid 1990s that studies of Bacon’s rhetoric still pale in comparison to the important place occupied 
by rhetoric in Bacon's career and his thought.   Works that have looked more carefully at inventive aspects of 
Bacon’s rhetoric like Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science (1978) by Paolo Rossi, or Karl R. Wallace’s landmark 
Francis Bacon on Communication and Rhetoric (1943), or much in the recent collection Claus Zittel’s collection 
Philosophies of Technology: Francis Bacon and His Contemporaries (2008), have demonstrated that Bacon’s 
revaluation of two Brannches of invention was a “central element for natural scientific research” and his view of 
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rhetoric was a  designed to appeal not just to the audience, or to the intellect of the Renaissance man, but to 
persuade the “whole man,” to affect the spirit of science and an age of production (Rossi, 157, Wallace, 132) 
136 when he said: "Constant practice devoted to one subject often prevails over both intelligence and skill" 
137  He goes on to address specific degradations of an art of invention by the Greeks and by Virgil, citing: “labor 
omnia vincit improbus, et duris urgens in rebus egestas”  or, persevering labor overcomes all difficulties, and want 
that urges us on in the pressure of things (Virgil).  It should be noted that Bacon also made racial comments 
regarding the Turks and Italians in his essays 
138  The essays offer some of the most accomplished and well-rounded examples of his style and his intent to 
address major themes like man in relation to the physical world, man in relation to himself and his morals, and 
man in relation to truth and knowledge.  In an age of convoluted and fanciful verbiage, Bacon revised the essays 
for almost thirty years to shift from a jejun style to a style that mixed imaginative and allusive expression with 
painfully accurate and systematic exposition.  He combines and contrasts aphoristic and plain style, Senecan and 
Ciceronian style in ways that generated wider appeal to a public audience and an immediate appeal for scholars 
who took up the essays as both poetic and philosophical contributions that transformed traditional ideas and 
genres.   Much of this poetic language seemed to both reclaim and transform the ideas of the ancient Greeks, 
Romans, Machiavelli and other great thinkers.  His early essays often borrowed heavily, such as his essay on death, 
which is largely repeating Lucretius and Erasmus, or his essay “Of Youth and Age” which is heavily borrowed from 
section 12 of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, bk. II.   
139 For instance, he touches on core rhetorical questions in “On Studies” where he discusses rhetoric as what 
makes people “able to contend,” and in “Of Youth and Age” (which he heavily borrowed from section 12, book 2 of 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric) to demonstrate that Hermogones’ rhetorical teachings and textbooks was an example of 
youthful wisdom gained and lost (likely to Meningitis). 
140 Jonathan Bennett’s translation and interpretation 
141 “Francis Bacon and the Art–Nature Distinction.” AMBIX, Vol. 54, No. 2, July 2007, 101–129 
142 Bacon, Descriptio globi intellectualis, The Oxford Francis Bacon, vol. 6, 103. See also De augmentis 
scientiarum, in The Works of Francis Bacon, ed. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis and Douglas 
Denon Heath, 7 vols. (London, 1859–64), vol. 4, 294, cf. vol. 1, 496. 
143 Here Weeks cites: Bacon, Cogitationes de natura rerum, The Works of Francis Bacon, vol. 5, 423, cf. vol. 3, 18. 
144 First quote:  Bacon, De principiis atque originibus, The Oxford Francis Bacon, vol. 6, 267 (italics in original). 
Second quote: Bacon, The New Atlantis, The Works of Francis Bacon, vol. 3, 156; Bacon, Novum organum, The  
Oxford Francis Bacon, vol. 11, 175. 
145 (Klein, Jürgen, "Francis Bacon,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/francis-bacon/>) 
146  The use of rhetoric for Bacon here, seems to be that he hopes it can not only moderate such “zeal,” but build 
on their “respectable reasons” and to bring rules, testing, and experimenting to the path that staked “everything 
on hard thinking and continuous mental effort,” but “to establish degrees of certainty, to retain the evidence of 
the senses subject to certain constraints, […] to reject ways of thinking that tracks along after sensation,” and to 
correct dialectical failures (by which he typically means more narrowly formalized logic) in order to address the 
“processes of everyday life [that] had filled the mind with hearsay and debased doctrines and infested it with 
utterly empty idols” (1).  The ellipsis from the quotation removed the following: “whether they have spoken in 
simple conﬁdence or in a spirit of professional posturing, have done great harm to philosophy and the sciences. As 
well as succeeding in •producing beliefs in people, they have been effective in •squashing and stopping inquiry; 
and the harm they have done by spoiling and putting an end to other men’s efforts outweighs any good their own 
efforts have brought. Some people on the other hand...” 
147 “Rhetoric and Action in Francis Bacon,”… 
148 Sean Patrick O'Rourke, et al., "The Most Significant Passage on Rhetoric in the Works of Francis Bacon," RSQ: 
Rhetoric Society Quarterly 26, no. 3 (1996): 31-55. 
149  (before dissociating it somewhat from invention) 
150 Cogan himself seems to reinforce this as something Bacon emphasized when he argues that any deep and 
systematic pursuit of rhetoric is likely to bear out that underlying this ‘art’ we will always find a ‘new-science’ 
grounding it and guaranteeing both its “rigor and power” and its prerequisite as an object of study and teaching 
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that aims to direct the technological/scientific realms to the improvement of human life in thought and action 
(230).   
151 De Augmentis VI.3, Works 4:456-57.    
152 (to borrow Karl Wallace’s term) 
153 Aristotle wittily, but hurtfully, doth deride the sophists near his time, saying, “They did as if one that professed 
the art of shoemaking should not teach how to make up a shoe, but only exhibit in a readiness a number of shoes 
of all fashions and sizes.”  But yet a man might reply, that if a shoemaker should have no shoes in his shop, but 
only work as he is bespoken, he should be weakly customed.   
154 ... note two sources in ‘commonplace file’.... and here Bacon endorses a kind of “preparatory store” was 
endorsed by “our Saviour, speaking of divine knowledge, saith, ‘That the kingdom of heaven is like a good 
householder, that bringeth forth both new and old store’” (XIII, 7).    
155 As Weeks discussed recently in “Mechanics in Bacon’s Great Instauration” (2008), Bacon was interested the 
tension between methods of interpretation and experientia literata as a broad set of ‘literate experiences,’ not just 
a broad (and sometimes crude) set of scientific ‘experiments’ (142). While it has been tempting for some 
modernize this idea of experientia literata as what directly supports Bacon’s ideas about the ‘intentional 
experiment,’ it is here in the Advancement that Bacon clearly initiates his most ambitions process of inquiry into a 
broad set of rhetorical mediations of nature, and proceeds through a process of arrangement and invention that is 
indeed comparable to his better-known process of “extending or transferring or putting together former 
inventions… found by intentional experiment” such as the long list of experimenta fructifera and experimenta 
lucifera (experiments of use and of light), a method which led to Bacon’s (unfinished) natural history Sylva 
Sylvarum, the natural history published in 1627 a year after his death. 
156 XVIII. 3 
157 [ Here he is almost surely referencing Virgil’s The Georgics, and “Next I will discourse of Heaven’s gift, the honey 
from the skies.”   The fourth book of the Georgics, his great farming poem, is devoted to bees, and honey that was 
the product of the bee’s union with the sun. 
158 David Parry also cites an interesting case: “In 2010, Prince Charles, the Prince of Wales, published a book 
entitled Harmony: A New Way of  Looking at our World , co-written with Tony Juniper and Ian Skelly.  As well as 
offering concrete policy solutions to ecological problems in fields such as architecture, agriculture and medicine, the 
book argues that, for human beings to be related to the world around us in a healthy way, we need to relinquish 
the“mechanistic”  understanding of the natural world characteristic of Western modernity and return to an older 
“organic” model of the world in which humans see themselves as participants in the deep spiritual 
interconnectedness of all things. Charles and his collaborators highlight the seventeenth century in particular as 
the start of what they dub “The Age of Disconnection ,” in which humans came to see themselves as detached 
from nature and to see nature as something to be exploited for human ends. Francis Bacon’ s1620 work the 
Novum Organum Scientiarum is highlighted as particularly culpable”  
159 Here Weeks cites: Bacon, Cogitationes de natura rerum, The Works of Francis Bacon, vol. 5, 423, cf. vol. 3, 18. 
160 Now in its second edition (first edition 1992).  
161 Bacon’s ideas did ideas as consolidate in the Royal Society, which formed several decades after death in 1626 by 
a group of scientists, philosophers and philanthropists began a pan-European scientific movement. 
162 particularly as the Scientific Revolution as “a coherent, cataclysmic and climatic event,that fundamentally and 
irrevocably changed what people know about the natural world and how they secured proper knowledge of that 
world” is no longer, as Steven Shapin most convincingly argued, typically construed simply as “a conceptual 
revolution, a fundamental reordering of our ways of thinking about the natural.  Schapin begins this argument 
claiming Alexandre Koyre gave it wider currency in 1939 
163 In Foresight: The Art and Science of Anticipating the Future (2008) 
164 This book was Forrester’s attempt to draw the broadest possible implications from his work in industrial 
dynamics and electrical dynamics.  Initial reception found the book to be a curiosity more than of any real value, 
though it did stir up immediate controversy and spur a number of related theories such as catastrophe theory and 
chaos theory.  Even though the Club of Rome’s popularization of the models is often taken as a failure of "big 
simulation," the simulations impacted practices in future modeling (as well as practices in business, finance, and 
the economy).  
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165 These critiques were less an attack on scientific and mathematical model-building in the social sciences than an 
early attempt to think through the relationships between the two -- while working to add clarity and complexity to 
the models’ relationships to different political economic theories, and underlying theories of growth, which the 
authors suggested had lead to uncritical methodologies and assumptions about resources that could effectively be 
construed as inputs in these models (Cole 1).   
166 The prevalent style of explanation is a rhetorical minefield.  Problems are seriously tied to (but not limited to) 
the different cultures of research in humanistic sciences and in the natural (or technological) sciences (where 
causal explanation is the rule). The division is lamentable from the viewpoint of today’s interest in the history of 
technology or ‘media archaeology’ or any researcher who normally has to deal with both inanimate objects and 
people using the objects. 
167   Most of these apply A.I. programming to problems in the environmental sciences in ways that weave the 
pattern seeking of humans and 'natural' data-driven methods from A.I. with the more traditional modeling 
techniques in order to shape “decision-making forums” or to help support the process of “Bridging Research and 
Policy” (WMO).   Notable examples include: 
Elicitator serves as an expert elicitation software tool created to process, retrieve and quantifying expert 
knowledge in a particular domain.   These are typically used when empirical data is expensive, limited or 
unreliable. This new software tool can assists in quantifying expert knowledge in a form suitable for use-- prior to 
imputing further data into traditional models.  The tool has been developed to be “user-friendly, extendible, and to 
facilitate consistent and repeatable elicitation of expert knowledge on a case-by-case basis.” 
Management Option Rank Equivalence (MORE) – “a relatively new but not an unusual type of sensitivity analysis 
for decision-making:  MORE responds to the rapid increases in model size and complexity, particularly in the case 
of integrated models used to assist decision-making, and to the problems of effective sensitivity analysis. In 
particular, the sensitivity that is of interest is often that of the decision being made about the model's varying 
inputs and parameters. To assist decision-making model outputs will result in a ranking of management options.”  
The EXploratory Climate Land Assessment and Impact Management (EXCLAIM) tool: The tool brings together 
hydrological and socio-economic models with easy to use user interfaces. “Developed with specialised GIS tools, 
via thin-client technology, to assist policy makers, donor organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) understand how the interactions between changing land use and climate affects water resources and 
people's livelihoods.”  
168 Lessl’s work is an inspired piece of rhetorical analysis with a historicist’s penchant to expose how a religious 
context for science gave way in the 19th century to the ‘twin lives’ of evolution as both a ‘careful science’ and as 
type of ‘rhetorical Darwinism’ that gave science a new “narrative form” while it “conflated history with science” 
and overcoded older narrative forms that “originally expressed religious meaning” and gave science its place in a 
patronage of ideas (168). 
169 At present popular works continue to analyze what Andrew Brown called The Darwin Wars with entrenched 
positions on about ‘selfish gene’ theories used to explain nearly all human motivations, and where newer debates 
venture into questions about ‘punctuated equilibrium’ or the ‘ends of evolution’ and whether gross evolutionary 
pressures are still of any effect on the human species now that medical and genetic science steer our survival 
through an urbanized, and technologically mediated environment (as evolutionary biologists Eldredge and Gould 
have argued, and naturalist David Attenborough often argues publicly).   
170 See Stauffer, R. C. (1957). "Haeckel, Darwin and Ecology.” Quarterly Review of Biology 32(2): 138–
144. doi:10.1086/401754.  Works by ecological historians (including both historians and ecologists writing 
histories) such as McIntosh, Egerton, Worster, Nicholson, Nash and others have positioned Darwin as a central 
figure in relation to a number of other pioneering figures of the science of ecology (like Humbolt, Wallace, 
Warming, Huxley and Haeckel), considering for instance how they composed their work in correspondence with 
Darwin as he shaped his ideas of natural selection and the transmutation of species, or (in the case of Haeckel and 
Warming) how they argued against Darwin’s elevation of the principle of natural selection, either by maintaining 
some notion of a divine plan or siding with some version of Lamarck’s inherited traits.  For these distinctions see 
for example Acot, P. (1997). "The Lamarckian Cradle of Scientific Ecology.” Acta Biotheoretica 45(3/4): 185–
193. Forbes, S. A. (1887). "The Lake as Microcosm.” Bulletin of the Scientific Association: 77–87.  Paterson, H. 
(2005). "The Competitive Darwin.” Paleobiology 31 (2): 56–76.  Worster, D. (1994). Nature's Economy: A History of 
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Ecological Ideas.  Cambridge University Press.  Kormandy, E. J. (1978). "Ecology/Economy of Nature—
Synonyms?.” Ecology 59(6): 1292–1294.  
171 These debates are well mapped in works by Nicholson, Egerton, McIntosh, and Worster in particular. 
172 See in particular: “Nature's Fancy: Charles Darwin and the Breeding of Pigeons” by James A. Secord 
173  Artificial selection is sometimes, though unconventionally, a special case or a somewhat problematic pattern of 
evolution, like the other principle sub-categories of natural selection, sexual selection (and, much later, ecological 
selection) as mechanisms or as sub-sets of natural selection fitting within the struggle for existence but operating 
very differently, as sexual selection for instance often works against the principle of survival, such as the peacock’s 
tail which functions to arouse and sustain interests but makes it vulnerable to prey.  The following presents a 
typical hierarchical breakdown classifying natural and artificial selection, where natural selection is further 
subclassified into ecological and sexual selection (taken from wiki commons): 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Selection_classification_diagram.png 
 
174 See A New Approach to Conservation by Gill Aitken for a fuller discussion. 
175 In The Rights of Nature: A History of Environmental Ethics (1989) Nash cites on Darwin’s notebooks and his 
reflections mainly, where Darwin comments on his family as nested within the human family, a mammal family, 
and the living world – noting how these ideas lead Darwin to his more frank discussions on how radically different 
his views had strayed from the Christian view of man as divinely created.  Nash highlights one of Darwin’s 
frequently cited from the following citation: “Man in his arrogance thinks himself a great work worthy of the 
interposition of a deity, more humble and I believe truer to consider him created from animals” Pamphlet: de Beer, 
Gavin ed. 1960. Darwin's notebooks on transmutation of species. Part II. Second notebook [C] (February to July 
1838). Bulletin of the British Museum (Natural History). Historical Series 2 (3) (May): 75-118.  
176 In one of his more succinct essays, “The Dialectical Links Between Environmental Ethics and Sciences,” Rozzi 
singles out Darwin for three reasons: because his “examination of the social influences and circumstances that led 
Darwin to formulate his theory of natural selection form one of the most studied and debated areas in the history 
of science;” because “Darwinian theory constitutes a foundational basis for major strains of both ecology and 
environmental ethics;” and because “it presents contrasting connotations in respect to Modern values and 
attitudes that have promoted an abuse of human society over the natural environment.” 
177 Rozzi examines one seminal text in ecology (Ernst Haeckel’s 1866 work Generelle Morphologie der Organismen, 
1866) and one seminal text in environmental ethics ("The Land Ethic" established in 1949 by Aldo Leopold in A 
Sand Country Almanac).   
178 Worster’s account is organized around four formative episodes of a history of science that lead to modern ideas 
about ecology: an 18th century marked by various naturalists negotiating science and reason (particularly Gilbert 
White and Carolus Linnaeus); an early 19th century “romantic Ecology” devoted to popularizing and romanticizing 
scientific work (such as Thoreau with the botanical work of Humbolt); the pivotal mid-19th century work of Darwin; 
and a maturation of ecology early in the 20th century that coincided with apparent limits in the frontiers of the new 
world, and the ecological devastation after World Wars (XII).   See M Nicholson’s work for a major critique, which is 
also summarized in Robert McIntosh’s The Background of Ecology.  
179 He charts briefly how Darwin’s concepts and ethos shapes a wide range of texts: from natural history essays 
embracing forms of vitalism (Bergson and John Burroughs) to philosophical essays exploring ways to overcome 
man’s estrangement from nature (from Marx to Romantic or transcendentalist thinkers like Thoreau), to what 
Worster calls a resurgence of literary “interest in the fearful and demonic forces around them” in ‘disenchantment 
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thinkers’ or ‘post-Romantic’ thinkers (like Tennyson or Melville), which continue to be in vogue today (i.e. Morton 
and Stone) (125-6).   
180 see Miller and Halloran’s “Reading Darwin, Reading Nature; or, On the Ethos of Historical Science” 
181 See Darwin and the Barnacle by Rebecca Stott, Faber and Faber: 2003 
182 To sum up Parrish’s recent project, Adaptive Rhetoric : Evolution, Culture, and the Art of Persuasion, he states: 
“Language, culture, art (including the art of persuasion) are behaviors that help us adapt to our needs as social 
animals, and must be considered when studying rhetorical practice. A biocultural view emphasizes both specific 
historical practices shaped by culture and the constraints our physical bodies place on us as rhetors. The second 
idea a biocultural approach entails is that animal rhetorics should be viewed as analogues or even evolutionary 
precursors to certain human persuasive activities, allowing us to gather information about the origins of these 
activities” (iii).  
183  Here Campbell is citing Darwin’s Origin pages 50-54.  It should be noted too that this response to Philip Kitcher 
is an effort by Campbell to sidestep certain debates about how a concept of natural selection springs from 
Darwin’s thoughts on artificial selection (which is often treated then as merely a trick for rhetorical discovery or 
invention).  This also comes after Campbell credits Kitcher for an excellent analysis of Darwin’s rhetorical logic that 
focuses on tactics such as: dead rhetoric (field-specific conventions or clichés to establish context), emergent 
rhetoric (his recognition of how his arguments changes both himself and his audience), pathos (brining affective 
commitments and desires into play), dialogues of one (deliberations with the self as a means to begin social 
change) and uncharted territory (or changing the certain scientific rules while anticipating and blocking certain 
audience-specific arguments) (See Campbell’s “The Comic Frame” 26).  
184 Campbell then tends to look backwards, calling the analogy a “concept/metaphor/oxymoron” in the Baconian 
tradition that applies vera causa logic while showing how imagination can be brought to the aid of reason in two 
key ways: as an attempt “to use imagination to save reason from inferential work too demanding and too 
incredible either for the public or his fellow naturalists” (33). The ‘abductive inference’ is a “weak form of inference 
that inclines our judgment so slightly toward its conclusion that we cannot say that we believe the latter to be 
true; we only surmise that it may be so" (34). Campbell believes that The Origin of Species can be summarized 
simply as a set of deductive inferences (i.e. the basic logic that organisms vary, variations are largely inherited, 
organisms produce more than can survive, and organisms that vary most strongly in directions favored by the 
environment will accumulate), but that it should be understood in terms of a contrasting kind of logic working 
through abductive inferences connected to the artificial/natural selection analogy, which he thinks is designed to 
“incline” a kind of ‘sufficient’ reasoning (or even ‘guessing’) about the connections between artificial and natural 
selection in ways that might address “what Burke would call ‘trained incapacity’” in both the “habits of thought 
common to breeders” and the “inability of professionals to see beyond their own specialty” (34, 30).   Similarly, 
Campbell singles out certain imagery associated industrialism as a basic persuasive strategy, such as Darwin’s 
request “to use the exprestion the manufactury of species” as an attempt to show that this “manufactured” 
process must be both “intelligible to the common sense of technological reason” for the species that is clearly 
“beyond the average” in their ability to influence evolution (Campbell 38, citing Origin pg 56).    
185 Like many studies in rhetoric in recent decades, Davies thinks Darwin’s skills as a rhetorician do not diminish his 
accomplishments as a scientist, but quite the opposite, that his rhetorical insights are deeply intertwined with his 
scientific inquiry, and not just because of the commonplace understanding that science like all human discourse is 
subject to rational and sometimes irrational forms of persuasion that are either persuasive or coercive.  Instead he 
emphasizes that Darwin’s long view of human history sees human nature as fundamentally persuasive because 
“like our primate cousins... we are well equipped to anticipate and navigate our environment in ways that never 
reach conscious awareness or ways that rise to consciousness only after the fact” (5).  Davies initially states his 
interest in a similar set of rhetorical strategies to Campbell’s early work, the strategies of adopting a tone and 
cadence from Romantic imagery that can create calm, optimism and a love for nature and life that can “outlive our 
dying belief in God” (4).  More generally, however, Davies is interested in several leading questions: “What 
happens if we discard the theology latent in the Romantic view but retain the rhetorical strategies?  Might we 
succeed in convincing those with theological instincts that the right view of life is decidedly nontheological? Might 
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we make the evolutionary view of life palatable?  Might we invite acceptance where Nietzsche’s madman provokes 
resistance?” (5). 
186 Here he is emphasizing that Darwin’s long view of human history sees human nature as fundamentally 
“persuasive” because “like our primate cousins... we are well equipped to anticipate and navigate our environment 
in ways that never reach conscious awareness or ways that rise to consciousness only after the fact” (5).  Like 
Campbell, Davies interprets certain Darwinian insights into human nature as fundamentally rhetorical and ‘tragic,’ 
concluding that Darwin reflects “the wisdom of the rhetorician” in how he addresses his audience as having “the 
architecture” of other species with “affective and low-level cognitive capacities” that are “far more elaborate and 
persuasive than the architecture of our consciously accessible cognitive capacities” (5).    
187 For example see Jaeger’s Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture187, which outlines a version of classical humanism 
rooted in the culture of antiquity, offers some representative conclusions about techne that stood for much of the 
first half of the 20th century: that technê diverges from theoria (as “pure knowledge”) by being related, in all 
accounts, with practice, teachability, and use value (130), and because of its problematic uncoupling from moral 
responsibility (59-72), virtue (1-12), and contemplation of truth (17-22, 192, Vol 2).   
188 There is very little said about Huxley’s arguments in relation to this concept and analogy, although much said 
about other aspect of his rhetorical legacy, notably in Thomas Henry Huxley: Communicating for Science 
by John Vernon Jensen (1991), which is thorough treatment of “the greatest public spokesman for science in his 
century” (15).  
189 It is often said that Huxley’s greatest rhetorical achievements is not only his defense of evolution, but the way 
he made evolution a part of his professional career, which offered a kind of “revised positivism” that became a 
rhetorical resource for remaking institutional and political ideologies in the image of science, usually by noting his 
“all-consuming drive to professionalize English science” and his apparent understanding of the “practical rhetorical 
conditions under which this new professional identity needed to take form” (Lessl 166).    
190 'The origin of Species,’ Westminster Review 17 (n.s.) 1860, pp. 541-70. 
191 Huxley differed from Darwin in maintaining that processes of artificial selection “had not yet produced a 
species” and that breeding or horticulture created morphological speciation not physiological changes creating a 
new species, and there are well documented differences in opinion between Darwin and Huxley in their disputes 
over what criteria are necessary for creating a physiological species (Blinderman, Lovejoy, Richards, Lynn).   
192 For a discussion of ‘cosmetic rhetoric’ see in particular his discussion in the notes to “Evolution and Ethics” 128-
131. 
193 His work with Mill led to his eventual presidency of the Land Nationalization Society in the 1880s. 
194 See Evolution and Ethics” 10-11 for this discussion of art.  
195 See Jensen’s discussion on pg 115 of Thomas Henry Huxley: Communicating for Science 
196 We might think of Huxley drawing on a this well known analogy to interrogate whether institutions carrying 
professional scientific ideals and educational pragmatism might forward a more rigorous scientific realm of 
artificial selection (which may be reminiscent of the application of this concept to consider how something 
functions as “technê1”), while thinking about how this might be a ‘centre of force’ for the social-political realm 
(which may remind readers of thinking about a less predictable corollary in “technê2” or questioning how this does 
or does not forward ‘truly’ virtuous actions) (Roochnik 2).  sDavid Roochnik’s landmark study Of Art and Wisdom: 
Plato’s Understanding of Technê (1996) critiques Jaeger’s depiction of technê in two ways: as a resting too heavily 
on one of two principle modalities for technê in the dialogues, and as purveying a ‘technê analogy’ in Socrates that 
suggests technê is more than a model of knowledge for Plato, but a model of ethics or virtue.  Roochnik, who is a 
philosopher and not a classicist, develops his argument through an exceptionally thorough reading of Plato’s 
treatments of technê in his early dialogues (the Apology, Laches, Charmides, Euthyphro, book 1 of Republic, 
Euthydemus, Ion, Hippias Minor, Protagoras, and Gorgias), where he charts technê’s multiple meanings in Greek 
thought, including: “a ‘craft,’ ‘skill,’ ‘expertise,’ ‘profession,’ or even, as it is sometimes translated, a ‘science’ […] a 
thorough, masterful knowledge of a specific field that typically issues a useful result, can be taught to others, and 
can be recognized, certified, and rewarded”(1).   Although Roochnik admits Plato never offers a systematic account 
of technê in the dialogues, through his own extensive listings of the kinds of technai Plato employs as illustrations 
(a list similar to Vlastos and Brumbaugh before him196), he makes the case that Plato’s technê is a concept with two 
fundamental modalities: mathematical (which he also calls calculative, abstracting and theoretical) and productive 
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(which he associates with Gorgias, rhetoric and stochastic knowledge).  This is a distinction he 
calls technê1 and technê2.  Technê1 rests on calculating or theorizing a "fixed" or formulaic technê, which is 
thought of as analogous to a logic guiding most forms of fabrication, and containing a determinate reliable end 
which can guarantee some form of expertise and teachability (Roochnik 44-50).  Technê2 suggests a more flexible 
method or set of skills that one can use and improve upon without having to rely on in an entirely mechanical  
way, but which produces changes that can only be determined as probable or contestable, a technê that  Roochnik 
assigns to Protagoras' and Isocrates'  rhetorical  education.   
197 noting especially Darwin’s fascination with the ‘deceptive’ aspects animal behavior (such as the ability of one 
species to mimic another, or of ants to domesticate aphids), and bad conclusions such as a simple “struggle for 
existence” or as humans needing to survive by “increasing efficiency as regards [to] outside competition.” 
198 See especially Paul White’s Instituting Biology (57-63) 
199 See Sutton and Pindar’s quoting of Bateson in the introduction to The Three Ecologies, pg 11. 
200 Ecospeak: Rhetoric and Environmental Politics in America (1992) customized Habermas’ ideas of reconstructive 
science and critical rationality, concepts which remain persuasively tied the more recent ‘deliberative turn’.  
201  The International Institute for Environment and Development (an international policy research institute and 
NGO) defines mainstreaming as “the informed inclusion of relevant environmental concerns into the decisions and 
institutions that drive national, sectoral, and local development policy, rules, plans, investment and action” (IIED 
2009). The UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) offers a similar description and lengthy set of 
strategies guided by a number of theories for mainstream sustainable development.   
202 There is much more to be said about  recent work in the field, especially about work in technical 
communication, ecocomposition and service learning that has linked up with civic initiatives intent on developing a 
meaningful grasp of what sustainability means for cities, universities, general education, rhetoric and writing 
classes, and developing either new or appropriate practices that might support this.  Something that was deleted 
from this dissertation was a discussion of a number of such scholars who have been reclaiming and stitching 
together new ideas about technê in order to advance current theories of service learning and work as a form of 
rhetorical invention, or intervention-- scholars including Annie Merill Ingramm, David Barton, Eleanor Long, Dennis 
Carlson, James Dubinsky, and Jeff Grabill.  We might further consider how such work is appropriating the 
conventional ideas about technê in this dissertation and re-aligning the discourses and language of sustainability 
and ecology.   
203 In “Philosophical Foundations of Responsibility” from the collection Responsibility: the Many Faces of a Social 
Phenomenon, he notes that much of the classical discussion of responsibility is essentially of a form of 
retrospective “ex post responsibility”, “a kind of responsibility that one incurs by being held ‘answerable’ for some 
act of one’s own, done by commission or by omission in the past, either as someone acting in a socially defined 
role or simply as an accountable person” (9). 
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